This is a source for analysis, interviews, and commentary on security in Latin America. Herein you will find rumors, the results of off the record interviews, and information you'll not find in international or United States news media.
Sunday, April 26, 2009
Most Dangerous Cities in the US
Though nationwide crime was down 3.5% year over year in the first six months of 2008, the cities atop our list illustrate a disturbing trend: All 10 of the most dangerous cities were among those identified by the Department of Justice as transit points for Mexican drug cartels.
The whole article is here.
Thursday, February 26, 2009
Operation Xcellerator
I'll quote their press release:
"To date, Operation Xcellerator has led to the arrest of 755 individuals and the seizure of approximately $59.1 million in U.S. currency, more than 12,000 kilograms of cocaine, more than 16,000 pounds of marijuana, more than 1,200 pounds of methamphetamine, more than 8 kilograms of heroin, approximately 1.3 million pills of Ecstasy, more than $6.5 million in other assets, 149 vehicles, 3 aircraft, 3 maritime vessels and 169 weapons."
I'd say that's major news.
On the heels of Project Reckoning, which focused on the Gulf Cartel, this operation seems to have delivered a gut shot to the Sinaloa DTO.
It's a given that most of the 755 arrests were mid- to low-level operatives. But they are a functioning part of a much larger machine, one that cannot run smoothly without even the smallest cog.
Here is some information on what was not reported.
Two reactions to this news:
First, the renown of the intelligence networks operated by Mexican DTOs has been somewhat dissipated - at least when they operate on the US side of the border. In Mexico, these guys can buy off just about anyone, and set up a pipeline of information that extends all the way to the top levels of state and municipal government - even federal government in some cases.
This level of corruption is simply not going to happen inside the United States.
The Mexican DTOs have a well funded and deeply entrenched network of lookouts, informants, and others who work within their own capacity to provide information, but the high number of arrests in Xcellerator suggests that the operation maintained integrity until boots started kicking in doors.
Second, we've gotten a glimpse, and only a glimpse, of the extent to which Mexico's DTOs have stretched their operations across the United States. This is not just a border state phenomenon. We have seen in Texas and in Arizona where there has been violence directly related to Mexican DTOs, and it's spreading.
I talked here (paragraph 5) about when five Mexicans where found dead in their apartment outside of Birmingham, Alabama. And in another case, a man was abducted and tortured until police came to the rescue in Atlanta. He owed Los Zetas money - never an ideal debtor.
Here is a map of all the places - towns, cities, hamlets, etc - that have reported a Mexican DTO presence.
For better or for worse, Mexican immigrants are working and living in just about every state. Most of these people are hard working and give a necessary contribution to their community, even if they syphon some of the "commons".
But as we get a glimpse of Mexican DTO activity in the United States, and especially as Washington begins to absorb this reality (and they take a very long time on The Hill), we will see the merging of two formerly separate worlds: immigration policy and drug trafficking interdiction.
Where and when the two will meet is largely up to Janet Napolitano, her staff, the president, and Congress.
Until then, I'm sure we will continue to see more shining examples of the DEA's exemplary work in the field of interdiction - but while necessary, interdiction is less than half the battle...
Thursday, September 18, 2008
A drop in the Bucket
In addition, the DEA seized a large quantity of drugs and money. Their press release reads: “Project Reckoning has resulted in…the seizure of approximately $60.1 million in U.S. currency, 16,711 kilograms of cocaine, 1,039 pounds of methamphetamine, 19 pounds of heroin, 51,258 pounds of marijuana, 176 vehicles and 167 weapons.”
At a glance, this operation was a resounding success. The DEA’s mission has always been to focus on the big fish, the major players in drug trafficking, and by investigating the upper echelons of the Gulf Cartel’s operations in the United States, focusing on Atlanta, it had led a multi-agency effort to dismantle an important faction inside a major criminal network.
It is an impressive conclusion to a long investigation, and perhaps even a good start. But it is still only a drop in the bucket.
Not long ago, in early August, five Mexican nationals were found with their throats cut in an apartment complex in Birmingham, Alabama. Local police responded in force. But it is likely they were too late to catch the perpetrators, who were miles away, en route to Mexico before the first 911 call was even made.
This incident reminded us of the shoot out that occurred in Phoenix, Arizona on 22 June when organized criminal, dressed like Phoenix Police Department SWAT, entered the house of local drug traffickers and killed everyone inside before leaving the scene and fleeing back to Mexico.
