Security in Latin America

New Southern Pulse website online

2010-03-15T16:08:00.000-07:00

The new Southern Pulse Networked Intelligence website is now online. We have archived all our material there. Please visit www.southernpulse.com for more information.

For a time, I will focus my energy on preparing field notes and intel briefs for the new Southern Pulse site. Please check the new site for information that would normally appear here in blog form.

Regards,
Samuel Logan

Brazil: Still Against Honduras

2010-02-16T09:48:00.000-08:00

Brazil's Minister of Foreign Affairs, Celso Amorim, spoke out against Honduras on 16 February, claiming that elections should not be used to "wash" coup d'etats.

His remarks underline Brazil's continued chagrin over the forced removal of Zelaya, and I'm interested to see how Brazil's stand against Honduran President Lobo will play out across the region. As the US moves to support the Central American country, Brazil may find itself standing alone in the region. So far, however, many countries have yet to show support.

War and Trade

2010-02-10T07:41:00.000-08:00

The Venezuelan government has replaced Colombia with the United States as a main supplier of meat, fabric, clothes, cooking oil, and pharmaceuticals among other items.

Since July 2009, when President Chavez ordered a freeze in Venezuelan-Colombian relations, diplomatic ties have been severed with commercial ties under considerable restraint.

Chavez has looked to China, Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay, Bolivia, Ecuador, and now the United States to provide goods that Colombia previously sold to the Venezuelan market.

Obviously, this is a clear case of Chavez placing political considerations over economic good sense. Transaction costs alone dictate that the farther an item has to travel before arrival in market, the higher the cost, apart from the time it takes to establish new relationships, determine which products to buy, and so on.

Replacing Colombia with Ecuador or Venezuela probably doesn't make much of a difference, and given the extremely low cost of Chinese goods, there's probably an acceptable pay off there, economically and politically.

But when Chavez turns to the "evil empire" for a long list of goods, he's increasing transaction costs and further deepening the double standard under which his government operates with the United States.

Chavez is happy to sell the US oil and buy US goods, but he's just as quick to claim that the US is about to invade.

At the core of the decision to purchase goods from everyone but Colombia, however, is that Chavez is distancing Venezuela from his western neighbor, and the de facto nature of the two country's close commercial ties has been the strongest argument for why Caracas will not go to war with Bogota.

Yet the war drums continue to beat. Rumors of war circulate, and on both sides information continues to circulate about military activity on the border, including illegal fly overs and tense troop encounters.

As I wrote before, Venezuela would not do well to enter a protracted war with Colombia, but a quick and dirty firefight that ends before even the media picks up on it would serve Chavez's rhetorical purposes well - all just in time for the September legislative elections…

Worth a thousand words...

2010-02-03T08:28:00.001-08:00

Chavez, CTD?

2010-02-01T11:44:00.001-08:00

When I worked as an emergency medical technician many years ago, we used a short-hand lingo to describe the status of victims. We used "CTD" to describe someone who didn't have long to live. Their lives, like the water in a bathtub soon to disappear down the pipes, was "circling the drain."

With all the recent protests and such in Venezuela, I've fielded a few questions here and there concerning Chavez's chances for political survival. I have to say, they still look pretty good. Students continue to protest, and they have solid grievances, from the closure of television stations to energy and water shortages, and violence. In Caracas alone, some 34 people died from 29 to 31 January.

And on 1 February, a group of former Chavez supporters published their call for him to resign. This group, known as the Polo Consitutional "urged" the ruler to resign.

Yet on the same day, Chavez opened government coffers once again to solve his problems. He has announced a US$1 billion fund for investments in Venezuela's energy infrastructure, announcing a raft of projects designed to fill the gap between the country's energy demand and stagnant supplies, focused mostly on the Guri damn hydroelectric plant.

Ahead of the September legislative elections, we've seen Chavez stumble but he has a long way to go before he falls. The recent currency devaluation doubled the amount of money he has available to spend inside Venezuela. And as the price for oil remains relatively high, Chavez continues to collect foreign exchange. We're watching a long list of items, however, to see where and when support for the embattled president will begin to deteriorate. At the top of the list is food and water. Inflation, security, and jobs round out the top four.

Chavez has his work cut out for him, but there's plenty of time before the elections. As one local journalist said, Chavez will shoot for 70% control of the National Assembly, but even if he wins 60% he'll still be happy and solidly in control of the country's legislative agenda and output.

Irony in Bolivia

2010-01-15T13:25:00.000-08:00

How many times has President Evo Morales criticized the US for spying on his administration? Most people who follow Bolivia know that Morales has often used public statements concerning the CIA and intelligence operations against his government to rouse local support. He even kicked out the Drug Enforcement Administration (although I suspect some agents remained in place), but his rhetoric is rarely, if ever, destined for an international audience.

So I can't help to find the following news a little ironic. The Bolivian government announced on Jan. 14 that it would create a state intelligence directorate modeled after the CIA. Bolivia's intelligence organization will fall under the control of the executive branch and focus on strategic questions. There will be some representation from Bolivia's armed forces and police.

And I suspect that the focus will be on organized crime and drug trafficking.

Game Change in Mexico

2009-12-17T06:58:00.000-08:00

This morning the Washington Post reports that after a two-hour shootout with the Mexican Navy, Arturo Beltran Leyva, known as the Boss of Bosses, died in a Cuernavaca apartment in the state of Morelos, just south of Mexico City.

This is a major victory for the Calderon administration in a month that has seen an uptick in violence across the country, as members of Los Zetas, working with Beltra Leyva, have gone on the offensive against the Sinaloa Federation in and around the Federation's traditional stronghold in the city of Culiacan, Sinaloa.

To date, Arturo Beltran Leyva is the highest ranking Mexican criminal to be killed by government forces during the Calderon administration.

Arturo's death will certainly destabilize the BLO, which will likely lead to more violence in Morelos, Guerrero, along the border and other pockets of Mexico where the BLO has held fast to its turf despite a year in which his organization saw a series of major arrests.

Zetas headed to the white market

2009-12-09T07:16:00.000-08:00

On a few occasions I have been invited to talk about the evolution of the Zetas, from elite bodyguards for Osiel Cardenas to a powerful criminal organization in their own right.

Two men now control the Zetas, Miguel Triveño, and Heriberto Lazcano.

Lazcano is the undisputed head of the Zetas and known to keep a cool head and think strategically. Triveño is more like a traditional Mexican drug lord with his ostrich skin boots, big cowboy hat, gilded pistol, and country-time apparel. Both men will kill on a moment's notice, but between the two, I believe that Lazcano has a mind for business and a long-term strategy for his visions of what the Zetas are today and what they are evolving into for tomorrow.

He doesn't want to go out like his former boss Osiel, who was extradited to the United States, never to be heard from again. And he certainly doesn't need to go down like one of his captains, El Hummer, who was found unguarded in a house in Reynosa.

My argument has focused on the idea that the Zetas are moving out of the black market, into gray and while market activities. From traditional drug and human trafficking and kidnapping and extortion, the Zetas have moved into the gray market of protection. I believe that Lazcano's men will offer protection to anyone who is willing to pay for it - from criminals who work for the Beltran-Leyva or Carrillo Fuentes organizations, to well positioned businessmen. In both cases, the client needs protection from other criminals, the police, and everyone in between.

And the Zetas have long demonstrated that this protection is something that they do best.

On 6 December 2009, a Dallas Morning News article further backed up my argument for the Zetas movement into the white, or legal, side of business in Mexico and abroad. The Gulf Cartel, and the Zetas by extension, have always invested in small businesses, which help launder money. But this article takes this consideration a slight step farther, and I think their sources are right.

Here's an excerpt:

"Aside from money laundering, the Zetas are seeking legitimacy from those they have terrorized over the years…Investigators and civic leaders say the Zetas are trying to position themselves to become movers and shakers, even political players, in communities where they have a major presence."

At the head of this strategy is "La Compania" - a term the Zetas started using for themselves in mid-2009 (maybe sooner) to differentiate less violent activities from the criminal branding already well established by the Zetas brand.

Looking ahead, I would not be surprised to see clean cut, respectable looking businessmen working for the Zetas as the group moves from looking and acting like Triveño and more like Lazcano.

And if law enforcement is worried now, they've got a lot to consider looking toward a future where a group as sophisticated, organized, and ruthless as Los Zetas goes from hiring bullet slinging thugs to clean-cut business mans. The evolution will be slowly and difficult to detect, but I think it's already underway with a long road to go yet.

Perspective

2009-12-08T20:55:00.001-08:00

Colombian National Police released statistics earlier this week revealing that investigators registered 14,715 homicides between 1 January and 6 December 2009.

There were over 14,000 homicides registered in Venezuela in 2008.

By the end of November, authorities had registered 7,396 homicides in Mexico, passing 16,000 since December 1, 2006.

Chavez: Going out with a bang

2009-12-02T09:44:00.000-08:00

During a lecture I gave yesterday on Mexican DTOs and criminal insurgencies, one of the students brought up President Chavez and the civilian militias in Venezuela.

He wondered out loud about how civilians with little training and a handgun could - over time - contribute to insecurity in the South American country. And that got me thinking...

A friend who travels to Caracas regularly has told me that even in the light of day you can't walk through the middle of town in a suit without feeling like you might be mugged at any moment. I felt the same way the last time I was there.

And as SouthernPulse has reported, there were over 14,000 murders in Venezuela during 2008 - compared to a little under 14,500 murders in Mexico between December 2006 and December 2008.

After a quick look, I found an interesting piece on Venezuela's civilian militias, recently published by Colombia's Semana Magazine.

The "Milicia Bolivariana" is a fifth fighting force made up of civilians. A presidential decree formally inaugurated this militia in October of this year, and plans to have at the least a million individuals prepared to repel any invasion of Venezuela.

Chavez tried to slip the creation of this militia in the 2007 referendum, but it was not approved. Only when the National Assembly approved the "lye organica" for Venezuela's military was his militias finally added as part of Venezuela's fighting forces.

The militias will have two components. One referred to as territorial, and the other combat. The territorial component will be made up of what amounts to domestic spies, something similar to the revolutionary defense committees in Cuba, which have had everyone in Cuba speaking in a whisper for decades.

The combat component seems to be little more than a formal expansion of the so-called "circles bolivarianos", which are made up of uber-Chavez supporters (see photo), armed to defend his policies across the country capital city, especially in the slums of Caracas, and some would argue in countries across South America such as Bolivia, Ecuador, Colombia, Argentina, and Peru.

These men essentially formed street gangs that have over time become quietly marginalized by the Chavez government, some argue, because Chavez realizes that they were a mistake, one that today cannot be controlled. And here I must recall the high murder rate in Caracas, as I would suspect that homicides have a lot to do with what left of the circles bolivarianos."

Venezuelan security analysts agree that there are between nine and 15 million illegal weapons in circulation in Venezuela today. That is, there is little control over stockpiles or any efforts to remove these arms from circulation.

Add to that reality one where normal civilians are armed, waiting to be called to war by their president, and we have an extremely volatile situation, especially around election time.

As we watch Chavez's popularity slip, I'm becoming more convinced that when he goes, not if, he'll go out with a bang, or perhaps a few million "bangs."

FARC with money problems

2009-12-02T07:05:00.001-08:00

Some interesting news out of Colombia earlier this week reported that the FARC is in financial trouble.

Former Defense Minister Juan Manuel Santos announced at the end of November 2009 that "there are certain disagreements between [FARC leaders] Mono Joyjoy and Alfonso Cano."

For many years, the FARC has suffered the effects of a two-way split between the younger members, led by Joyjoy, who want to go after the money through drug trafficking, and the older members, led by Cano, who are more ideological and presumably still set on overthrowing the Colombian government.

Since both factions are in need of money, a disagreement over the direction of the FARC has surfaced with a significant amount of tension, according to some reports.

It will be interesting to see how Cano and Joyjoy resolve their differences. If the FARC does split, I would imagine that the more militarized Joyjoy faction would continue on, while the ideological side of the FARC would either wither on the vine or somehow try to transform into a peaceful political party… Maybe events in 2010 will tell...

Human Rights and Corruption vs. Exposure in the Mx. Army

2009-11-24T07:35:00.000-08:00

I submitted a comment on Shannon O'Neil's blog Latintelligence, and it turned out to be long enough to share here.

Her post is here.

My comment, written as the Founding Editor of SouthernPulse, is as follows:

Apart from concerns over corruption and human rights, which are both important considerations, we must also keep in mind that the Mx. military is not a sustainable option for Mexico's and indeed the sub-region' long-term security for many reasons, including the solder's exposure to the temptations of organized crime.

When you consider that there is one general for every 333 soldiers in the Mexican Army, compared to one general for every 1,720 soldiers in the US Army, we have a top-heavy scenario. These numbers coupled with the fact that generals earn US$13,000.00 a month, compared to recruits, who earn US$453 a month, spells out what we would consider a significant problem with pay for recruits.

Another consideration: the contract for a recruit is three years. But when a soldier is deployed, the Mexican Army can extend the recruit's term of service by a total of six more years. This, in part, is why we've seen a consistent number of soldiers A.W.O.L. Keep in mind that when they leave, they know that no one will hunt them down for desertion. The only real penalty, apart from foregone pay, is that their command post retains federal identification documents. These are easily forged.

Our consistent worry, apart from human rights abuses and corruption, is that the military's presence in the streets exposes soldiers to a criminal element that can pay them better, offer them better equipment, and in at least the case of the Zetas, can offer them benefits for their families and an esprit de corps that in many places has begun to falter across the Mexican Army deployments.

We don't mean to suggest that all who choose to go A.W.O.L. go rogue and join the ranks of organized crime. This is not the case. But there is an opportunity and a strong incentive. The longer the military remains in the streets, the longer soldiers will have to think about crossing to the "dark side."

Along with a discussion over human rights and corruption, we should consider this exposure, as exposure is what likely most contributes to abuses and corruption.

Brazil takes a step closer to Iran

2009-11-24T06:27:00.000-08:00

Iranian president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and Brazilian president Luis Inacio "Lula" ad Silva signed a raft of 13 agreements on 24 November 2009 that encompassed just about everything except military and energy.

The most notable agreement signed detailed the loosening of visa restrictions. As those of you who have traveled from Brazil to the US know, Brazil maintains a reciprocal visa policy, which simply reciprocates for foreign nationals the procedure required for Brazilians to enter any given country.

So if Iran agrees to allow Brazilians to visit Iran and receive a three-month tourist visa upon entry, then the same would be true for Iranians visiting Brazil. I haven't seen the wording of that particular agreement, but I suspect it might be something similar to a three-month tourist visa stamp upon arrival.

Ahmadinejad also won an important position statement from Lula, who has now announced that Brazil supports Iran's right to peaceful nuclear energy. This is classic Lula, who likes to talk one way and act another. Given Brazil's desire to reform the UN Security Council, such positions are not tenable in an environment where Iran is considered a "non-aligned" country.

It's also worth mention that Brazil has had its own disagreements with the IAEA, so Lula's position in support of Iran is also one that supports Brazil's long history with the IAEA, one that promotes sovereignty and peaceful nuclear development. But then again, Brazil is not Iran, nor is it a "non-aligned" country.

When push comes to shove, I don't think Brazil will choose supporting Iran over its UN goals.

And on that note, Petrobras announced on 16 November that it's conducting an evaluation of its operations in Iran to determine if the energy company should pull completely out of Iran. The excuse? Discoveries have not been commercially viable...

La Familia in Chicago

2009-11-23T08:11:00.000-08:00

The New York Times reported today that prosecutors indicted 15 members of La Familia DTO out of Michoacan, Mexico.

Here's an excerpt:

"The investigation, officials said, uncovered a “command and control” group distributing thousands of pounds of cocaine for La Familia Michoacana, a major cartel in Mexico known for its messianic leaders and propensity to behead enemies. Last month, Attorney General Eric H. Holder Jr. announced federal charges against 300 people linked to the organization in 19 states."

La Familia is one of the smallest and least established Mx. DTOs in the US. If the organization is in 19 states with some 300 people, and at least 15 operating a "command and control" post in Chicago, what does that mean for the Zetas or the Sinaloa Federation's activities in the US?

Breaking the Silence

2009-11-02T06:06:00.000-08:00

Posts have been thin and sporadic of late - such is the life of a freelance journalist. Wells have dried up, so like most of my brethren, I'm scrambling to keep pace with the changing nature of the media industry…

Here are some updates:

With John Sullivan, I published a piece on how Costa Rica and Panama have been caught in the middle between Mexico and Colombia, where organized criminal operatives from both countries have pushed into new territory.

Since that publication, we have seen a string of murders in Panama City, and just this past week, the head of the Sinaloa Federation in Costa Rica was arrested in Puntarenas (See Southern Pulse newsletter, Networked Intelligence tomorrow afternoon for details).

Honduras continues to provide some interesting developments. Since I published a piece on Honduras and how mainstream media should be focusing on what's going on behind the so-called coup de teat, we've seen a sharp up-tick in narco-flights landing in various points across the country.

Most of the flights, according to both Honduran and Colombian officials, originate in Venezuela, where the bulk of air traffic has shifted - it was once the purview of Colombian traffickers.

And Caracas has quietly become one of the most dangerous places on earth. With over 14,000 murders last year (country wide but many in Caracas), and police as corrupt as ever, Caracas has become a nightmarish place to visit. I'm told that you can't walk on the streets in a business suit after dark, and during the day, you should stick to the main streets. I felt this tension on my last visit to the city in November 2005.

Side streets, apparently, are teeming with young thieves. Dairy products and meat are hard to come by, and soon the entire city will begin rationing water, with rolling "water cut offs," scheduled by the government in 48 hour segments. Can you imagine being mugged for a bottle of water? Back in Mexico, we continue to watch an ever-changing situation. Many of the country's states remain in solid control of one of the many DTOs there, but the agreements between various groups form and break like ice melting and re-freezing from one day to the next.

From what I understand, the Beltran-Leyva Organization (BLO) has hired Los Zetas to strengthen its fight against the Sinaloa Federation. The Carrillo-Fuentes Organization (CFO) cooperates with BLO and the Zetas, and remains very active with its own group of sicarios.

Los Zetas, meanwhile, have targeted Sinaloa and Michoacan.

The Arellano-Felix Organization continues to crumble, and now faces a very real threat from inside Tijuana. The tit-for-tat murder and dismemberment of cops and others in the state of Michoacan indicates that the Zetas are pressuring members of La Familia, who have initiated La Familia Guerrense for the state of Guerrero. The Zetas are also pushing into Sinaloa, and the recent kidnapping if nearly two dozen ranch workers outside of Culiacan indicates that the powers that be in that area are worried about Zeta infiltration. After all, these guys - and their trainees - are well versed in training locals to act on their behalf…

I'll also add that I recently published a piece on diamond smuggling in South America, with a focus on Guyana, Venezuela, and Brazil. The Panamanians will soon open the region's only diamond trading hub, and some are worried that it will become a funnel for illegal diamonds leaving the region.

In September, narco-executions surpass 2008 numbers

2009-10-06T05:41:00.000-07:00

Iran and Venezuela: The 2009 Dosado

2009-09-28T07:24:00.000-07:00

This Southern Pulse Intel Brief, dated 24 September 2009, is republished here with permission from the Southern Pulse editors.

In a recent interview with conservative French newspaper Le Fiargo, Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez thanked Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad for the technology transfer required to develop a nuclear energy program in Venezuela. The agreement, Chavez claims, was signed in early September, and serves as a capstone for the tightening of relations between the two countries over the course of 2009.

While visiting Ahmadinejad on his eighth trip to Iran during the week of 5 September, Chavez reportedly followed up on 186 separate agreements formed between the two countries since 2005. A 10-year strategic alliance was proposed, as well as joint plans for the construction of a oil refinery in Syria with an expected capacity of processing 150,000 barrels of oil a day.

Venezuela has also agreed to sell Iran 20,000 barrels of gasoline a day beginning in October 2009, but Chavez declined to disclose the duration of the US$800 million agreement. To further support Iran’s energy needs, PDVSA has also agreed to establish operations at Iran’s South Pars 12 gas field, with estimated reserves of some 12.6 billion cubic meters of natural gas

Iran has reciprocated with the announcement that its government will validate educational qualifications and academic titles awarded in 47 Venezuelan universities.

The September meeting comes only five months after Chavez’s last visit to Tehran in the first week of April, when he travelled with a selected group of Venezuelan businessmen. They were on hand to witness the inauguration of a joint Venezuelan-Iranian development bank, reportedly capitalized with US$200 million, with half to be provided by each government. Iranian Kourahs Parvizian will become the president of the bank, while Venezuelan Nelson Ortega will become the vice president.

While in Tehran, Chavez also called into a Venezuela Television show, Contragolpe, to describe plans for a joint Venezuelan-Iranian mining company to formalize five years of mining operations shared with Iran in Venezuela. Chavez noted that the new mining company would focus on six minerals and some precious stones, including diamonds.

Later in April, the Iranian Defense Minister Mostafa Mohammad Majjar landed in Caracas for a short trip to sign a series of “unspecified agreements.” Presumably, these agreements facilitated the 29 April signature of a memorandum of understanding between the Venezuelan and Iranian armed forces.

Within the remaining months of 2009, Venezuela and Iran are likely to expand on their peaceful nuclear initiative, one that France has already flagged as a violation of UN Security Council resolution 1737.

Traffic accidents as leading cause of death

2009-09-28T06:43:00.001-07:00

With all the talk and focus on organized crime and other matters of security in Latin America, I wanted to take pause to underscore one often over-looked fact: traffic accidents are the leading cause of death in many Latin American countries.

Most of these "accidents" are due to driving under the influence of alcohol.

In Mexico, for example, a consultant for the Pan American Health Organization, and the World Health Organization, says that Mexico ranks 7th in the world for deaths caused by vehicle accidents. The total surpasses 20,000 a year, averaging about 55 a day.

Compared to the swine flu, the consultant states that for every one death caused by the swine flu, some 20 deaths are caused by automobile accidents.

Murders related to organized crime in Mexico, while by no means benign, have yet to surpass 5,000 a year.

In a city such as Rio de Janeiro, traditionally considered one of the most violent in the region, automobile accident deaths have outpaced murder for well over a decade. Last year, for example, a car full of teenagers speeding home after a long night at some of the city's most expensive dance clubs, jumped a curve and hit a pedestrian before wrapping itself around a tree. Body parts were found strewn across the accident scene.

In Peru, where many people die due to bus accidents, investigations in 2007 found that many of the bus drivers were drinking behind the wheel. One particularly nasty accident in December, 2006 sparked the accident. A bus had slipped off the side of a high Andean road and plunged well over 1,200 feet to the valley floor below, killing 45 passengers. A five-year-old boy and the bus driver were the only two survivors.

Some 4,000 people die and another 40,000 are injured in traffic accidents every year in Peru.

Buenos Aires, surprisingly, was the only city where I found that death caused by traffic accidents did not surpass other causes of death. I say surprisingly because Argentine drivers in the capital drive offensively like just about every other driver in Latin America.

Apart from that small slice of life in Latin America, across the region, from Mexico south, you will find many examples of drunk-driving deaths. With all the focus on organized crime and violent death, it's important to consider the leading, rather than the most news-worthy, cause of death in Latin America.

Guatemala: An Important Source of Weapons

2009-09-15T04:19:00.000-07:00

This Southern Pulse Intel Brief, dated 5 September 2009, is republished here with permission from the Southern Pulse editors.

--

The Mexican navy announced at the end of August 2009 that it had installed six new naval stations in Chiapas near the Suchiate and Usumacinta rivers that form part of Mexico's southern border with Guatemala. These two rivers have traditionally been where many illegal crossings into Mexico occur, so this focus on the Mexican-Guatemala border is reassuring, but for Mexico. As for Guatemala, we've received a significant amount of information that points toward Guatemala's increasing role as a secondary source of weapons for Mexican criminals, especially Los Zetas.

On 21 August 2009, authorities seized a cache of weapons and vehicles near the Mexico-Guatemala border in Huehuetenango, allegedly owned by members of Los Zetas. There was enough equipment and firepower to mount a swift attack patrol.

Just a week before that event, a small aircraft landed near Escuintla, located near Guatemala's Pacific coast, with 636 kilos of cocaine. Police who discovered the plane also found five assault rifles, a grenade launcher, and six containers of fuel (during the last week of July, Guatemalan authorities discovered a cache of 750 kilos of cocaine, reportedly valued at US$9.2 million, in the same area near Escuintla).

Perhaps the most significant weapons seizure so far in 2009 happened in April in the small village of Amatitlan, just south of Guatemala City and not too far from Escuintla. After a firefight with alleged members of Los Zetas, five federal agents had been killed, but those who remained standing seized 350 kilos of cocaine, 11 grenade launchers, nearly 600 fragmentation grenades, 11 M-16 rifles, over 5,000 rounds of ammunition, and 11 M-60 machine guns.

Another 500 fragmentation grenades and five AK-47 rifles were found during a routine sweep of "hot-spots" in Guatemala's Peten department in March 2009.

Sources in Guatemala have noted that fragmentation grenades can be sold for as much as US$38 a unit, while AK-47 rifles sell for around US$315 a unit if used or US$1,255 new.

When we consider that some 1,100 fragmentation grenades, 11 M-60 machine guns, around a dozen grenade-launchers, and at least 20 assault rifles have been seized in Guatemala between March and August of this year, the conclusion is disturbing. The black market for guns, and especially grenades, in Guatemala is hot. The Zetas, however, have added stealing weapons as a procurement option.

Between July 2007 and January 2008, members of Los Zetas stole an estimated 500 weapons from the Mariscal Zavala military base - a random assortment of pistols, rifles, machine guns, grenade launchers, and grenades are missing.

Finally, on 20 August 2009, alleged members of the Zetas stole a shipment of weapons en route from Guatemala to Mexico. Grenade launchers, rocket launchers, grenades, assault rifles, and magazines were included in the heist.

DHS sets a goal for border interdictions in 2010

2009-09-08T14:38:00.000-07:00

I'm on the road, but wanted to share a quick note.

According to the Gov't Accountability Office (GAO), the Dept. of Homeland Security (DHS) has set a goal for fiscal year 2010 to apprehend around 30 percent of all criminals and contraband that flows into the US from Mexico.

Here's an excerpt:

"At the ports of entry, Customs and Border Patrol has both increased training for agents and enhanced technology. However, the DHS Annual Performance Report for fiscal years 2008-2010 sets a goal for detecting and apprehending about 30 percent of major illegal activity at ports of entry in 2009, indicating that 70 percent of criminals and contraband may pass through the ports and continue on interstates and major roads to the interior of the United States."

More detail here.

I'll be back to more regular posting next week.

Juarez could be the most violent city in the world

2009-09-02T08:46:00.000-07:00

Mexico's Citizen Council for Public Security and Justice has issued a report just ahead of today's presidential address in Mexico (Calderon's version of the State of the Union) that underlines insecurity in Ciudad de Juarez, Mexico.

Juarez, according to the report, is more dangerous than Caracas, Cape Town, Baghdad, and Medellin.

August killings reached 300, surpassing a record set in July, with 267.

In 2008, a homicide rate of 130 killings for every 100,000 inhabitants was recorded, and Juarez accounted for nearly half the killings in Mexico in 2008.

So far this year, a total of 1,481 murders have been recorded, compared to a total of 1,623 murders for all of 2008. There were only 320 murders in 2007...

From the Dallas Morning News:

A poll published Tuesday in Mexico City's Reforma newspaper seems to indicate continuing support for his policy.

The poll showed that 37 percent of Mexicans believe the government is winning the battle against organized crime and that 20 percent do not. Moreover, 82 percent said they approve of the use of the military against drug traffickers, although 49 percent said they believe the military is involved in human rights violations.

The nationwide poll of 1,500 people had a margin of error of plus or minus 2.5 percentage points.

Ye Gon is Exhonerated in US Federal Court

2009-08-31T05:10:00.000-07:00

Zhenli Ye Gon, the Chinese-Mexican who was arrested in Maryland in late 2007 on charges of "selling 500 grams or more" of methamphetamine in the United States, is one step closer to freedom.

On 28 August, a federal court judge dropped the drug trafficking charges, claiming there was not enough evidence to prosecute the case.

One affidavit filed with a US Disctrict Court claimed that Ye Gon had imported some 87 tons of restricted chemicals into Mexico "for the express purpose of manufacturing pseudoephedrine/ephedrine" - the precursor chemicals for methamphetamine.

In October, 2008, as federal prosecutors worked to gather evidence, they warned the judge that they "were having difficulties" gathering needed evidence from other governments (such as Mexico).

Ye Gon was the owner of a house discovered in March 2007 by the Drug Enforcement Administration and Mexican Federal Police where they found US$207 million dollars stacked like bricks in the house. At the time, the DEA noted that it was the organization's largest cash bust in history.

Further investigation revealed that Ye Gon had actually accumulated US$305 million in pseudoephedrine sales.

Ye Gon must now fight his extradition to Mexico, where he will face justice for money laundering and organized crime.

Texas Sheriff Sentenced to Five Years

2009-08-28T05:57:00.000-07:00

Former Starr County (map)Sheriff Reymundo Guerra was sentenced to 64 months in prison and four years of supervised release yesterday (27 August). He was found guilty of disrupting justice and facilitating Gulf Cartel smuggling operations into Texas.

A few months ago, when I was in Cochise Cty., Arizona, the local sheriff there told me that taking a bribe from mexican criminals amounted to a "sin of omission." That is, men and women who protect the border can choose not to do something that they can and should do.

On the border, they can choose not to stop a car that they know is full of contraband. Border sheriffs, likewise, may choose not to focus their investigative force on specific subjects, or a specific hot spot in the county, because their criminal employers have asked him to simply look the other way. In the criminal world, there is likely no other job that is easier than looking the other way...

Kudos for the FBI on taking this guy out. He is a disgrace to all men and women who wear a badge, and, unfortunately, stands as yet another example of how our law enforcement officials here in the US are not immune to the corruptive force of Mexican drug trafficking.

One of my favorite Texas bloggers concluded a similar post with the same thought I'd like to put forward:

"How many more officers are out there on the take is anybody's guess."

Lula's UNASUR Summit

2009-08-28T05:23:00.000-07:00

Southern Pulse Intel Brief | 27 August 2009

republished here with permission from Southern Pulse editors.

Brazilian President Luis Inacio “Lula” da Silva generated the most interesting news this week, ahead of the 28 August UNASUR summit, to be hosted by Argentina in the ski-resort town of Bariloche.

On 22 August, Lula signed a raft of agreements with Bolivian President Evo Morales in Bolivia’s Chapare region. An agreement worth US$332 million underpins the construction of a 306-kilometer highway from Villa de Tunari in the Chapare to the eastern Bolivian department of Beni.

Brazil has also agreed to import tariff-free textiles worth some US$21 million, which is the same amount of money Bolivia lost due to Washington’s decision not to renew the US-Andean Trade Promotion and Drug Eradication Act (ATPDEA) last year. The two leaders also discussed changes in the Brazil-Bolivia natural gas deal, as well as cooperation for bilateral efforts to combat the drug trade, but no solid agreements surfaced.

By many accounts, this meeting was a significant win for Morales, who has been under pressure to find alternative markets for Bolivia’s textiles. The highway construction will also please Chapare leaders, who are Morales’ closest political supporters. He will need them later this year for the run up to Bolivia’s 6 December 2009 presidential elections

For his part, Lula has assured support from Bolivia, despite Morales' anti-US stance, at the UNASUR summit, which promises to be contentious with both Venezuela and Colombia in attendance, and with Ecuador currently holding the president’s chair, which Colombia will likely view as an unfair arbiter.

While Lula has voiced some concern about Colombia’s agreement to allow the US military access to seven military bases in Colombia, he does not side with Chavez, nor can he take such a hardened position against Colombia. UNASUR is widely considered Brazil’s initiative and the strongest effort towards unifying South America under Brazil’s leadership. Lula cannot lean too far to the left in criticizing Colombia and the US at the risk of distancing himself from regional moderates and Washington.

The concern over US bases in Colombia does signal that the United States can still tilt the balance of soft-power in the region, but Lula’s deft diplomacy will likely win out. He did invite President Obama to attend the summit, and while Obama will likely not attend, Lula can at least maintain an open posture towards Washington, signaling that as the de facto regional leader, Brazil has nothing to fear from the US’ increased military presence in Colombia. He also did receive assurances from Obama’s National Security Advisor, Jim Jones, in early August that there would be a “good explanation” for the US’ presence in Colombia.

But Brazil would like a commitment: Obama will not use the Colombian bases to launch missions into other countries. This request is also one made on behalf of all of Colombia’s neighbors - a conciliatory geopolitical stroke ahead of the summit to make sure that Ecuador, Colombia, and Venezuela can at least agree on something.

Is Venezuela's economy stronger than Mexico's?

2009-08-24T06:20:00.001-07:00

Most of us who follow Venezuela would agree that this country's economy is in the tank, and largely reliant on oil, the one export that manages to pay the bills.

Mexico, however, is in a very similar situation. Pemex suffers, and Mexico is heavily reliant on the national oil company to maintain a robust revenue stream.

Then the so-called "global recession" hit. And somehow, Venezuela has faired better than Mexico. Here are the latest numbers:

Bloomberg reported on 20 August that Venezuela's economy shrank 2.4% during the second quarter of 2009, compared to 2Q08. This is the first time Venezuela's economy has contracted since 2003...

Mexico's National Statistics Institute reported on 20 August that the country's economy shrank 10.3% during the second quarter of 2009, compared to 2Q08.

The Pressure for Results in Mexico

2009-08-20T05:38:00.001-07:00

When corruption undercuts good police work, pressure to falsify results builds to the point where innocent men and women are tagged and persecuted for crimes they did not commit.

What's worse is when torture is involved.