Texan teens were recruited by members of Los Zetas to conduct assassinations in the Laredo area in 2006. The recruiters purposely targeted minors who were US citizens for the grisly work. For the duration of one year there were at least three cells of minor assassins operating across Texas.
These are just three examples of how the tentacles of Mexican organized crime have begun to stretch into and across the United States. Continuing demand for methamphetamines, cocaine, heroin and other drugs ensure a constant flow of drug supply north. And as Mexican organized crime consolidates control of all levels and layers of the drug trade in the United States, down to the wholesale level, the need to protect turf will extend north from the border into American cities as far north as Seattle and New York.
As the Merida Initiative indicates, the front line of the so-called drug war has moved north from Colombia to Mexico. But what Project Reckoning exemplifies is the fact that this front line will not stop at the US-Mexico border. It will continue north into American cities, towns, neighborhoods, and the suburbs of small cities like Birmingham, a place most people would consider safe and a fair distance from the blood bath constantly splayed across Mexican press.
For many years now, the argument against a supply-side approach to reducing the amount of drugs flowing into the United States has fallen on deaf ears, Republican and Democratic alike. And when the DEA most needs funding and support to dismantle large smuggling operations, the organization has seen significant budget constraints and a forced hiring freeze in 2007 and part of 2008, while the Department of Homeland Security, perhaps one of the best examples of bureaucratic failure in the past decade, has seen a constant budget boost.
The result is an increase in the number of Immigrations and Customs Enforcement agents organizing the deportation of immigrant criminals who are back within the week, often bringing others with them. There are many examples that suggest deportation feeds a cycle of violence between the US and Central America, with Mexico in the middle.
The encroaching presence of Mexican organized crime inside the United States is inexorably tied to immigration because both challenges have everything to do with the US-Mexican border. In as much as Mexico is unable to provide security incentives to stay home and contain its own organized crime problem, Americans will continue to watch as violence directly linked to the drug trade migrates from foreign press, to national news, to local reports.
The border cannot be plugged, and deportation is not an answer. The most direct route to improving this situation is by focusing on assisting the Mexican government with a security problem it clearly cannot handle. The Merida Initiative is a start, but when the total aid for three years, some US$1.5 billion, is compared with the annual earnings of Mexican organized crime, estimated between US$15 and 40 billion, one begins to see how much more help is required. It is best sourced from international partners, and if Mexico continues to suffer, the United States will continue to be the first in line to feel the effect.
Tuesday, August 12, 2008
The Deportation Conveyor Belt
In a recent interview with Mexico’s Processo news magazine, Romero claims her organization simply cannot keep up with the growing number of illegal and documented migrants that enter Mexico on a yearly basis. Human trafficking, she claims, is a “juicy business” supported by INM officials that have been in place since November, 2006.
“…We are advancing a series of investigations…to identify a networks of traffickers. And when I speak of networks, I’m referring to an arrangement between foreigners and Mexicans, and within the group of Mexicans I have no doubt that some migration agents and officials with INM are involved,” Romero told Processo.
One group, called the Miami Mafia, specializes in trafficking Cubans into the United States through Mexico. According to reports from Mexico’s Attorney General’s office, this organization may earn as much as US$80 million a year. In other cases, human traffickers have charged as much as US$4,000 a person, to move them from Guatemala, through Mexico, and into specific points inside the United States.
The INM has some 4,600 employees between migration agents, investigators, and mid- to high-level officials. And for many years, the number of employees has not risen to keep pace with the growing number of people passing through Mexico’s various ports of entry via land, sea, and air.
“In 2000, the country had 23 airports and now there are close to 100,” Romero admitted, adding, “The most worrying is that INM now has less employees that it did in 2000.”
One in five or six illegal immigrants make it through and remain in the United States, Processo reports.
“In the state of Tamaulipas, which is a very complicated situation, there are only 240 employees, and they are not enough to cover 11 international bridges, five airports, two sea ports, apart from migration stations,” Romero said.
Tamaulipas has long been the stronghold of Mexico’s Gulf Cartel, and a major trafficking point for any illegal product – human, drug, or otherwise – that flows into the US from Mexico.
Meanwhile, INM must document and receive all those Mexicans deported from the United States apart from preventing the passage of illegal immigrants through Mexico.
The organization’s Countryman Program oversees this process, and has two separate initiatives for children and minors who are deported from the United States, unaccompanied by adults.