On the 21st of June, 2008, 30 members of the Mexican federal police (PFP) interrupted a child's party in Tijuana and arrested 58 guests and the lead singer of the hired band. Now, over a year later, information has surfaced to suggest that every single one of these "suspects" were innocent. Beyond the horror of being falsely accused and forgotten in a Mexican prison, many of these people were tortured and forced to admit that they were members of the Arellano-Felix Organization (AFO), the drug trafficking organization that operates out of Tijuana.

One man's story is particularly disturbing. He was the godfather of the birthday child.

Cristian Jesus Sotelo Mendoza, along with the rest, found himself in the basement of a military base somewhere in Tijuana. For a period of time he cannot remember, he was tortured, threatened, and ultimately forced to admit that he was someone called "El Muletas" a wanted criminal and member of the AFO.

Sotelo Mendoza told Ricardo Ravelo of Proceso magazine in this week's latest issue that he was taken into a separate room from the others where both members of the police and soldiers punched and kicked him.

Then they placed a wet hood on his head with a second bag covering the hood. The aggressors then began hitting him in the stomach with a rod so he would inhale deeply and choke on the wet hood, shouting and threatening to kill him.

Sotelo Mendoza was handcuffed and forced to sit in a chair. The bag and hood was removed. The interrogators then took a wet shirt and stretched it across his face before throwing buckets of water in his face and kicking him in the stomach to force him to breathe in the water.

The torture didn't stop there. The forced chili peppers up his nose before taking him to another room where he was stripped naked pushed to the floor and forced to endure long secessions of physical attacks.

The next day, together with his brother-in-law, Sotelo Mendoza was forced to run to the end of a hall and into a room packed with Mexican press. When Sotelo Mendoza opened his eyes, he faced the Mexican press, standing behind a table of weapons he had never seen.

He, along with his brother-in-law, was presented as one of the lieutenants of the AFO, known as El Muletas. His brother-in-law was presented as "La Perra." The third man in the room was the vocalist from the band hired to perform at the birthday party. He was presented as "El Gordo Villarreal."

After the press conference, the three men along with another 37 of the original 59 who were arrested at the party were transferred to a separate military prison where they were held for another 40 days, without charge. When a charge did come through, all but 22 were let go.

And those 22 people, who apparently did nothing wrong more than attend a little girl's party have spent the past year in prison, apart from being tortured and presented as people they are not.

By now, most of these people have been released, except for the father of the birthday girl, who is still in prison, accused of being La Perra despite the fact that the Mexican Attorney General's office announced on 6 July 2009 that the real man, known as La Perra, had been captured.

Shifting security realities in Brazil

2009-08-19T04:23:00.000-07:00

The Brazilian military announced on 18 August that it will increase troop presence on the country's border with Colombia.

This is a conversation that has been going back and forth between the president's office and the military generals for years. Slowly but surely, the Brazilian military has begun to make a shift from its traditional focus in the southern part of the country, where the assumption is that Argentina is considered the most likely to invade and the Amazon provides the best defense from potential enemies to the north.

Closer ties with Colombia, such as the hot-pursuit fly over agreement, and generally closer cooperation on security matters, has prompted the Brazilians to think more about that border. Exactly where the troops will be concentrated remains a vague detail, but I suspect that Leticia is one destination, as well as certain areas of the infamous "Dog's Head" area.

The Dog's Head refers to the shape of a specific section of the Brazilian-Colombia border, traditionally a haven for illegal gem miners, FARC soldiers, and all sorts of ne'er-do-wells.

Overtly, the military is worried about "spillover" from Colombia's internal conflict, but I wonder to what extent that worry about Venezuela has primed the generals for spillover from that country, in the event of a political meltdown in Caracas.

Brazil would be very careful not to tip off Chavez, so where troops are placed will be very interesting. How close to the Brazilian-Venezuelan border will they go?

More here on the Brazilian-Colombian aspects of this decision. Boz explores today the "post-conflict" scenario in Colombia with the so-called emerging-groups capturing some attention as the newest threat to security in Colombia.

Iranian activity in Bolivia

2009-08-18T12:32:00.000-07:00

My research assistant, Kelsey Price, has completed her third backgrounder for this summer. Her first detailed energy security in Russia and Turkey, and the second reviewed Sino-Brazilian relations. In her third and final piece, she reviews Iranian activity in Bolivia.

International observers have questioned Bolivia’s ability to control crime within its borders before, especially concerning the drug trade and the Maoist terrorist group Shining Path. Four provinces are looking to separate from the central government, resulting in referendums and anti-referendum marches. Now with Iran’s increasing presence in South America, Bolivia may also be susceptible to radical Islamic activity inspired (or organized) by its new ally.

President Evo Morales’ track record doesn’t help Bolivia’s case either—his links to various attacks in Peru, especially, cast doubt on his ability to control (or keep away from) terrorism in the region. Morales’ former aide was accused in 2007 of assisting terrorism in Peru, specifically with the Cuban Tupac Amaru movement of the 1980’s.Deteriorating relations with Latin American neighbors combine now with right-wing opposition of Morales’ Movement Toward Socialism (MAS) party. Main opposition leader Manfred Reyes Villa, former Cochabamba Prefect, has joined forces with disgruntled indigenous rights leaders in order to form a significant alternative to Morales. More importantly, four provinces began to seek independence from La Paz in 2008: Santa Cruz, Tarlja, Beni, Pando and Chuqulsaca. The two parties reached an agreement that October, but tension still lingers over relations between Morales and the opposition-led provinces.

The conflict brought about by such a strong—and influential—opposition may create the kind of instability needed for a future crime hotbed to grow. Bolivia’s ties with Iran, especially, suggest that radical Islamic activity may begin to take root in the region.

Iran’s initiative to gain support in Latin America leads it to investing in left-wing Bolivia, second only to Venezuela in winning the Middle Eastern nation’s favor and financial support. The two partners have discussed joint venture projects in the industrial and manufacturing sectors, and critics conclude that Tehran secretly has its hands in uranium mining deals as well. Iran promised in 2008 to invest 1.1 billion dollars in Bolivia in the next five years, aimed at strengthening economic and agricultural ties while also fostering the Bolivian energy sector.So far, Tehran has lived up to its promise. Iran has funded on credit the construction of two cement and six milk-processing plants, three health clinics, and suggests potential aid in oil and other energy fields.

The Iranian administration caused an uproar in the government’s own Majlis parliament when it provided Bolivia with an unapproved loan of over 280 million dollars on July 31, 2009.Over and above the material and financial support that Iran has provided, newly installed TV and radio stations may spread Tehran’s influence at a more cultural level. Iranian radio has broadcast in-depth reports and interviews about its positive relationship to Latin America, the evils of colonialism, and anti-imperialism. “This opportunity has come up for Iran,” said Dr Massah, a university lecturer on one program, “to spread the slogans of anti colonialism, prevent the international system from becoming monopolized, and spread the sense of seeking justice, which arises from Islamic standards, in [Latin America].” Bolivia’s state-run TV channel regularly shows Iranian movies, and a Muslim preacher delivered services at a state-sponsored event in June 2009.

^{Some of Morales’ sizable opposition questions Iran’s intentions and growing influence. “We need to ask what Iran’s real interest is in Bolivia,” said dissident presidential candidate Roman Loayza. “Evo has no business entering into agreements with foreign interests at the back of the Bolivian people which could harm our environment.” Both sides of those agreements insist that Iran’s activities are harmless.}

The partnership has become more than just economic, however; Bolivia has sided with Iran in recent controversial issues, including some in which Islam influenced the decision. Bolivia joined its radical counterparts in the Israel-Palestine issue in January 2009 by breaking off relations with Israel, a move endorsed by President Ahmadinehad, Iranian MP and head of Iran-Bolivia Parliamentary Friendship Group Arsalan Farthi-Pur, and even Hamas. The support of the terrorist organization may be at least the first step in the direction of a Bolivia heavily dependant on radical Islamic groups.

Bolivia shares another political stance with these groups: its disdain for the United States. Morales even expelled the US Drug Enforcement Agency in November 2008 in a move that analysts have said was thought-out foreign policy. However, Bolivia is predicted to return for the American agency to help counter its ever-growing drug problem; the country is the third-largest producer of the coca leaf in the world.

^{Bolivia’s only reported brush with radical Islamic activity was a group of Shi’ite missionaries sent by Iranian fundamentalist group Hezbollah to convert indigenous Latin American tribes, according to a Bolivian journalist in 2007. At the time of the report, the group had successfully installed bases in other areas, mostly along the Venezuelan-Colombian border, and was spreading to the Quechua and Aymara Indians of Bolivia. The real threat, however, comes from Hugo Chavez’s role in the Hezbollah group’s presence. Considering the strong relationship between Iran and Venezuela, especially among its populist leaders, the possibility of Morales’ involvement in something like the Hezbollah missionary project seems likely. Bolivia, with its Iran-sponsored health clinics and TV channels, may adopt the same relationship to Tehran’s more controversial groups.}

Notes:

“Peru seeks extradition of terrorism-accused ex-Bolivian aide.” Global Insight. 25 October 2007.

“Bolivian candidate forms alliance with indigenous leader.” Bolivian newspaper La Razon websitre, 7 July 2009. Translated by BBC World Monitoring.

Barbel, Marion. “Andean bloc, European Union offer mediation services to tense Bolivia.” 14 April, 2008. Global Insight.

“Bolivians resist Iran's search for uranium; Mountain holds mineral prospects.” Washington Times. 27 July 2009.

Kazemi, Azadeh. “Iran wants to ‘exploit’ Bolivian uranium.” Iranian newspaper Kargozaran. 22 September, 2008.

“Iran confirms plans to install television channel in Bolivia.” Bolivian newspaper La Razon website. 20 May 2009. Linked by BBC World Monitoring.

“Iran MPs slam government over loan to Bolivia.” Iranian news agency Mehr. 3 August 2009.

“Iranian Esfahan TV airs programme on Iran-Latin America relationships.” 7 October 2008. Iranian Esfahan provincial TV station. Supplied by BBC World Monitoring.

“Bolivians resist Iran's search for uranium; Mountain holds mineral prospects” Washington Times. 27 July 2009.

See “Bolivians resist…” Washington Times, 27 July 2009.

“Iranian President praises Venezuela, Bolivia for break with Israel.” Venezuelan newspaper El Universal website. 22 January 2009. Linked by BBC World Monitoring.

“Iranian MP thanks Bolivia for condemning Israel’s ‘war crimes.’” Iranian official government news agency IRNA website. 20 May 2009. Linked by BBC World Monitoring.

“Hamas welcomes Bolivian decision to sever ties with Israel.” Pro-Hamas Palestinian Information Centre. 15 January 2009. Linked by BBC World Monitoring.

“Expulsion of US agency ‘well thought out foreign policy.’” Bolivian newspaper Los Tiempos. 4 November 2008. Linked by BBC World Monitoring.

Volkel, Christian. “Anti-Narcotics Co-Operation to Continue between US and Bolivia.” Global Insight. 8 April 2009.

“Hezbollah Missionaries Operate in Amazonia.” Peruvian newspaper La Razon, 29 October 2007. Provided by BBC World Monitoring.

Southern Pulse Intel Brief, 13 August 2009

2009-08-14T05:50:00.000-07:00

I have posted below the Southern Pulse Intel Brief, with permission from the Southern Pulse editors. This intel brief is normally published only for Southern Pulse members, and no longer available on Networked Intelligence, the organization's blog. I hope you find it interesting and informative.

INTEL

Russia and Cuba signed agreements in August 2009 to explore oil in the Gulf of Mexico. As part of this latest effort to deepen ties between the two old friends, Russia has also extended Cuba a US$150 million credit line for construction materials and farm machinery.

Out of India, sugar refining group Shree Renuka Sugars has made public its interest in acquiring a stake in Brazilian sugar and ethanol producer Grupo Moema. Shree Reunka has up to US$100 million available for the acquisition. Moema is also reportedly interested in other sugar refining groups, including Cosan, São Martinho Guarani, Cargill and Bunge.

Finally, we have learned that in Mexico, Army personnel detained Roberto Gaspar Caballero, a 21 year-old resident of Reynosa, Tamaulipas on 5 August 2009 as he attempted to smuggle 20 grenades into the U.S. in his Chevy Suburban via the Reynosa-Pharr port of entry.

ANALYSIS

Russia’s new relationship with Cuba began to take shape in June 2008 when Russian Deputy Prime Minister Igor Sechin made a state visit for formal talks. Sechin returned with a delegation of businessmen and diplomats on 18 September 2008. News of the development of a Russian-Cuban space center later surfaced, and in mid-March 2009, we learned that five Russian companies could begin oil exploration in several Gulf of Mexico blocks owned by Cuba. With this agreement in place, Russia has solidified its position in Cuba as an energy partner for many years to come.

Indian sugar producers have had a tough year. This explains, in part, why the international price of sugar hovers at record highs, and why Brazilian sugar producers have begun to shoulder global demand, raising their international profile. Brazilian sugar production is closely tied to ethanol as both are made from sugar cane. Grupo Moema is but one of many companies that can produce ethanol or sugar, but only a few have attracted international attention. Cosan, which has been negotiation with Shell oil over a minority stake, is another. In the short-term, Brazil’s sugar/ethanol producers will struggle to meet domestic and international demand. The price of sugar, however, will help offset losses over the depressed price of ethanol and limited export markets.

The news of a Reynosa man caught smuggling grenades into the United States reminded us of when an unidentified man threw a grenade into a bar in Pharr, Texas. From 2008 to 2009, there has been a considerable jump in the amount of seized grenades in Mexico, indicating that the use of explosives in armed confrontations will continue to be a normal occurrence. We are watching for improvised explosive devices, however, which would be a serious escalation. On 16 March 2009, Mexican soldiers seized 34 Tovex sausage explosives, 47 meters of explosive fuse, and around ten pounds of granulated explosive from a safe house just south of Sunland Park, New Mexico. Additionally, on 19 and 24 February 2009, 30 kilos and 121 kilos of explosives, were stolen in Mexico. These explosives have yet to turn up.

First TV segment! CNN Int’l - Connect the World

2009-08-06T11:44:00.000-07:00

Just a quick note to say that I'll be on CNN International today at 16:30 EST, talking about Mexican drug trafficking organizations.

More details on the book blog.

Tune in if you can!

Serious Extortion in Guerrero

2009-08-03T08:06:00.000-07:00

La Jornada de Guerrero reports that a group of mayors from all political parties in the Mexican state of Guerrero reported on 26 July that they were the targets of an elaborate and expensive extortion scheme carried out by organized criminal groups in that state.

Fees as high as US$50,000 are required for family and personal "protection."

The mayors said that, together, their budget is some US$1.8 million, and if forced to pay the extortion fees, they would run out of money within four months.

Poaching military soldiers in Mexico

2009-07-27T07:26:00.001-07:00

A Mexican judge ordered to prison a retired Mexican Army First Captain for ties to the Beltran Leyva organization. The Captain was accused of organized crime, drug offenses, and conspiracy, and, more interestingly, was found to be guilty of "enabling" active and retired soldiers to act as hired assassins and bodyguards.

There had long been talk of the revolving door between the rank and file of the Mexican military and organized crime. This is the first case I've seen of a middle-management military officer actively recruiting from his own rolodex for Mexican organized crime.

Ideally, this case will dissuade others from doing the same, but it's hard to deny the economic incentive offered by organized crime versus the salary paid, often late, by the Mexican government.

Sino-Brazilian Naval relations

2009-07-16T07:58:00.000-07:00

The Chief of Staff of the Japanese Maritime Self Defense Force recently met with Chinese Defense Minister Liang Guianglie in Ningbo, Zhejiang province, China to review China's East Fleet.

Many analysts agree that Naval control over the waters of East Asia will again become a contest (as it was during WWII) as China's Navy, known as the PLAN, continues its rapid development.

Japan, especially is worried, as is the United States.

But what I find more interesting is Brazil's role in China's naval development.

Below, my research assistant Kelsey Price, has prepared a backgrounder on Sino-Brazilian naval relations, including Brazil's offer to train the Chinese on the use of aircraft carriers - something the PLAN has yet to deploy.

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As China attempts to solidify its place as an emerging world power, its leaders have placed more emphasis on building a stronger navy. At the forefront of this naval initiative is the construction of, and training for, China’s first aircraft carrier. Russia has sold China its former carrier Varyag (renamed the Shi Lang), and China has been slowly updating the craft since its docking at a Chinese shipyard in 2002. Analysts conclude that China’s navy, or PLAN, may use the ship for training and as a base for the construction of two of its own carriers.

Brazil is looking for international significance as well, so when PLAN turned to Brazil’s aircraft carrier-trained crew to train China’s navy, the Latin American power agreed to invite Chinese naval personnel aboard the Sao Paolo, Brazil’s only aircraft carrier. While the two BRIC nations—part of a group with Russia and India—both benefit from the military favor, China had very few choices. Brazil is one of only four nations to maintain an aircraft carrier capable of launching and recovering conventional aircraft, and the only one willing or able to train PLAN personnel. The United States has little interest in training the navy of a country it sees as a potential threat; EU law prohibits France from helping; and China’s relationship with Russia is hampered by an intellectual property dispute over Chinese fighter aircraft.

China clearly benefits from the naval training, but Brazil’s reward for helping China is less material than political. Brazil strengthens its reputation as a global force, especially when it assists a country as powerful as China. It also establishes stronger relations between the two countries, which formerly concentrated on economic ties and shared inclusion in the emerging BRIC nations.

Brazil and China’s other BRIC partners—India specifically—have expressed concern over PLAN’s technological advancement. India has declared China to be its “biggest threat.” China’s Major General Qian Lihua, director of the ministry’s Foreign Affairs office, assured, “Even if one day we have an aircraft carrier, unlike another country, we will not use it to pursue global deployment or global reach.” China’s President Hu Jintao also claimed that he did not seek regional hegemony or an arms race; rather, China would use its navy to pursue international cooperation in peacekeeping and anti-piracy enforcement.

The United States suspects other motives. A US Congressional Report for the People in May suggested that China may plan to use its improved navy to create conflict with Taiwan, and perhaps to prevent US intervention in the dispute. China may also use its threatening aircraft carrier to assert itself in the region, especially regarding its claims in territorial and freedom of navigation disputes. Its strengthened place as a world power may also convince other countries to align its policies with China, and displace US influence in the region. These concerns have prompted the US navy to pursue increased monitoring of China’s actions and to send more personnel to the Pacific.

Bates Gill, director of the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, considers the very display of China’s navy a non-verbal threat to other countries. PLAN celebrated its 60th anniversary by including 52 navy vessels and aircraft in maneuvers off the eastern port of Qingdao in April. "Showing what you have can always also act as a deterrent - that's how it's seen in the US," said Mr Gill. "When the US navy takes an aircraft carrier to Hong Kong, it also tells the Chinese, have a look, you don't want to confront this."

Brazil and China’s rise in international influence—and displacement of US influence—is expedited by a visibly strong navy, and the partnership forming between the two nations suggests the emergence of a strong BRIC allegiance without the sway of the United States.

Notes:

“Beijing’s aircraft carrier will convert Asian oceans into Chinese lakes.” 28 May, 2009. Rupee News delivered by Newstex.

Farley, Robert. “The New China-Brazil axis.” 27 May 2009. The Progressive Realist.

“Brazil/China consolidate energy, trade and finance partnership.” 19 May, 2009. South Atlantic news agency MercoPress.

Ansari, Moin. “BRIC-battered: The growing Brazil china axis and fraying Indo-Russia deals.” 27 May, 2009. Rupee News.

“China has aircraft carrier hopes.” 17 November 2008. BBC.

Hille, Katherin. “China’s show of sea power challenges US.” 24 April 2009. The Financial Times.

“China Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy Capabilities -- Background and Issues for Congress.” 29 May 2009. Open CRS, Congressional Report for the People.

See “China’s show of sea power challenges US,” Financial Times.

Iranian embassy hoax?

2009-07-13T06:16:00.001-07:00

This is just a quick post to point out a Washington Post article about the Iranian embassy in Nicaragua, or lack thereof...

Apparently this "embassy" is a rented house where the Iranian Ambassador lives with his wife, hardly the behemoth that housed 150 Iranian agents...

Now, back to the MS-13 blog...

An example of criminal branding?

2009-07-10T09:31:00.000-07:00

Today, I came across an article that appears to be an example of criminal branding.

As I've talked about before, criminal branding is an effective way for small-time crime group to leverage the fear factor already earned by larger groups.

This example is one where kidnappers claim to be a member of Los Zetas.

The story in the El Paso Times notes:

"Three of the suspects seemed to be younger than typically hardened Zetas, who often are former soldiers and ex-police officers."

It is possible that these guys were members of Los Zetas, in a way part of the organization's evolution.

It's also possible that these guys operate with the permission of Los Zetas, and have been told that if they are caught, that they should tell the police and press that they are Zetas, which expands the perception of this group's presence across Mexico.

TFMS book trailer no. 2

2009-07-09T12:28:00.000-07:00

Southern Pulse Intel Brief - wk of 29 June

2009-07-09T03:49:00.000-07:00

The week of 29 June 2009 saw two very interesting developments in Mexico, with the continuation of a third very important economic indicator.

First, remittances from the United States to Mexico continue to drop. In the first six months of 2009, we have seen remittances drop by 19.9%, compared to the first half of 2008. This decline represents some US$1.9 billion dollars.

A new vigilante group has emerged. The “Mata Zetas” is one of the latest of the so-called splinter groups we’ve seen surface. At the end of June, when police discovered three bodies in Cancun, they also discovered a note that read: “We are the new group, Mata Zetas, and we are against kidnapping and extortion and we are going to fight against them in all of the state for a cleaner Mexico."

Just a few days later, police arrested eleven members of a separate splinter group known as “La Contra”. Mexican authorities suspect this group has formed to fill gaps opened by arrested members of the Los Zetas and La Familia.

Analysis:

After petroleum exports, remittances make up the largest source of foreign currency in Mexico. And from January to April, total remittances added up to US$7.3 million. This number continues to drop as a direct function of the economy. Indirect effects, however, may be seen in Mexico, where individuals who relied on these remittances have little option but to turn to organized crime to pay the bills.

Consider three converging realities. Last year, 17,772 minors were deported from the United States to Mexico. It is likely that many of them landed in a crime-controlled municipality. Between 60 and 65% percent of all Mexican municipalities suffer from organized crime infiltration. This adds up to about 1,500 cities.

Finally, there are a reported 980 zones of impunity across the country. Also called “criminal enclaves” the political leadership is either directly involved in organized crime, or is somehow compromised.

We’re not surprised by the presence of La Contra and Mata Zetas. We expect more such groups to surface before the end of the year.

Cross-posted with Southern Pulse blog, Networked Intelligence

Brazil, Russia, and Turkey - energy backgrounder

2009-07-09T03:16:00.000-07:00

On 10 June, ISN published a piece I prepared on Brazil and Turkey. Entitled, "Petrobras Empowers Turkey", this commentary focused on Lula's recent trip to this promising country and the energy deals sealed between Petrobras and its Turkish counterpart, TPAO.

In the piece, I discussed briefly how Turkey and Russia compete for dominance in the EU energy markets - Russia by providing natural gas through its own pipelines, and Turkey by developing its own energy supply for sale and, more importantly, by allowing others to lay pipe across Turkey to access EU markets.

But this topic deserves more attention and explanation.

My research assistant, Kelsey Price, has prepared a Russian energy backgrounder that expands upon Russia's role as an energy supplier for the EU as well as Turkey's budding presence in regional energy markets.

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Russia’s immense supply of natural gas gives Moscow a significant hold over its foreign consumers, especially the European Union, which received over a quarter of its gas supplies from Russian gas company Gazprom in 2004. Disputes over pricing with third party countries have, in the past, cut off large portions of Europe’s energy supply, and despite the EU’s pleas with the Russian state Duma to open its gas line monopoly, the Duma has reinforced Gazprom’s power by giving it “exclusive right to export of gas” in 2006.

Recently, Russia expanded its influence, promising large-scale projects in southeastern Europe: the ambitious South Stream pipeline, for one, would help Europe diversify its energy supplies at least among the various Gazprom lines. Russia has also promised to build a power plant in Bulgaria, create a Central European gas hub, and finance various storage facilities, all to court skeptical countries into supporting the South Stream.

However, Russia’s strategy lies solely in its willingness to make generous concessions to European partners that outweigh the disadvantages of foregoing energy diversification. This strategy may have seemed feasible at one time, considering Russia’s success during formerly high gas prices. Now that gas prices have dropped and the global recession has taken its toll (Russia saw a 9.5% contraction in its economy during 1Q09) funding for these projects may disappear. Moscow’s European partners are happy with promises for now, but Gazprom’s controversial Russia-to Germany project Nord Stream has already needed to request an increase in its credit guarantee by about 1 billion euros. Once the gas giant has to begin cutting back on its projects, Russia may have to delay or retract some of its hefty promises.

Financial problems may also affect Russia’s energy supply; the Energy Ministry reported on June 18 that most new oil projects in Russia would not be profitable even with gas at $150 a barrel. Without government incentives for new fields, such as lower export tariffs and a laxer taxation system, Russian oil companies will produce 40 million tons less oil in 2013 than they did this past year, the ministry said. While the ministry is attempting to make oil companies more profitable, this drop in confidence in Russia’s energy supply may also drive European countries and other gas importers to work harder to diversify their suppliers.

Russia has also been known to restrict its gas supply as leverage in payment skirmishes. In January 2006, Russia decreased the amount of gas sent to the Ukrainian pipeline because of a drawn-out pricing dispute; this pipeline brought gas not only to Ukraine, but to Western Europe as well, and countries like Germany, Italy and the Czech Republic saw drastic reductions in their energy supply. Russia and Ukraine signed a treaty four days later, but the dispute demonstrated Russia’s strong influence in energy and its powerful “negotiating” tactics.

In October 2007, Russia threatened to cut off power to Ukraine once again because of unpaid debt. While Gazprom assured Europe that its consumers would not experience any decrease in energy supply, the European Commission still called for a swift resolution in the dispute, still wary of Russia’s hold over the region. While Ukraine’s deputy prime minister repaid the debt, Gazprom claimed that the overall issue was not over. “Gazprom is a reliable supplier of energy resources, but we cannot and should not deliver gas without payment,” said Gazprom spokesman Sergei Kupriyanov after the March 2008 repayment.

At the end of 2008, Ukraine owed Gazprom over $1 billion, and on January 7 Russian Prime Minister Putin ordered a halt on all gas sent through Ukrainian pipelines on accusations that Kiev had been siphoning off energy and disrupting the flow to Europe. At least eighteen countries reported significantly less pressure in pipelines, especially Bulgaria, Moldova and Slovakia. After Europe suffered gas shortages during a subzero winter, on January 18 Russia restored gas supplies and began demanding that Ukraine pay European prices, not its previously discounted post-Soviet prices.

The gas crisis caused even more concern than before for European consumers, who lost confidence in Russia and Ukraine as reliable gas suppliers and business partners.

Russia’s influence over Europe as a major supplier also faces some challenges from an empowered Turkey. Various companies other than Gazprom have offered Turkey the opportunity to become a European energy hub, mostly through the U.S.-backed Nabucco line. The 3,300-km pipeline from Azerbaijan would help European countries diversify their energy options, and some say it is more cost-efficient than Gazprom’s proposed South Stream project. The Nabucco project would violate Turkey’s prior support of the central Iraqi government’s exclusive right to export oil from the country, as Turkey has been a key ally in Iraqi centralization. However, Turkey would become the energy hub for Europe if Nabucco succeeds over South Stream, giving it some needed influence in the continent—Turkey is still bidding for a spot in the EU, despite opposition from France’s Sarkozy and Germany’s Merkel.

Russia has blocked Turkey’s influence in the past, however, striking deals with Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan in 2007 that drew exports away from the Nabucco line. Also, Russia and Gazprom have remained confident in gas sales to Europe despite decreased exports to the region and a group of oil fields deemed unprofitable. Gazprom’s market share in Europe and Turkey dropped from 30 percent last summer to just 16 percent in the first quarter, in part because Russian contracts held prices that were set at the record-high levels of six to nine months ago. Medvedev reassured reporters at a news conference, “this can be seen as a shift in demand from an earlier period. That’s why we, at Gazprom, don’t see any reason for panic and pessimism.”

Sources/Notes:

Bogle, Sally. “EU Countries Glimpse Consequences of Future Dependence on Russian Gas-as Pricing Dispute with Ukraine Cuts Import Flows.” Global Insight, 3 January, 2006.

Buck, Tobias and Buckley, Neil. “Duma votes for Russian gas export monopoly.” Financial Times, 16 June 2006.

For environmental and security reasons: http://tinyurl.com/mmoptk

Koutsarov, Ivan. “Economic crisis threatens Russian projects in Southeastern Europe.” Global Insight, 27 May 2009.

Malkova, Irina. “Most oil projects may not be profitable.” The Moscow Times, 18 June 2009.

“Russia cuts off gas supply to Ukraine.” The New York Times, 1 January 2006.

“Gazprom cuts Ukrainian gas supply.” BBC News, 3 March 2008.

“Factbox- 18 countries affected by Russia-Ukraine gas row.” Reuters, 7 January 2009.

Solovyov, Dmitry and Ferris-Rotman, Amie. “Russia and Ukraine aim to sign gas deal on Monday.” Reuters, 18 January 2009.

Ciszuk, Samuel. “OMV, MOL, Crescent Attempt to Bring Iraqi Kurdistan Gas Through Nabucco to Europe.” Global Insight, 18 May 2009.

Ü.S. throws weight behind EU’s Nabucco pipeline.” Reuters, 22 February 2008.

Schleifer, Yigal. “Questions cloud Turkish-EU energy cooperation.” EurasiaNet, through ISN. 13 June 2007.

Medetsky, Anatoly. “Gazprom sees no reason for ‘panic.’” The Moscow Times, 25 June 2009.

Desperation Route - investigative series on the border

2009-07-08T05:10:00.001-07:00

In March, I traveled to Arizona and Sonora to research a series on border culture for the International Relations and Security Network.

We've completed the piece, christened Desperation Route, and it is now available on the ISN Special Reports site.

There are four parts: Drugs and Vengeance; Armed for Corruption; Getting Across; and, Meeting the Smugglers. Each piece is a stand alone but considered a four-part investigation.

Thank you to the editors at ISN for your hard work!

Now, back to the MS-13 blog...

Moving over to my book blog...

2009-07-06T11:17:00.000-07:00

I'm moving posts over to my book blog, focused on the MS-13, immigration, deportation, with additional information on radio interviews, book tour dates and locations, and news of reviews, coverage, etc.

Starting tomorrow, July 7, the blog will be accessible via the official website of This is for the Mara Salvatrucha.

Relevant posts will be cross-posted here, but I don't expect to be back to regular posting for a few weeks, at the least.

Thanks!
Sam

PS - I wanted to thank John Robb at Global Guerrillas for mentioning my book on his GG news blog post on the 2nd of July. Cheers, John!

Zeta and Gulf Cartel Relationship Revealed

2009-07-02T06:56:00.000-07:00

An interesting piece from Jeremy Roebuck in The Monitor about the relationship between the Zetas and the Gulf Cartel.

This is information based on court documents.

And a few interesting paragraphs follow below:

"The extradition of alleged former Gulf Cartel chief Osiel Cárdenas Guillén from Mexico in 2006 set off a leadership crisis within the organization...

In Cárdenas' absence, three leaders have emerged to helm the drug trafficking organization, the June 9 indictment states. His brother - Antonio Ezequiel "Tony Tormenta" Cárdenas Guillén , 47 - took the reins after his sibling's arrest along with fellow cartel leader 37-year-old Jorge Eduardo "El Coss" Costilla Sánchez, federal investigators say. Zeta commander Heriberto "Lazca" Lazcano Lazcano, 34 - a founding member of the paramilitary group believed to be one of its most violent members - also took on a prominent role.

...[The] triumvirate comes together to decide matters ranging from payments owed to plaza bosses to the price The Company will charge for its drugs, U.S. federal authorities say."

As Mexican DTOs go, cooperation never a lasts. A showdown between the Gulf Cartel and the Zetas could very likely spark another round of violence - one that possibly would play out in a number of cities across the US where the Zetas and the Gulf Cartel work in tandem - Dallas, Houston, New Orleans, Atlanta, Charlotte, Baltimore to name only a few...

Finally, here's a map of where the Gulf Cartel operates in the US (a little dated), but it gives you an idea of where some of the violence in the US could happen if the Zetas and Gulf Cartel alliance ruptures.

UN cocaine numbers (partial) breakdown

2009-07-01T08:28:00.000-07:00

I'm still catching up on posts and information. I'm putting this up today, echoing what Adam Isacson has already posted with a much more thorough review.

Breakdown on latest UN drug trafficking numbers:

70% of the world's cocaine supply is transported through Mexican territory.

In 2007, 48,168 tons of cocaine were seized in Mexico (7% of the world total).

The first place was taken by Colombia with 195,135 tons (27 % of total) and USA second with 147,804 tons (21%).

A total of 994,000 tons of cocaine were produced in 2007, and 41% was seized.

The prevalence of cocaine use increased from 1.5% in 1998 to 2.5% in 2008 among people between 12 and 65 years of age.

Nonetheless, the majority of cocaine, 17.8%, is consumed in the USA.

Saudi Arabia is the principal country with global methamphetamine seizures, with 32% of the total seizures while in Mexico only 2% occur.

Brazil: A fiscal paradise?

2009-07-01T08:19:00.001-07:00

This is just a quick post to share some interesting information on Brazil and money laundering.

The OECD is pressuring Brazil to sign on to its Global Forum on Transparency and Information Exchange regime, branded as a "Partnership Against Corruption."

For most of his presidency, Lula has spoken out against so-called "fiscal paradise" countries around the world, where financial controls and laws governing money movement are both relaxed enough to invite would-be money laundering organizations to take residence.

Brazil has done it's fair share of anti-money laundering efforts, but it appears that in the eyes of the OECD, Brazil is still just another money laundering hub in Latin America. I would imagine that Brazil has opted not to join the OECD's club simply because under Lula's leadership, the country still has some affinity for the non-aligned movement, which would preclude any membership in such "aligned" organizations.