Between January and May, 2008, some 300 thousand Mexican nationals were deported from the United States, nearly 2,000 a day, placing the 2008 tally at over a million.
When considering the complex situation of immigration inside the United States, and the current focus on deportation, the above facts should place a light on a larger reality: many of the people who are deported back to Mexico simply cannot be processed by the INM.
The trouble within Mexico’s INM is just one of the many reasons why a number of Mexican analysts consider the movement of people between Central America, Mexico and the United States to literally be like a human conveyor belt. Once deportees arrive, its likely they are shuffled through a haphazard layer of backed up paper work, resulting in a high probability of human error. And once repatriated, what’s to stop them from returning?
Until the INM receives better funding, reduces corruption, and increases the number of personnel required to cover the country’s various ports of entry, deportation as a tool for controlling illegal migration in Mexico or the United States is, at best, a mechanism that keeps the conveyor belt moving.
Tuesday, February 19, 2008
Border corruption and a 73 million dollar question
On the US side of the border, however, such “plata o plomo” decisions have not been forced upon Border Patrol Agents, at least not that the media is aware. Corruption remains a concern, however, and when officials along the border talk about how Mexican organized crime will initially be felt inside the United States, the first answer is not what many expect. Firefights between members of Los Zetas and US Border Patrol are less likely than the clandestine offer of a white envelope stuffed with cash.
During his congressional testimony on 14 February, the Secretary of Homeland Security, Michael Chertoff, sat before the appropriate Senate Committee and explained why the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) needs US$50.5 billion dollars for fiscal year 2009. Within this amount, there is a request for US$442.4 million for the Border Patrol. DHS wants to hire, train and equip 2,200 new Border Patrol agents in an effort to reach President Bush’s goal of adding a total of 6,000 new Border Patrol agents by the end of 2009.
The total would surpass 20,000 Border Patrol agents, more than double the amount used in 2001, according to Chertoff.
Could it be that a handful of those new agents working on the US-Mexico border may be corrupted along the way? Could it be that as the Border Patrol has ramped up from 10,000 to over 20,000 agents, some moles have been placed by Mexican DTOs?
Meanwhile, another interesting question was raised a week earlier in early February by House Representative Eliot Engel, Chairman of the Western Hemisphere Subcommittee of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs.
Noting that in President Bush’s 2009 fiscal year budget request, another US$73 million has been removed from money set aside for drug use prevention programs inside the United States, Rep. Engel asked his guests – leaders from the DEA, DOS, ATF, FBI, etc:
“Why are we cutting demand side spending at a time when we have promised the Mexican government to intensify our efforts on the demand side of the drug war? This is absolutely shocking to me and is no way to show our commitment to our partners in Mexico, Central America, and elsewhere who are combating narco-traffickers on a daily basis.”
None of the witnesses that day came up with an adequate answer.
Tuesday, December 04, 2007
Digging into Blackwater USA
Hugo Chavez has lost the referendum to vote his reform package into law. And some news has surfaced that a group out of
But for now, we're digging into Blackwater
When two
The agent obviously didn’t know that the two investigators were working for the Government Accountability Office on a report requested by the House of Representatives Committee on Homeland Security. The report, entitled, “Despite Progress, Weaknesses in Traveler Inspections Exist at Our Nation’s Ports of Entry,” found that both the Department of Homeland Security and the Border Patrol had some serious issues to overcome, including communication between field offices and headquarters, and training.
Training is an expensive process the
Such considerations have been on the books for Blackwater
Since early 2007, Blackwater has worked hard to lobby the right politicians in
What’s more, the training camp would be located less than ten miles from the US-Mexico border. The selection of the site, according to Blackwater, has nothing to do with the company’s interest in increased involvement in border patrol and the
But this base’s location become more interesting given the results of a recent DOD bidding process for a US$15 billion dollar contract to combat narcoterrorism.
On 14 September, Blackwater
These facts, when considered together with the news that military contractors will be used to train Mexican law enforcement officials as part of the Merida Initiative, or Plan Mexico, draws a narrow bead on Blackwater as a likely candidate for a bidding process that will award the contract to train Mexicans how to fly the surveillance helicopters used to patrol the Mexican side of the border.
If this is the case, we should consider two more questions. First, how will the Mexican government react to Blackwater's presence so close to their border and on Mexican soil to train Mexican law enforcement officials. Second, in the long run, how involved will companies such as Blackwater become in protecting the US-Mexico border? As we've seen in