And perhaps more to the point, Brazil doesn't like to join a group that will tell it what to do, unless, of course, Brazil is at the head of the table, such as UNASUR.

This is for the Mara Salvatrucha - book trailer no. 1

2009-06-26T09:44:00.000-07:00

A little coverage: This is for the Mara Salvatrucha

2009-06-26T07:29:00.000-07:00

I've been on the road for work this week, so before the weekend I wanted to share here a few spots on the Internet where there has been a little early coverage of my book on the MS-13.

One of the few bloggers I read regularly, Zen Pundit, received an early copy of my book from my publisher. He was kind enough to devote some time for a post. Thanks!

Over at the Dallas Morning News' bookblog, reporter Diane Solis put up a brief review on my book and a related book by Tom Diaz. I've not read Tom's book, but I'll be sure to buy it. He operates a blog called Fairly Civil.

Our friends at Mexidata.info also posted a note on the book release.

And investigative reporter Jonathan Franklin, who recently published a piece - The Real Con Air - on deportation, interviewed me for this piece, and was nice enough to get the book's title in there. Thanks Jonathan!

Finally, my book is available for Kindle readers, and will be on stands July 7th.

Brazil: the low hanging fruit

2009-06-17T06:54:00.000-07:00

Southern Pulse has reported yesterday that the French authorities are investigating the possibility that two terrorists boarded Air France flight 477 in Rio with the premeditated intention of exploding the aircraft.

A week or so ago, the Brazilian intelligence agency leaked (not sure if it was intentional or not) that some analysts were considering the theory that the explosion was a terrorist attack.

News out of the UK exonerates the two men who the French thought were terrorists, but I want to consider for a moment the possibility that terrorists boarded a flight in Rio to explode an Air France jet.

I've lived in Brazil for a long time, most of that time spent in Rio. I can say from first hand experience that it would not be a challenge for anyone who wanted to board a plane in Rio with an explosive device.

The security is all but non-existent. But that's not the root of it. The bottom line is that the Brazilian government, and most Brazilians, think that terrorism is some one else's problem.

This is why, for example, that certain employees of the USG have complained in the past that the Brazilians were dragging their heels when it came to the 3+1 group (Brazil, Argentina, Paraguay - plus - the United States), which worked on issues such as money laundering and terrorist financing in the tri-border area.

When I speak with Brazilian Federal Police, politicians, and academics, and others, we always talk about organized crime, the drug trade, black markets, Brazil's borders (it shares a border with ten other countries), and areas of the country that are most vulnerable, namely the Amazon.

But when the topic of terrorism comes up, the usual response is the FARC - and rightly so. The FARC is the most proximate terrorist group that many Brazilian officials consider a threat.

The idea that Hezbollah or some other terrorist group may be forming cells in Brazilian cities, with the intention of hitting a soft target in Brazil, is not something that I think the Brazilians spend a lot of time talking about and thinking about.

Then again, the United States did not embrace a national dialogue about terrorism until September 11.

Terrorism is not a happy topic. When we dig into the realities that a terrorist presence may produce, the conclusions are frightful, and demanding. Homeland security in any county is a high-ticket item. And the Brazilian government simply does not have the resources.

The explosion of AF477 likely was not a terrorist act. The strongest evidence of that theory is that no one has stepped forward to claim responsibility - correct me if I'm wrong.

If it was a terrorist act, however, it would put Brazil on the map of terrorist targets, changing the reality of all who live and work in Brazil, and likely changing the posture of the Brazilian government vis-a-vis working with the USG to clamp down on terrorist activity in South America.

I am thankful the flight was most likely a freak accident, but I'm worried for Brazil.

For any terrorist group looking for a place to hit a soft target, Brazil is a low hanging fruit - one that becomes ever more juicy as Lula raises Brazil's profile on the global stage.

This is for the Mara Salvatrucha, the blog

2009-06-15T13:09:00.000-07:00

We've finally finished tweaking the blog for my book's website, focused on the MS-13.

The blog will serve as extra space for media items, announcements, speaking engagements, and a catch all for thoughts, observations, etc, on the Mara Salvatrucha, immigration, deportation, street gangs and organized crime.

The troll under the bridge and terrorists in Mexico

2009-06-12T07:39:00.000-07:00

I know I'm supposed to be off promoting my book, but I had to get in at least a couple more posts...

Lately I've seen a great deal of media flack about terrorists and Mexican smugglers. I've also spoken to many, many people on border violence, and this issue seems to continue to rise to the surface of the conversation.

Let me begin by stating a well known fact among Border Patrol, Intel analysts who focus on the border, and just about anyone who deals with trying to stop illicit products - people and goods - from crossing north.

"Smugglers are smugglers" one intel analyst and veteran field operative told me this morning.

This is perhaps the only reason why we should keep an eye on the theory that terrorists could leverage contacts with Mexican organized crime to enter the United States.

I call it a "troll under the bridge" arrangement. All border crossing zones into the United States are either tightly controlled or contested (such as Juarez these days). Those border crossings, or plazas, all have one man who oversees the south-north traffic into the United States. He is an economic actor motivated by power and wealth. He is the troll.

If anyone who is not part of his integrated network comes along and wants to cross the bridge into the United States, the troll will be paid. This exchange is sometimes called a tax or a fee in Mexico.

This is where the theory of terrorists crossing into the US through Mexico holds water. The troll will let anyone cross the bridge if they can pay the tax, with the exception of rivals within Mexico, of course.

To take this theory one step farther, and beyond where most US-based media stops the analysis, we will have to consider the existence of Hezbollah in Latin America.

Apart from the Iranian presence in the Americas, which is an overlapping issue - there is a de facto presence of Hezbollah operatives in the region, likely concentrated now somewhere in Venezuela.

My guess would be in northwestern Venezuela, near the border with Colombia. Email me if you want details on why.

Other places are:

The TBA (tri-border area between Argentina, Paraguay, and Brazil), and possibly other tri-border areas in South America;

Bolivia, Peru, and Chile;

and, Nicaragua.

Beyond the presence of Hezbollah operatives in the Americas, however, is the very real existence of a culture of Islamic fundamentalism. I admit, I'm not an expert on this, but I have seen enough evidence of Islamic fundamentalist activity in South America, especially Venezuela, that leads me and others to consider that "home-grown" Venezuelans could become converts to a Hezbollah operative's way of thinking and viewing the world.

The possibility that a Venezuelan national, who looks Latino and speaks fluent Spanish, converts to a fundamentalist Islamic way of thinking is just that: a possibility.

This possibility, when combined with the reality that a smuggler is just a smuggler in Mexico, strengthens the theory that terrorists could cross into the United States from Mexico.

But I'm not an alarmist on this. In a recent conversation I was labeled "bullish" by a new friend in New York who is working on a piece on this issue.

But the truth is, there is very little evidence to suggest that Hezbollah operatives are crawling around in Mexico. And apart from a crossing tax, what do Mexican criminals get out of it?

...Likely reduction in their market size.

A piece in Newsmax, published on 5 June, pulls together conclusions from a secret intelligence mission. To me, this piece is more media flack than anything.

But the truth is that Washington is paying attention to this issue, and our leaders there should because Mexico needs all the help it can get. Prevention is the best medicine, and I'm relieved to know that the DIA, NSA, and CIA are all aware of this issue and trying to stay on top of it.

Focused on Book Promotion, for now...

2009-06-12T06:55:00.000-07:00

My book on the Mara Salvatrucha (MS-13) will be on shelves by the 7th of July. So as we get closer to that date, I expect I'll be blogging a lot less on issues pertaining to Security in Latin America, and working more on the book's blog (under construction), as well as Southern Pulse | Networked Intelligence.

Once my book promotion activity simmers down to a more manageable level. I'll return to regular, and hopefully, daily posts here.

Thanks for your patience!

The fallacy of 287(g)

2009-06-04T07:55:00.000-07:00

I wanted to share here a post from a blog I frequent, Standing FIRM.

This post is about the 287(g) statute that allows ICE to essentially deputize local authorities so illegal immigrants may be arrested by local cops simply for being illegal.

Below is the first two paragraphs of the post, with a link for the rest:

I have been posting for at least a year about the negative impacts of the so-called 287(g) program that allows local police agencies to enforce federal immigration laws. The most notable case of 287(g)’s negative impact on communities is that of Maricopa County and our food friend Joe Arpaio. 287(g) is the program that gives Arpaio the authority to continue his reign of terror in Arizona.

Recently the Police Foundation, a non-partisan Think Tank whose stated goal is “Supporting innovation and improvements in policing“, released a study on local enforcement of federal immigration laws. The result? To be brief: Federal Immigration laws should not be enforced by local police agencies. Period.

Read the rest here

Mr. Terrorist, Do your homework

2009-06-04T05:59:00.000-07:00

I caught this piece from the Washington Times this morning about an alleged terrorist proclaiming in a video that "soldiers" could use tunnels under the US-Mexico border to smuggle a bio-weapon into the United States.

His example is four pounds of anthrax.

Of course such claims can be alarming, but I'm doubtful.

I don't think any terrorist with four pounds of anthrax, or of any chemical agent, would be allowed to use the tunnels. And I say allowed because these tunnels are tightly controlled on the Mexican side.

Second, Mexican criminals are economic actors. What do they get out of a catastrophic terrorist attack in a city in the Southern half of the United States?

They get increased vigilance on the border - not good.

They lose thousands of potential customers and therefor money - not good.

They become labeled as terrorists - which they are within their own right, but not according to the USG - and are then the target of the most powerful anti-terrorist organizations in the world, all working for the USG. Again, not good.

So, this guy in the video may think he has a good idea, but I doubt he has done his homework.

Terrorist Communications Cell in Brazil?

2009-06-01T08:11:00.001-07:00

I'm in DC now for a few meetings, and I'm talking quite a bit about Brazil. It seems there is a lack of information and understanding about Brazil's future here in the nation's capital.

When I speak to US federal agents - and other security analysts - about Brazil's past, especially regarding their interest in working with Brazil in the arena of terrorist financing and related security matters, the usual response is simple.

Brazil doesn't play ball because they don't think terrorism is a Brazilian problem.

There is one reason why this type of pre-programmed response has begun to change on the Brazilian side.

Brazil is becoming more important on the global stage. As the so-called "sleeping giant" begins to make waves beyond South America, Brasilia will be expected to assist Washington and other countries with relevant security-related efforts, and this stretches well beyond UNASUR and Ameripol into the realm of terrorist financing, organized criminal activity out of Eastern Europe, and, most recently, terrorist communication networks.

Recently the Brazilian Federal Police, working with the FBI, captured an alleged "important leader" of the Al Qaeda organization. According to some reports, this man had a "high degree" of operational responsibility in the sector of communications.

This man, now named Khaled Hussein Ali, comes from the Bekaa Valley region of Lebanon and had worked in the IT sector in Sao Paulo. He has lived in Brazil for some 20 years.

His location in Sao Paulo is significant because heretofore, the focus of terrorist activity in Brazil, was in the south, bundled around Ciudad del Este, the focal point of the region's most famous tri-border area.

Khaled was arrested due to his association with the Jihad Media Battalion, which is known as a "very radical" Islamic group. He was arrested for racism on the 26th of April, then released some time later by a Brazilian federal judge who saw no reason to keep the guy under lock and key. The Brazilian government has denied that Khaled is part of Al Qaeda (predictably), but it has revoked Khaled's Lebanese passport.

As far as I know, there have been wire taps on Khaled's phones, and the Brazilian media continues to follow this case pretty closely. As I learn more, I'll post it here.

On the road again...

2009-05-30T06:54:00.001-07:00

I'm on the road again. Last Thursday, I gave a briefing on the evolution of organized crime and street gangs for a group in Los Angeles, focusing on Los Zetas and the MS-13.

Today, Saturday, I'm working with a film crew that is working on a documentary about meth in America. We're going to talk about how the US exported meth addiction south of the border and the Mexican involvement in the regional meth trade.

Then off to NYC next week for book publicity...

I have a long list of back logged information, so I hope to upload a number of posts before the end of next week.

Zetas in Belize and Texas

2009-05-20T06:32:00.000-07:00

A contact in Mexico told me this morning that according to his 2008 research, 67 "operational Zeta bases" were located on the Mexican border with Belize.

He went back in April 2009, and counted 78 operational bases that "specialized in criminal activity".

The border between Mexico and Belize is an underreported transit zone, one more likely to be used as the Guatemalan military works with the Mexicans to seal Guatemala's northern border in the Peten department (more on the Peten here, here and here).

Moving to Texas, a San Antonio paper reported today that the FBI is circulating to local and state authorities a report that gives a vague reference to the presence of a Zetas cell in Texas, complete with a ranch, inside Texas, where Zetas train others in the art of kidnapping, such as how to run a car off the road to kidnap the driver and/or passengers, surveillance, small groups tactics, etc.

The Zetas continue to evolve, and may even have become something of a criminal brand. It will be interesting to see how this news in Texas pans out.

We already know what will happen (or already has happened) in Belize - a new transshipment route from the Caribbean into southern Mexico...

Honduras: "En route to a failed state"

2009-05-18T04:02:00.000-07:00

Friends with NARBPO sent over a translated piece of an interesting editorial out of Honduras. The title "En route to a failed state" indicates, at least, that some people in Honduras are looking at a bleak future.

I would aruge that these spikes in violence are a combination of an ongoing street gang problem and spillover from Mexico.

Here's the translation El Heraldo (5/14/09):

The slaughter of seven workers Tuesday in the town of Arizona (no connection with state of Arizona in the U.S.) , Department (read : state) of Atlantida, on the same day that various more persons were assassinated in different events in the country, is a bloody indication of the increase in criminality to levels never before seen. One day before, on Monday, four policemen lost their lives, two in Olancho and two in Tegucigalpa, which once again manifests that insecurity affects everyone equally, even law enforcement agents. It’s unacceptable that every time more and more Hondurans of all social classes are victims of assassinations, extortions, robberies and all type of criminal acts and that the immense majority of the cases remain an absolute mystery and go unpunished. If the political and administrative chaos continues and nothing is done to combat organized crime, which each time carries out more daring activities, we shall go from being a poor and underdeveloped nation to being a failed state.

Publishers Weekly review of my book

2009-05-18T03:42:00.000-07:00

I've posted below the Publishers Weekly review of my book. This is the kind of cookie-cutter review we've all seen on Amazon, but it's a great overview of the story (with a couple of gratuitous comments thrown in:

This Is for the Mara Salvatrucha: Inside the MS-13, America’s Most Violent Gang Samuel Logan. Hyperion, $24.99 (256p) ISBN 978-1-4013-2324-0

Using all of the tools of a capable police investigation, Logan, a journalist based in Latin America, connects the fortunes of Brenda Paz, a Honduran-American teenager, with the ultraviolent Mara Salvatrucha gang. After family difficulties led Paz’s father to send her to Texas to live with her uncle, she witnessed a friend’s murder by her boyfriend, the leader of the local MS-13 gang, and fled to Virginia following her boyfriend’s arrest. Logan probes the secretive Mara Salvatrucha, which funds its illegal activities through extortion, kidnapping, prostitution, drugs and theft, causing the FBI to label it the most dangerous of all criminal outfits. Eventually Paz informs on the gang about the national leadership and crimes, and the Feds unwisely stash the restless teenager in the witness protection program. Placing the reader in the midst of this story with harrowing detail, Logan writes of a young life wasted and an evil crime empire. (July)

Demand (in)elasticity for cocaine in EU

2009-05-14T04:51:00.000-07:00

I'm in Portugal this week, so I've been curious to find out more from local contacts (here and in Spain) about the demand for cocaine in the EU.

Spain, by the way, is by far at the top of the countries over here that report high levels of cocaine use.

This morning, I saw a piece from La Semana, which reported on this item from the BBC which states that the price for cocaine is higher in EU, while the quality is less pure.

According to the article, the price for a kilo of cocaine (likely not a pure kilo) in the UK was US$59,500 in 2008, and is US$68,700 in May 2009. Retail prices, the BBC article mentioned, have remained the same. So let's just focus on wholesale...

We've seen that kind of statement before in the US (here is a summary), usually from the DEA or the Drug Czar's office (both obviously biased sources). And we've seen the opposite, from the same source, but over here in Europe, I wonder about the elasticity of demand for cocaine since the EU is a relatively untapped market with a number of independent actors at the wholesale and retail level.

When considering price elasticity for anything, there are some key determinants at play, such as necessity and duration.

Necessity is probably pretty high, as addiction dictates that users will continue to "need" coke, even as the price goes up. This would point to a more inelastic demand curve.

The duration of this price hike is likely short. pure coke is always in storage somewhere, so the groups shipping the product to the EU can pump up the volume when necessary, which would drive down price (but never too low) and improve quality (never too high). If the duration is short, we again have an ineslastic demand curve.

Now, my econ 101 teacher would probably tell me that we shouldn't think about price elasticity for illegal products because the black market does not play by the rules. For me, it's an interesting exercise b/c I'm interested in seeing how long the cocaine market will continue to grow in Europe. How deep will it go? That is, how many countries, cities, etc. will begin to report on cocaine addiction and the resulting health problems.

Looking at how the EU deal with this growing social health problem will be an interesting point of comparison to the US. On one side of the Atlantic (the US) we've seen supply-side interdiction efforts and a heavy hand towards interdiction, with little effort put into prevention and harm reduction. What will the EU do?

The Guatemalan Community Defense Network

2009-05-14T03:58:00.001-07:00

Guatemalans living in the United States have come together to blow the whistle on abusive deportation raids.

The Guatemalan Community Defense Network (GCDN) came together to avoid "by any means" the Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) detentions. So far, they have freed at least 60 undocumented workers.

Rhode Island, Arizona, and Chicago are the areas where this group is the most organized.
The defense network is manned by volunteers, who remain on watch for a period of a few days.
"We have an emergency number that works 24 hours. In case ICE detains an emigrant on the street, or tried to knock down the door of his house, the undocumented persons must call immediately, so that we can arrive and protect his rights," Shanna Kurland, a GCDN organizer told Guatemalan daily Prensa Libre.

In Rhode Island, a local Guatemalan radio station is part of the network. It broadcasts 24 hours, and when the network phones start ringing, one of the volunteers calls the radio station, which begins to broadcast the address of the ICE deportation raid.

Those who arrive, bring cameras, and demand that the law is followed, and that rights are protected. The 60 undocumented workers who have been released were set free because when ICE executed the raid, they did so without deportation orders, which is illegal, explained Prensa Libre.

One other item of note from the Prensa Libre article:

Maricela Garcia, Latin Politics Forum representative in Chicago, asserted that the Guatemalans and Central Americans adopted a new lobbying procedure without having to leave their homes. “Fear reigns among the migrants; they have fear of being captured or deported, for which reason now they get together in homes and invite their friends to write lobbying letters for a migratory reform and afterward they send them to the congressmen of the whole country”, said Garcia. This new method is called “congressmen’s fiestas.”

Immigration is history

2009-05-14T03:33:00.000-07:00

As the immigration debate begins to gain traction again in US mainstream media and inside the Beltway, I thought it would be interesting to put a little perspective on the spin:

Below is a translation prepared by some friends at the National Association of Former Border Patrol Officers. The original information was prepared by the Center of Investigation of Economic and Community Political Action, based in San Cristobal de las Casas, Chiapas.

Every day, at least 165 people in the state of Chiapas lose hope and leave for the United States. Fifteen years ago such emigration was unnoticeable, but now it has turned this southernmost Mexican state into one that most exemplifies this trend.

The main reasons that people leave are lack of employment and natural disasters such as the hurricane of 2005 that affected 41 cities in this region.

The history of Mexican migration to the US began in the 1880s when Southern Pacific and Santa Fe railway companies began to “import” cheap labor, the majority of which was indigenous Mexicans. Up to 1910, they recruited 20,000 Mexicans annually.

During the First World War, our countrymen played an important role in the economic development of the US, receiving in return from that government a wave of violence and persecution; war veterans physically attacked workers labeled as “aliens,” burned down their houses and stole their belongings. No one stopped them.

But neither the hunters nor the fences have halted the emigration toward the so called “first world country.” As an example, of those from Chiapas who migrate to the US, 79% never return. Our countrymen have advanced significantly in their type of work, from agricultural workers to construction, manufacturing and services.

In the city of Frontera Comalapa, a travel agency popularly known as “tijuaneras” [alluding to trips to Tijuana] has changed to focus its business on one purpose: every week, 40 buses leave from this area with at least 40 people from Chiapas headed for Tijuana, Baja California, with the intention to “cross the line.”

Immigration goes back much farther than 2006.

When considering how we will change/improve/etc immigration legislation, I think it's important to note that immigration is a part of US history. Trying to "get rid of them" didn't work in the the 19th century (or before), so why should we think that deportation would work now?

Catching up on some reading

2009-05-12T01:46:00.000-07:00

I've been on the road since last Thursday, and only today have I been able to catch up on some reading. I've added here some interesting stories with more detailed posts to follow later today.

1. Ecuador troops hunting down the FARC. This is one of the first stories I've seen that sheds some light on what Ecuador is doing to stop the spread of the FARC inside Ecuador.

2. Just over a ton of explosives found near Colombia/Venezuela border. This cache allegedly belonged to the FARC. The amount of explosives is the most alarming aspect of this news. A seizure this large certainly puts a dent in any short-term plans the FARC has for exploding anything east of Bogota.

3. Dominican and French "terrorists" busted in Venezuela. El Universal piece here. These guys had assault rifles, C-4 explosives, and other toys. Chavez is still mum on these guys, but rumors have spread in the gov't that it was a group set up to try to overthrow the Chavez regime.

4. A well-heeled lawyer killed in Guatemala City's Zona 14 - a nice part of town. This is an interesting case that authorities are still trying to unravel. The lawyer blamed the President Alvaro Colom, in a post-humusly released video, for his death. More here.

5. A former member of Los Zetas spoke with a white boy. I've seen interviews in Mexico, but this is the first English language piece I've seen out there... The information is not new.

UPDATE (May 16, 2009): a much better interview, prepared by Charles Bowden for Harper's Magazine, is on the stands. From what I heard, the other interview is a bit thin...

6. Finally, an interesting piece from the LA Times that looks at the immigration debate, again.

On the road...

2009-05-11T02:25:00.000-07:00

I've been traveling - Brazil, UK, Spain, Portugal, US - for the past week or so with no connection. When I'm settled again later this week, I'll be back to normal posting.

Brazil's Iron Lady has cancer

2009-05-04T07:31:00.000-07:00

I have said many times now that Brazil has a bright future. And on 25 April it just got a little brighter for Lula's team.

With Obama in office, the realities of Brazil's increasing power and presence in South America, and the very real possibility that Brazil will not ask for financial help from the IMF or anyone else to help weather the global economic slow-down, President Lula will leave his hand picked successor everything she needs to carry Brazil into its new role as a regional leader and global energy provider.

Dilma Rousseff, currently serving as Lula's chief of staff, has a decent chance of winning, but now, it looks like her chances just got better because she has cancer.

On 22 April, she found out that a swollen lymph node was malignant. On 24 April, she told her boss, President Lula, and on the 25th, both stood on a stage in Manaus and brought the news to Brazil.

Lula had weighed his chances.

First, Dilma's doctor caught the cancer very early. According to one expert here, she has over 90% chance of complete recovery.

Second, right now, Dilma runs some 30 points behind Jose Serra, the "other" candidate for Brazil's presidency (elections in 2010). But she's already at 11%, well ahead of her initial polling results at 3%. And we're not even close to the campaign, which will begin around May, 2010.

Third, many here agree that Dilma's greatest political weakness is two fold. One, she's never run for political office. Two, her "iron-lady" reputation, might not resonate well with Lula's supporters who are used to his warm smile, teddy bear presence, and well practiced charisma.

By getting out in front of Brazilian media, putting out details of Dilma's cancer, her recovery prognosis, and her intentions to "nao se entrega", or not give up, Lula and his team has dealt a political master stroke.

As Dilma passes through her four month treatment, Lula's press office will release some photos of her suffering, and maybe even one of her bald. The bottom line effect is to make her more human.

Dilma is already known as a tough lady who's been through a lot. She was tortured, was an armed guerrilla fighter, has been through divorce, among other hardships. Add cancer to that list, and Dilma has a great portfolio of drama in her past - something Brazilians love.

The other important factor is that Dilma has never been out in front of a campaign. She's relying completely on various members of her party, the PT, to help her on a regional and local level.

Until the news of her cancer came out - and more importantly, the news that Lula stood behind her 100% - many members of the PT were skeptical, and didn't want to openly support her candidacy.

Now, as more and more PT members, as well as the members of other parties, begin to voice support for Dilma - support for her to get well, initially - she will be seen by Brazilian media and possibly the rest of the world as a "consolidated candidate," and Lula can enter 2010 with Dilma recovered, with a more solid backing, and ready to win over the Brazilian voting public with her cancer story.

Normally, cancer is a cause for worry, sadness, and sorrow. Not in Brazil. Dilma's cancer is (almost) cause for celebration in Lula's camp. With out it, Dilma's chances of winning were slim to none. With it, she's got a much better chance of winning, and beating out Jose Serra, a very strong candidate.

Border Patrol on the wrong side of the Law

2009-05-01T07:43:00.000-07:00

I was on the FBI's San Antonio press releases page for 2009, and I was struck by the five stories I saw about Customs and Border Patrol officers or inspectors in Texas who have either plead guilty or have been convicted of bribery, corruption, smuggling, etc.

Doesn't that seem like a lot?

I'll also share a story I came across some time ago about another Border Patrol Agent who fell on the wrong side of the law:

BROWNSVILLE — A former Border Patrol agent was sentenced Wednesday to 14 years in federal prison for helping drug smugglers move a 44-pound cocaine load.

Prosecutors showed that 30-year-old Leonel Morales, of Zapata County, took $9,000 in exchange for telling drug smugglers how to avoid sensors and drawing a map of the best routes for shepherding drugs through the county. He also bragged he could keep other Border Patrol agents out of the way.

Morales made the drug smuggling deal during the summer of 2008, unaware he was being recorded. He pleaded guilty to bribery in January.

The sentencing judge in Laredo also ordered him to pay an $11,000 fine.

FBI press release on Morales here.

DEA scores extradition victory

2009-04-30T06:32:00.000-07:00

The DEA successfully extradited the first Colombian drug trafficker from Sierra Leon, a country considered to be at the top of the list of West African countries where Colombians, Venezuelans, and others are deeply involved in moving drugs from South America into Europe.

You don't know who Geraldo Quintana Pérez is because he did a good job keeping a low profile, at least for a while. (picture shows his plane and load of coke.)

He arrived in Sierra Leon about two years ago, but when he made an unauthorized landing in Freetown, Sierra Leon on 13 July, 2008, it was his last.

His plane had left Venezuela, making stops in Trinidad and Tobago, Grenada, Barbados, and Santa Lucia before flying across the Atlantic to Sierra Leon.

He, along with his partner, was busted with 600 kilos of coke (worth about 125 million Euros), and two rifles, an AK-47, and an AK-48

From the DEA press release:

QUINTANA-PEREZ, 51, and PEREZ, 30, were arrested in Freetown, Sierra Leone on July 13, 2008 on Sierra Leonean charges, following the seizure of approximately 600 kilograms of cocaine. Upon their arrest in Sierra Leone, the defendants were tried there on drug trafficking charges, of which they were convicted on April 20, 2009. Thereafter, the Government of Sierra Leone transferred the defendants to American custody.

More details here, in Spanish.

Congratulations.

Now, will we see any extraditions from Guinea-Bissau?

El Goyo captured

2009-04-30T05:57:00.000-07:00

Arrests and seizures in Mexico are part of my daily news diet, but when police capture an old-school member of the Gulf Cartel, it's something I have to post.

Gregiorio Sauceda Gamboa, aka "El Goyo," was an original member of the Gulf Cartel as it was molded under the leadership of Osiel Cardenas, dating back to 1996 (pictured in the middle).

He was a heavy hitter, often asked to perform some of the more risky assignments hunting down members of the El Chapo's organization for kidnap, torture, and murder. This guy was a former investigative police officer, and likely had close contacts with many police in Tamaulipas, where he was arrested in Matamoros, with his wife, while sitting in a stash house stocked with thousands of rounds of ammunition, a number of long guns, and a M72A3 rocket launcher.

At different times in his narco career, El Goyo ran operations in Nuevo Laredo, Reynosa, and Matamoros.

According to a Houston Chronicle article, El Goyo moved an averaged 10 tons of cocaine and 30 tons of marijuana a month at the height of his drug trafficking activity, although recently, he's been "less" involved.

He'll probably be extradited to the US, and we'll never hear from him again.

FARC kills eight soldiers

2009-04-30T05:39:00.000-07:00

When I see news about the FARC killing eight soldiers in Colombia, near the Venezuelan border, I'm reminded that there is still some fight in this old revolutionary dog.

The Colombian government argues that the FARC is on the decline, with high desertion rates, and a declining revenue base.

And it's true. The FARC today is not what it was five years ago, or three years ago. I think we're looking at the "middle of the end" for the FARC.

But I have to consider the possibility that the FARC has, for years now, made concerted efforts to move beyond Colombian borders into Venezuela and Ecuador. Some time ago, we prepared a piece on the FARC's presence outside of Colombia. Venezuela is certainly a welcoming environment.

Given the country's well established role as a drug transit zone, and the ongoing allegations that at least a section of the Venezuelan National Guard is a drug smuggling organization (called the Sun Cartel by DEA agents in Venezuela before they got kicked out the first time), it is certainly a great place to operate compared to Colombia.

In Ecuador, the president is not a vocal supporter, but he is willing to look the other way, and allow the FARC to operate just inside Ecuador. Even if he isn't willing to let the FARC play on Ecuadorian soil, Correa has limited political currency, and I'm not sure he wants to spend it on making a loud and expensive campaign against the FARC.

Back to those eight soldiers. They fell under attack from the 49th front of the FARC, according to La Semana. The 49th front is known to operate on both sides of the border between Venezuela and Colombia. It is also considered the Caribbean front of the FARC, operating around the Guajira peninsula.

It will be interesting to see if Chavez answers Uribe's call to hunt down these FARC soldiers. I doubt it.

(image from colombiareports.com)

Illegal refineries in Colombia

2009-04-29T05:38:00.000-07:00

The Latin American Herald Tribune has reported that Colombian police and army troops found and destroyed two refineries used by the FARC to process stolen oil.

This story caught my eye because I've never heard of the FARC using oil refineries, but it's certainly something that makes sense.

The refineries could produce up to 11 gallons of fuel an hour, and were reportedly under the control of the 29th Front.

Authorities seized 1,849 gallons of fuel and 11 steel drums, each able to hold about a barrel of crude oil.

These illegal refineries were found in the Nariño department, on the border with Ecuador.

Most Dangerous Cities in the US

2009-04-26T07:00:00.001-07:00

Just a quick note here to share the Forbes.com "Most Dangerous Cities" article, which made note that ten cities on the list overlap with Mexican organized criminal activity:

Though nationwide crime was down 3.5% year over year in the first six months of 2008, the cities atop our list illustrate a disturbing trend: All 10 of the most dangerous cities were among those identified by the Department of Justice as transit points for Mexican drug cartels.

The whole article is here.

That .50 cal anti-aircraft weapon

2009-04-23T09:57:00.000-07:00

I just came across an article here, that breaks down some of the curious details surrounding the seizure of a anti-aircraft machine gun found mounted in the bed of a pick up truck.

Here's the more relevant section:

One of the most worrisome weapons yet was seized this week just south of Nogales, Ariz.: a powerful gun mounted on the back of an SUV and protected by a thick metal shield. Police said it belonged to one of the Beltran Leyva drug gangs.

Mexican and U.S. authorities disagree on just what type of gun it was. Federal police coordinator Gen. Rodolfo Cruz maintains it was .50-caliber anti-air craft machine gun. ATF, the U.S. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives, said it was an unmodified .50-caliber semiautomatic rifle made by TNW, a U.S. firearms manufacturer.

ATF investigators traced the gun - along with seven others seized at a house in Sonora state on Monday - to suppliers in the United States, said Bill Newell, special agent in charge of the ATF in Arizona and New Mexico.

While crudely built, the truck-mounted rifle would give traffickers a powerful advantage against lightly armed police, Newell said: A gunman could protect a whole convoy with sweeping fire while protected by the metal shield.

"Imagine being a two- or three-man police team at a rural checkpoint and these guys roll up with this thing," Newell said. "You'd be slightly intimidated, wouldn't you?"

Background checks on politicians

2009-04-23T06:49:00.000-07:00

Ahead of the upcoming 5 July legislative elections for all 500 seats of Mexico's lower house (as well as some gubernatorial seats), the PRD, has publicly asked the Attorney General's office (PGR) to complete background checks on all PRD candidates to ensure that they have no ties to organized crime.

The PRD has also asked the PGR to conduct background checks on PAN and PRI candidates as well.

This is a bold move, considering it's quite possible the PGR fingers some PRD members for ties to org. crime.

What's more interesting is that the PRI, arguably the party best positioned to gain some seats, is also the party most likely to have compromised politicians on the ticket, especially in the lower house.

The PAN, President Calderon's party, is in trouble, as many people are tired of the violence, and there's a growing momentum in Mexico of columnists, academics, thinkers, etc, who suspect the PAN will lose big in the upcoming elections.

But if the PGR takes up the PRD on its offer, then we're in for an interesting election cycle.

Finally, it's worth mention that many of us who think about ties between org. crime and politicians in Mexico would agree that org. crime focuses more on bribing state level politicians, from the governor down, and normally leaves the federal stuff alone - with the exception of killing federal level law enforcement officials from time to time.

So if the PGR does choose to investigate all candidates, it will be interesting to see who gets caught and who gets elected. Either way, I suspect Calderon will not like the outcome.

Trends of violence in Mexico so far in 2009

2009-04-21T07:35:00.001-07:00

Houston gun smuggling case

2009-04-15T08:28:00.001-07:00

This graphic from today's New York Times. (click for larger image). Here is the story.

Money Laundering in Brazil and Switzerland

2009-04-14T08:31:00.000-07:00

A federal judge in Sao Paulo recently sent a letter to the United Nations and the Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering to accuse Switzerland of violating a UN international convention because the Swiss government refused to inform a Credit Suisse employee that he had been subpoenaed to testify in Brazil.

The employee in question, Thomas Ulhmann, had been indicted in a criminal case in Brazil, accused of participating in a scheme that allowed Brazilians to open Credit Suisse bank accounts to launder money.

Switzerland does not have a bilateral money laundering agreement with Brazil, which forced the judge to arrange the subpoena through the 2003 Palermo Convention, signed by both countries, whereby both countries in theory should cooperate on matters related to money laundering.

Switzerland continues to snub the Brazilian judge, saying that Ulhmann did not violate Swiss laws.

This exchange has gone on amidst the larger debate over Switzerland's role in global money laundering practices. Switzerland has been included on the OECD and G-20 lists of "fiscal paradises." In response to this accusation, Switzerland has frozen all contributions to the OECD.

Finally, according to the BBC, some 70% of Brazilian overseas investments go to fiscal paradises. In 2008, some US$104 billion in Brazilian investments was placed abroad, with 50% of that money placed in Bahamas and the Caymans.

Why doesn't anyone worry about Guatemala?

2009-04-07T11:48:00.000-07:00

I don't spend much time reading the Guatemala Times, but I have to admit, they did a great job on making a list of interesting and perhaps important events related to the country's on going security crisis. You can find it here.

Here's more:

The Southern Pulse network (now with its database and new website finally in beta testing) has learned that one in four immigrants crossing from Guatemala to Mexico are stopped, detained, and deported. Simply put, the Mexico/Guatemala border is less patrolled and much, much less secure that the US/Mexico border.

Couple that fact with the fact that Ecuador, Nicaragua, and now Honduras have all relaxed visa requirements for a number of countries, including China, Iran, and Russia (see? some diplomacy has paid off for these international "bad boys"), and you've got basically an open sieve into Mexico from just about every sketchy country in the world...

Enter Alvaro Colom, the embattled president of Guatemala (pictured above, thanks Guat. Times).

He's a chain smoker, runs around with a 12-man security detail, and recently dealt with a scandal that blew up when he discovered that his chief of intelligence had bugged his bedroom, living room, and office - only to turn around and sell the intel to Mexican organized crime. Alvaro Colom's political party is littered with old school organized criminal elements who are in bed with Mexican organized crime, and his police are just as corrupt as the guys in Mexico.

More detail here and here.

Now, consider Colom's limited budget, limited number of trusted personnel, and double-dish security issues with both organized criminals and street gangsters running amock.

What will happen if Calderon manages to put too much heat on the DTOs in Mexico?

As we've already seen, there is a clear and well documented spillover, and not north but south. Guatemala is today a serious issue, and if there is any state in the Americas that is close to failure, it is Guatemala, not Mexico. Why doesn't the US government see this?

Why doesn't mainstream media talk about it? Probably because its too far away from US borders. The truth is, however, that if Guatemala becomes a failed state, both Mexico and the US will suffer. I sincerely hope it does not come to that.

Weekend News Review - FARC, Customs corruption, and grenades

2009-04-06T05:52:00.000-07:00

1) Colombian President Alvaro Uribe said that if the FARC keeps quiet and avoids any skirmishes with anyone for "three or four" months, then he will consider peace talks.

Up until now, Uribe has been staunchly against talking to the FARC. History has shown that the FARC is not always the most honest negotiators. But that was when the rebel army was much stronger. In its weakened state, peace might not be a bad idea.

Semana article here.

2) One of the conclusions of the 20th annual meeting of Interpol (held in Chile this year) was that Al-Qaeda (or any terrorist organization, really) could infiltrate Latin America because of lenient or in some cases (Ecuador and Nicaragua) non-existent immigration controls.

Of the 150 million or so annual visits to Latin America from other countries around the world, only 50 million passports are scanned, according to Ronald Noble, Interpol Secretary General.

Interpol is specifically worried about Central America.

3) Texas authorities seized some $120,000, gun parts, and "grenades" from a car headed south on Interstate-35, according to the San Antonio News.

Obviously the grenades are interesting. My sources mostly agree that grenades used in Mexico come from Guatemala. To sell grenades in the US, a merchant must operate a class two license, I believe, which is a very strict legal regime.

The article notes these grenades are "improvised".

4) A 34 year-old Customs agent was arrested this past Friday (April, 3rd) on charges that he arranged to "wave immigrant and drug smugglers through his inspection booth for money." If convicted he could serve up to 35 years in prison - ouch!

As a Sheriff in southern Arizona recently told me, this is a "sin of omission." To break the law, these men don't actually do anything. It's what they don't do - i.e. stop a car stuffed with coke - that breaks the law. To wave the right car and receive thousands a week for doing so, with little chance of apprehension, so long you don't flash the money or act out, is a tough thing to turn down. I often wonder about this kind of "soft" corruption, and whether or not the border is littered with these guys...

5) Not surprisingly, Chihuahua State Governor, Jose Reyes Baeza, was attacked on 22 February. One of his bodyguards was killed during the attack, and two were wounded. Two of the men allegedly responsible were arrested in the city of Chihuahua on 31 March. They were caught with AR-15 rifles stolen from the wounded bodyguards.

This news only came out in English on 5 April... That in itself is interesting.

Bad Deal for ATF

2009-04-03T06:17:00.000-07:00

Why then did the Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement receive US$130 million to combat gun smuggling in a Senate bill designed to give a cash injection to security efforts on the border when the ATF only received US$50 million?

I'd like to meet the Staffer who came up with these numbers.

The agency that has the most expertise when it comes to investigating illegal weapons transfers from the white to the black market in the United States is the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms.

Here's a breakdown (press release here):

* $130 million to Immigration and Customs Enforcement for 350 full time investigators to work on firearm trafficking and money laundering investigations;

* $20 million for DHS to improve the tactical communications in the field for CBP and ICE;

* $20 million for CBP to modernize its database used to identify potential criminals at the ports of entry;

* $30 million for Operation Stonegarden to reimburse state and local law enforcement for their participation in border actions;

* $50 million to the Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms agency to hire an additional 150 investigators and 50 inspectors to investigate firearms trafficking at the Mexican border;

* $10 million to provide assistance and equipment to local law enforcement along the Southern border and in the High Intensity Drug Trafficking Areas to combat criminal narcotics activity;

* $20 million for the Human Smuggling and Trafficking Center at DHS to better coordinate investigations between federal, state, and local law enforcement;

* $10 million for DHS’ Office of International Affairs and the Undersecretary for Management to oversee implementation of the Merida Initiative and to increase its staffing at the U.S. Embassy in Mexico.

Also, I see no provision to help the local sheriffs, or any wording that specifies that the federal government will work with local knowledge.

The ATF does receive some 200 new agents, but it will be at least 18 months before these agents are able to effectively contribute.

The ATF guys I know who work on the border will surely be happy to receive some funding, but they're likely to feel at least a little perturbed by what is clearly a Senate move to push Homeland Security onto their turf.

Chavez attacking his opposition

2009-04-03T04:29:00.000-07:00

On the first day of April, officials from Venezuela's Military Intelligence Division (DIM) arrived at the house of former Defense Minister Raul Isaias Baduel. They said they had a warrant, but never showed the papers.

When Baduel resisted, the men drew arms and forced him into their awaiting car under duress.

Baduel's lawyer is worried that he may be killed while in custody.

As you may recall, Baduel made a very public split from Chavez ahead of the November 2007 Constitutional referendum. One story on Chavez's defeat and Baduel's role is here.

A piece I wrote at the time is here.

In other news, another leader in the Venezuelan opposition, former presidential candidate Manuel Rosales, went into hiding on 31 March as word of investigation into corruption swirled in Venezuelan national media.

A Reuters story is here.

Bottom line, Chavez is worried. He's targeting the most powerful members of Venezuela's traditional opposition ahead of the next round of elections.

Finally, I'll add that a new opposition party has emerged in Venezuela. As reported by Southern Pulse | Networked Intelligence on 24 March, the National Assembly in Defense of Popular Power held its first party meeting on 23 March in Caracas. The name suggests that this party will go after winning votes from the poor Venezuelans who have become disillusioned with Chavez.

Torture and human trafficking in Reynosa

2009-03-31T09:27:00.000-07:00

Based on an informant's tip, Mexican soldiers kicked in the door at a house in Reynosa, Tamaulipas on 28 March. They found 55 immigrant hostages huddled together. The smell of urine mixed with screams as the heavily armed men barged in.

Blood splattered the walls and floor in one room used for torture. The culprit: a 2x4 spiked with nails used to beat and punish the immigrants as they waited for their family members in the US to pay the ransom: US$3,000 a head.

The leader - allegedly the son of a local police agent - and four others were arrested. After handcuffing the leader, he was hooded and pushed into a bathroom, where two soldiers allegedly filled a bucket of water and used a near drowning technique to force him to reveal the location of two other such houses.

This bust and the following reporting surfaced worries about human rights abuses among soldiers with the Mexican army. Through their work, however, we continue to receive proof that the Gulf Cartel - solidly in control in Tamaulipas - continues to operate human trafficking networks.

"We're Sending Federal Agents to the Border"

2009-03-27T07:20:00.000-07:00

The Dallas Morning News, along with a number of other major newspapers in the US, has given decent coverage to Clinton's visit to Mexico. But in many cases, this coverage is only skin deep.

I was reading this story just a few minutes ago, and the below paragraph jumped out at me:

The White House said Tuesday that it was sending hundreds of additional federal agents to the U.S.-Mexican border to help border states deal with the spillover effects of the violence and to stop the flow of guns and money from the U.S. to Mexico.

I was recently in Arizona and Sonora, Mexico, and spent a lot of time talking to Federal agents, off the record.

They did mention that Washington was planning on sending more federal agents, but when I asked if these agents would be rotated out from other posts, they told me that it was not likely.

The story I heard was that when the White House makes these announcements, it's for public consumption, not to bolster the faltering morale of the federal agents working on the border under stressful conditions.

The truth is, when Congress loosens the purse for more federal agents, the time between the moment when the funding comes down and when the new agent becomes an effective force on the ground can be as much as 18 months, maybe more.

New recruits need to be trained. Depending on the agency - ICE, ATF, DEA, etc - the academy training takes at least six months, likely more.

There is a background check process.

Then, the greenhorn, or FNG (F#$king New Guy), has to be paired up with a veteran. And as some of the veterans told me, this pairing doesn't mean you have double the effectiveness. If anything, two men - a vet and a rookie - add up to less than one agent as the rookie's steep learning curve in the field forces the veteran to slow down.

So when the White House tells us that more federal agents will be sent to the border, take that as good news, but keep in mind that will be around a year and a half before this new group adds value.

I applaud the effort, but it is one that should have been made years ago.

South Am Security Paradigm Continues Shifting

2009-03-25T07:13:00.000-07:00

Not two days after I published a piece with the ISN on how we're seeing a paradigm shift on security in South America, Brazil follows up on the Obama/Lula meeting and takes the lead on suggesting that the MercoSur countries - Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay, and Paraguay - develop a sub-regional police force modeled after Interpol.

Here is the story in Portuguese (thanks Mr. H. for sending this along).

The premise of the piece is that Brazil will present at the next MercoSur meeting a proposal to create "Mercopol" - a security organization that brings together the federal police units of each member country.

A few reactions:

First, it seems that Brazil is testing the geopolitical waters. By floating this idea within a forum that it closely controls (albeit with some bickering from Argentina), Brazil can get a sense of how the region as a whole would cozy up to the idea of a South American police force formed under UNASUR, as Lula mentioned in his meeting with Obama.

Second, this proposal will give all countries involved in MercoSur, even the observers and the associate members - thinking Chile, Bolivia, Ecuador here - a chance to approve or disapprove, again within a forum that is not too heavy in terms of political liability on the regional level.

Third, if Mercopol were to be formed, I suspect there would be a heightened opposition to Venezuela's full entry into MercoSur (still held up in the Brazilian Congress much to Chavez's chagrin).

Finally, this is yet another example of Brazil taking a leadership role. The UNASUR Defense Council (Brazil's idea) has already stated that it will not place drug trafficking and organized crime on its agenda because these are not military problems. And this is absolutely correct. What we need, however, is a federal police complement to UNASUR's Defense Council.

Mercopol could easily morph into such an organization and perhaps feed into Ameripol, which to date has done little more than meet and talk. Bottom line, Brazil is making moves to become South America's head cop. We will see if some of the region's top cop countries - Colombia and Chile specifically - fall in line behind Mercopol.

Mexico's Narco Counterculture

2009-03-24T11:31:00.000-07:00

In Mexico, you can go from nothing to a hired hit man in as little as three months, according to Mexico's Secretariat of Public Security (SSP). The hired gun position within most DTOs is the third up the ladder. Informant and recruiter comes first.

The analysis describes the three month process of becoming a narco hit man as one that has become something of a narco counterculture, one that presents "work in the gang as synonymous with success."

Minimum wage in Mexico is about 700 pesos a week (roughly US$65). Working as only an informant can bring as much as US$140 to US350 a week. The job requires that informants simply report on what moves in their area of responsibility. If invited to move up the ladder, young assassins can earn as much as US$700 a week, ten times more than they likely earned with a legitimate job.

Mexico as a Hollow State

2009-03-24T11:02:00.000-07:00

The good people at the National Journal agreed to post a discussion I offered on why Mexico is a hollow state, and why the country will never become a failed state.

See the post here.

Zetas as a Criminal Brand Name

2009-03-23T06:57:00.000-07:00

On 11 March, I published a piece on how the Zetas are evolving.

One of the most common evolutions is the use of the name "Los Zetas" as a criminal brand.

Armed thugs across Mexico have begun calling themselves Zetas simply to provoke fear in their victims - a useful tool for control when attacking a small village to search for and then carry away targets for ransom kidnapping.

The Houston Chronicle published a piece on 22 March that underlines exactly what I was talking about.

Here is an excerpt:

Solis said he and other townspeople suspect those who raided Cuauhtémoc in early February, kidnapping the 23-year-old son of a bean-and-grain trader, are simply “bad characters from the area who have just taken the Zeta name.”

Fear of the Zetas borders on hysteria in this corner of Durango state, residents and officials agreed. Village boys playing with toy trucks have taken to shouting “here come the Zetas” when staging chases, Solis said.

When a rumor started March 10 in a town nearby that scores of Zetas were planning to attack, stores in the area closed, classes were canceled and people fled.

“A psychosis prevails across the whole region,” said Isidro Aguilar, the police chief of Guadalupe Victoria, a market town 25 miles from Cuauhtemoc, who otherwise denied that the area faces a crime plague. “There are people who are taking advantage of it.”

Pen and Pad with Napolitano

2009-03-23T06:38:00.000-07:00

In a recent pen and pad secession with DHS Chief Janet Napolitano, a journalist asked a very good question:

Is that part of the problem, Madam Secretary, that the Mexico portfolio, you know, touches on so many agencies? Is the Administration at all thinking about housing them all, you know, particularly, you know, security, so that it’s not State and Department of Justice and Homeland Security but sort of creating a Mexico Security Czar?

This is entirely true. We have the DHS coming in with CBP and ICE. There is the DOJ with the DEA, the FBI, and the ATF. There is the DOS, which runs the Merida Initiative, and there is the White House - where an number of Obama-backed initiatives are born and passed along to others to implement.

Her answer:

You know, I don’t know about that. I mean a lot of the issues I deal with involve many agencies. I mean that’s just the problems of today don’t really match up with government, you know, organizations of — that we have in a way. They — they — and so one of my tasks is to be able to work with my colleagues on the Cabinet, with the White House, and with others and to recognize, you know, there are things Homeland Security will be doing, there are things that are going to impact the Department of State, impact DOJ and so forth, and that’s — that’s — you know, that — that’s the effort that’s going on now, is to make sure that we all know what each other is doing and are speaking with a consistent voice.

But — but if I had to sum up where we are, it’s that this issue’s getting top attention in multiple departments of the U.S., that planning is well underway and that we are having extensive discussions with our federal colleagues within Mexico and it is really focused on assisting the Mexican Government with their fight against the cartels. One facet of that assistance is looking at what we can do to stop cash and guns, and you guys didn’t ask me about cash which is kind of interesting, from going south.

One aspect of it is supporting our state and local law enforcement along the border and being ever prepared to respond with more resources should we see spill-over violence in the way I described it to you occurring...

I don't think a Mexican Drug Czar is the answer, but we can certainly make sure that the lines separating different agencies stay in place.

Operation Armas Cruzadas, the anti-gun smuggling program operated by ICE, is a good example. ICE agents are not arms experts. They are not well equipped to build a solid case against errant arms dealers, and they don't have the local knowledge (in places like Arizona and Texas) where most arms are legally purchased before slipping into the gray market.

With the exception of the X Caliber case (see below post), which was a fluke, the ATF has long demonstrated expertise when combatting gun smuggling. When ICE comes in with its own arms smuggling operation, it muddies the waters, creates conflict on the ground among agents, and further complicates the mission. This is just one example. Moving forward, I would argue that the one item that will most quickly deep six our efforts to control the border, to stop arms and cash from moving south, and to stop drugs from coming north, will be our inability to manage one large communications nightmare between so many agencies.

S*#t Hit the Fan

2009-03-20T11:18:00.001-07:00

On 18 March, a judge dismissed the charges against a Phoenix gun dealer accused of helping move weapons south to Mexico to arm the drug trafficking organizations.

Details are here and here.

I blurred the edges of the photo to cover identification tags on the weapons.

I was in the ATF office in Phoenix on Monday, and some of the guys were talking about testifying later in the week. The trial was big news with these guys, and many of them had worked hard to bring this errant gun dealer to justice. From what I read and heard off the record, I was convinced that the prosecutor had an airtight case. Then a judge throws the case out because there was not enough evidence to lead to a conviction. This is a shot in the gut for the ATF and the US government. Even when a solid case is presented in court, these guys still can't get a break. The case will go to appeal, but I'm not hopeful there will be an overturn on the judge's decision. We'll see.

The Locals of Douglas/Agua Prieta

2009-03-18T07:43:00.000-07:00

Agua Prieta, Sonora - just across the border from Douglas, Az - is perhaps the only Mexican border town that hasn't seen astronomical violence.

Even in the next town over, in Naco, men find time to corner one another and spray pick ups with hundreds of bullets.

But not in Agua Prieta. This is a town where everyone knows the name "El Chapo" - the head of the so-called Sinaloa Cartel - and no one knows the name "Calderón" - the president of Mexico.

El Chapo keeps a strong grip on Agua Prieta, preventing all but what many consider a normal level of violence.

About a year and a half ago, there were a few days when local cops found bodies here and there, but that was soon over. It was more of a message to anyone even thinking about trying to take over Agua Prieta: just keep thinking.

The locals in Douglas don't know much about gun smuggling. And they don't know much about the violence that rages across Mexico. Many of them get on with their daily lives, interestingly unaware of what's going on just to the east in El Paso/Juarez, or to the west in Nogales.

There is one local, however, who knows more about gun smuggling across the Douglas border than anyone else. He owns the only gun store in town.

"I get five thousand dollar bribes every week," he told me yesterday as an opening statement to what turned out to be a 45 minute monologue on why he keeps to the law and how the guys at the ATF - Bureau of Alcohol Tobacco and Firearms - won't leave him alone.

And with good reason. While staying well within the law, he can sell all the ammunition he wants to corrupt Mexican cops. Its such a large loophole that the ATF has asked him nicely not to sell to the Mexican cops.

Within the law, he can sell as many "long guns" as he wants. These are the so-called "weapons of choice" - the AR-15 variations and AK-47s.

About a year ago, he sold between five and ten long guns to a couple guys - nothing illegal about it - and some of the guns were used in Naco at a shoot out. When the guns traced back to his shop, the ATF agents on the case could only get the name and information of the men who bought the guns, but not the men who smuggled them across the border. This gray area - called the gray market - is where the legal trail ends, and the black market begins. Again, the gun dealer is just running a business.

If a guy comes into the store, obviously a gang banger or an otherwise sketchy individual, and wants to buy a gun, there's nothing the gun dealer can do if the guy checks out. Refusing a sale might get the gun dealer into trouble, especially if the customer wants to start talking about discrimination.

Back at the Border Mart, there is no talk of guns or drugs, really. People come and go, and "coyotes", known as "polleros" or chicken herders, often come in for a quick stop after a long day of smuggling people into the US.

Today, I'm heading back into Agua Prieta to learn more about how and why this town has managed through the recent trying times of violence, the economy, and a new feeling from the gringos who don't seem to want them any more.

Maybe I'll find someone who knows the president's name, not Obama (everyone knows him) but Calderón.

Hiding guns in a massive load...

2009-03-16T16:04:00.000-07:00

In Tucson, I recently spoke with some of the men who work the trenches, fighting gun smuggling south, from Arizona to Mexico. On the road from Phoenix to Tucson, I pass three separate trucks that exemplified what they said was a nightmare for Border Patrol and a boon for smugglers. Feats of engineering and twine-supported balance and load capacity that astounds . Many BP agents will not stop these guys because it would take their whole shift just to unload and search these vehicles. Meanwhile, smugglers know that they can wrap up a few guns at the bottom, in the middle, and pass on through...

I took this photo just a few hours ago, southbound on I-10, headed to Tucson - about 4 hours away from the border.

Headed to the Border

2009-03-11T14:45:00.000-07:00

I'm headed tonight to the US/Mx. border in Arizona to investigate tunnel technology, Border Patrol search and rescue, Project 28, death in the desert, open air gun shows, and drug addiction.

Blogging will be limited until 21 March.

For now, I'll share a photo I received today: one of the largest weapons seizures in Mexican history.

Escalation and IEDs in Mexico

2009-03-10T07:01:00.000-07:00

Rocket and grenade launchers, high powered machine guns, .50 caliber Barrett sniper rifles, and fragmentation grenades have become common on the lists of items seized by the Mexican army in 2009.

A number of analysts in both Mexico and the United States have noted a trend that shows an escalation in violence driven by the use of more powerful weapons and explosives, especially grenades. Fragmentation grenades are easy to come by in Guatemala, and it's nothing to smuggle them north. Just last week, the AFI stopped two men in a truck near Veracruz (read Zetas affiliation), and found in a hidden compartment 66 frag grenades, allegedly purchased from an arms dealer in Guatemala.

On 19 February, an "armed commando" stole between 20 and 30 kilos of explosives from a mining company in Durango. Five days before that heist, another 121 kilos of explosives and 230 blasting caps were stolen from a separate mining company. Some of the explosives from the first theft were recovered, but most of it remains somewhere in the Mexican black market.

"There's only one reason why someone would steal that much explosive," an agent with the ATF told me last week, raising an important question: when will we begin to see improvised explosive devices (IEDs) in Mexico?

Juarez: Unintended Consequences

2009-03-09T05:44:00.000-07:00

Federico Ziga, the president of the National Chamber of the Restaurant Industry and Comdiments (CANIRAC), recently told El Proceso that most of the narco-violence in Juarez happens in or around restaurants. Their battles have destroyed businesses, economically and quite literally. Few items are salvageable when it rains lead. But since thousands of soldiers and federal police have arrived, there has been peace - the goal - and at least one unintended consequence: economic stimulus. According to El Proceso, each soldier spends roughly US$2.00 a day on food and other items. With at least 5,000 soldiers in town, small and mid-sized restauranteurs enjoy a daily injection of some US$10,000 - multiply that by six months (the time period many believe that the soldiers will be in place), and we have a back of the envelop guesstimate of the soldiers' impact on the local economy, roughly US$1.8 million. This is not counting the hundreds of federal police who stay in hotels, eat a nicer restaurants, and generally speaking tend to spend more money. Juarez is at peace, for now, and her restauranteurs are doubly rewarded.

FBI "capacity building" in Chiapas

2009-03-04T06:22:00.000-08:00

For me, the term "capacity building" has always held a certain air of UN-esque newspeak for, "let's spend some tax payers' money, teach some people in developing countries a thing or two, and then leave before they get the picture."

And I normally wouldn't match the FBI with capacity building, especially in the last place anyone seems to do anything constructive: Chiapas, Mexico.

For a long time, I've talked about why Mexico needs help controlling its southern border, where most of the immigrants from Central America, and the rest of the world, pass through before entering into the maze of violence, corruption, and possible desert death that Mexico has become for illegal immigrants.

Chiapas is the state where many immigrants first meet the harsh realities of making it to El Norte, and by a long margin, Chiapas is one of the poorest and most often forgotten states in Mexico when it comes to federal attention.

Enter the FBI.

On 3 March, FBI agents began a week long "capacity building" class for investigators who work with the Chiapas state Attorney General's office. The class, "Criminal Intelligence Analysis", will offer instruction on developing informants, interview and interrogation techniques, threat evaluation, organized criminal profiling, the intelligence process (not sure what that means), and phone call analysis - among other items on a long list of things to cover in just one week.

What strikes me as the most interesting aspect of this class is that here we have a perfect example of police training other police. There is no military involvement here. In a region that is littered with bodies due to using the military in the role traditionally defined for police forces, Mexico stands out as a country where there is a deeply entrenched need for security sector reform and a professionalization of the police forces.

This FBI class takes a small but exemplary step in that direction. Bravo.

What was lost with Reyes' Death - one year ago

2009-03-03T09:37:00.000-08:00

Colombia's weekly news magazine, La Semana, recently published an interesting and insightful piece about the five things the FARC lost with Raul Reyes' death.

At the time of his death, one year ago on 1 March, 2008, Reyes was considered the FARC's number two leader; he commanded a considerable amount of respect around the world as a moderate, well spoken, and deeply committed member of the FARC's leadership council.

What was lost:

1. The FARC lost Reyes' international contacts. Reyes was close with a number of older members of Germany's Stasi - secret police from the Communist days in Eastern Germany. Through many of these contacts, Reyes was able to procure arms through the black market.

He was also the FARC's spokesman with many international organizations, and was responsible for rallying international support for the FARC's position when it came to negotiating with the Colombian government.

2. Many of the organizations that kept in touch with the FARC through Reyes were exposed when the Colombian government reviewed files recovered from his computer. These groups were subsequently forced to retreat from their supportive role, further isolating the FARC on the international stage, especially in Europe.

3. Also through a thorough review of Reyes' files, the Colombian government learned how the FARC communicated on both a domestic and international level. The guerrilla organization's communications protocols, what the leaders knew, and what the leaders didn't know was also disclosed. Without this knowledge, the deception used to rescue Ingrid Betancourt and the US captives, among others, would not have been possible.

4. The information on Reyes' computer also alerted the Colombian diplomatic corps to the linkages between the FARC and a long list of illegal organizations around the world. With these proven ties, Colombia's international efforts to stymie the FARC's support within illegal realms, especially the black market, have received a boost.

5. Colombia attacked Reyes in a FARC camp located within Ecuador, disrespecting that country's sovereignty while maintaining that if the Ecuadorians had been in on the operation, then the FARC would have found out. Colombia's relations with Ecuador have been severely damaged well into the future with a poor prognosis for any improvement, at least during Correa's mandate.

One year after Reyes' death, on 1 March, 2009, we still find two Andean countries with no diplomatic ties. But the FARC has been forever crippled.

If you ask Uribe if it was worth it, he would not hesitate to tell you yes.

Guinea Bissau: President Assassinated

2009-03-02T04:56:00.000-08:00

Mexico's El Universal reported (from an EFE news clip) this morning that the president of Guinea Bissau was assassinated in an explosion on 1 March.

Guinea Bissau is a western African nation long plagued by the drug trade, corruption, and civil unrest. It's difficult to pin down a specific actor in this assassination. But it's nearly certain that the country will now become - more than ever - an ideal spot for moving drugs from South America into Europe.

More on Guinea Bissau's role as a transit nation here.

Zetas Threaten President of Guatemala

2009-03-01T14:49:00.000-08:00

The Guatemalan National Police made public on 1 March that Los Zetas have made a threat against the life of President Alvaro Colom.

Someone representing Los Zetas made the phone call to the police emergency line - 110 - on February 28.

The President's security has been doubled.

More on this news as events develop...

Juarez: Calderon's Big Bet

2009-03-01T05:55:00.000-08:00

According to the Mexican government, nearly 8,000 soldiers will take on at least three mexican DTOs fighting for control of Juarez: Sinaloa, La Familia, and the Juarez Cartel.

As of this blog post, some 800 have already arrived, and the rest are on the way.

What a way to begin March: a month that could possibly be the bloodiest we've seen on record for Juarez.

This border city has registered the highest number of so-called "narco-executions" in the country, with 2,750 in the past 14 months.

Nearly 8,000 soldiers will be used to not only secure one city, but completely remove all presence of any drug trafficking organization from Juarez, said president Calderon. That's a big bet.

This is the first time he's poured this size of a force into one city. As we watch the fall out, I think it will be interesting to consider the outcome if Calderon does not succeed.

Borrowed from the idea of a failed state, the idea of a failed city could be one that has descended into anarchy, where most law abiding citizens leave, and those that remain are willing to work within a new system, full of criminals, vigilante gangs, the wretched, and run by one drug overlord.

This is a worst-case scenario. Best-case: Juarez becomes a city where the Mexican government tried and failed to exercise sovereignty within its own territory.

Unfortunately, the path to either conclusion above, or one where Calderon's bet pays off, and Juarez becomes a peaceful place, is one littered with bodies.

At some point, someone has to win. If it's not Calderon, then one DTO will have to triumph over the rest. And it's hard to see how three or more of these groups could come to some sort of time-share scheme for the plaza, or some sort of compromise. There's simply too much money at stake, and the nature of Mexican organized crime is that alliances never last as long as conflict.

If the Mexican military cannot save Juarez, we will watch as the various DTOs, vying for control, slowly and steadily rip the city apart, along the way rendering it ungovernable, insecure, and ultimately a black hole of death and violence just south of the US border.

Calderon has thrown down the gauntlet, making Juarez the new focus of his own personal War on Drugs.

On one hand, it is a very risky maneuver. And if he loses, he loses big. Mexican organized crime will have won one of the biggest battles to date in the war Calderon has waged since he entered office.

On the other hand, he's knocking on Obama's back door with the realities of violence in Mexico.

Calderon knows that bloodshed on the border will be a headline story for mainstream media in the US.

I can already see Lou Dobbs, Chris Matthews, Glenn Beck, O'Reily, and others invite a cadre of "experts" who will all weigh on on Calderon's big bet, and who will either admonish or support Obama for not getting more involved.

Calderon has repeatedly asked Washington for help. To date, his requests have been answered with some small results: the Merida Iniative, Project Reckoning, and Operation Xcellerator, to name a few. Obama is also slowly moving towards banning assault rifles again.

But even when we put all this together, it still is not enough.

How many more bodies will have to pile up before Washington realizes that Mexico can't do it alone? Calderon is determined to win, but if he loses, Obama will have no choice but to get involved and make bets of his own.

Operation Xcellerator

2009-02-26T07:19:00.000-08:00

Yesterday, the Drug Enforcement Administration (not Agency as many like to put it), released the results of Operation Xcellerator (photos here).

I'll quote their press release:

"To date, Operation Xcellerator has led to the arrest of 755 individuals and the seizure of approximately $59.1 million in U.S. currency, more than 12,000 kilograms of cocaine, more than 16,000 pounds of marijuana, more than 1,200 pounds of methamphetamine, more than 8 kilograms of heroin, approximately 1.3 million pills of Ecstasy, more than $6.5 million in other assets, 149 vehicles, 3 aircraft, 3 maritime vessels and 169 weapons."

I'd say that's major news.

On the heels of Project Reckoning, which focused on the Gulf Cartel, this operation seems to have delivered a gut shot to the Sinaloa DTO.

It's a given that most of the 755 arrests were mid- to low-level operatives. But they are a functioning part of a much larger machine, one that cannot run smoothly without even the smallest cog.

Here is some information on what was not reported.

Two reactions to this news:

First, the renown of the intelligence networks operated by Mexican DTOs has been somewhat dissipated - at least when they operate on the US side of the border. In Mexico, these guys can buy off just about anyone, and set up a pipeline of information that extends all the way to the top levels of state and municipal government - even federal government in some cases.

This level of corruption is simply not going to happen inside the United States.

The Mexican DTOs have a well funded and deeply entrenched network of lookouts, informants, and others who work within their own capacity to provide information, but the high number of arrests in Xcellerator suggests that the operation maintained integrity until boots started kicking in doors.

Second, we've gotten a glimpse, and only a glimpse, of the extent to which Mexico's DTOs have stretched their operations across the United States. This is not just a border state phenomenon. We have seen in Texas and in Arizona where there has been violence directly related to Mexican DTOs, and it's spreading.

I talked here (paragraph 5) about when five Mexicans where found dead in their apartment outside of Birmingham, Alabama. And in another case, a man was abducted and tortured until police came to the rescue in Atlanta. He owed Los Zetas money - never an ideal debtor.

Here is a map of all the places - towns, cities, hamlets, etc - that have reported a Mexican DTO presence.

For better or for worse, Mexican immigrants are working and living in just about every state. Most of these people are hard working and give a necessary contribution to their community, even if they syphon some of the "commons".

But as we get a glimpse of Mexican DTO activity in the United States, and especially as Washington begins to absorb this reality (and they take a very long time on The Hill), we will see the merging of two formerly separate worlds: immigration policy and drug trafficking interdiction.

Where and when the two will meet is largely up to Janet Napolitano, her staff, the president, and Congress.

Until then, I'm sure we will continue to see more shining examples of the DEA's exemplary work in the field of interdiction - but while necessary, interdiction is less than half the battle...