South Am Security Paradigm Continues Shifting

Not two days after I published a piece with the ISN on how we're seeing a paradigm shift on security in South America, Brazil follows up on the Obama/Lula meeting and takes the lead on suggesting that the MercoSur countries - Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay, and Paraguay - develop a sub-regional police force modeled after Interpol.

Here is the story in Portuguese (thanks Mr. H. for sending this along).

The premise of the piece is that Brazil will present at the next MercoSur meeting a proposal to create "Mercopol" - a security organization that brings together the federal police units of each member country.

A few reactions:

First, it seems that Brazil is testing the geopolitical waters. By floating this idea within a forum that it closely controls (albeit with some bickering from Argentina), Brazil can get a sense of how the region as a whole would cozy up to the idea of a South American police force formed under UNASUR, as Lula mentioned in his meeting with Obama.

Second, this proposal will give all countries involved in MercoSur, even the observers and the associate members - thinking Chile, Bolivia, Ecuador here - a chance to approve or disapprove, again within a forum that is not too heavy in terms of political liability on the regional level.

Third, if Mercopol were to be formed, I suspect there would be a heightened opposition to Venezuela's full entry into MercoSur (still held up in the Brazilian Congress much to Chavez's chagrin).

Finally, this is yet another example of Brazil taking a leadership role. The UNASUR Defense Council (Brazil's idea) has already stated that it will not place drug trafficking and organized crime on its agenda because these are not military problems. And this is absolutely correct. What we need, however, is a federal police complement to UNASUR's Defense Council.

Mercopol could easily morph into such an organization and perhaps feed into Ameripol, which to date has done little more than meet and talk. Bottom line, Brazil is making moves to become South America's head cop. We will see if some of the region's top cop countries - Colombia and Chile specifically - fall in line behind Mercopol.

A Look Inside Brazil's Foreign Policy Team

A source of mine in Brasilia, and someone close to the maneuvering of politics within the Brazilian Congress and Lula’s administration, recently made an interesting comment.

Lula, he says, becomes quite upset at the lack of coordination between the various cabinet-level politicians who operate a specific segment of Brazil’s foreign policy.

Brazil’s foreign policy is officially delegated to Foreign Minister, Celsom Amorim, and Lula’s Foreign Affairs adviser, Professor Marco Aurelio Garcia, who has been a foreign policy adviser with the Workers Party (PT) for well over a decade.

Professor Marco represents the PT’s hard left, based on ideology from the party’s socialist position formed in the 1960s. His position contrasts somewhat with the relatively more moderate position taken by the Brazilian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, aka Itamaraty, and under Amorim’s charge.

Amorim undoubtedly drives Brazil’s over all foreign policy maneuvers, but insiders report that it’s Professor Marco who works behind the scenes to maintain Brazil’s cordial relationship with the region’s leftist governments in Venezuela, Bolivia, Ecuador, Argentina, and Paraguay.

If Obama seeks to appease Brazil, and use the South American giant as a regional proxy in South America, his team must appease both Amorim and Professor Marco – not an easy task as both men often disagree.

Defense Minister, Nelson Jobim, also has a voice in Brazilian foreign policy. So does Carlos Minc, the Environmental Minister. In the area of foreign trade, Ministers Reinhold Stephanes with Agriculture and Miguel Jorge with Development and Foreign Trade, weigh in.

In addition to this not to small group, another appointee to Lula’s administration, Harvard Professor Roberto Mangabeira Unger, is in place to advise on long term, strategic foreign policy decision making. His voice and ideas fall directly in line with what Brazil would plan for a long-term, strategic relationship with the United States.

Mangabeira, my source reports, recently visited Washington to engage with the Obama administration. He claims links to the first couple because he was at least a professor for Barak Obama when he attended Harvard.

Perhaps Mangabeira’s influence led to the 26 January phone call between Presidents Obama and Lula. But the press never covered Mangabeira’s visit, nor was the Brazilians embassy directly involved in the visit.

Either way, Lula has unofficially committed to a trip to DC in March, and it is quite possible Obama will visit Brazil before the end of the year, maybe even before the end of the North American summer months.

South American Defense Council

Speaking from the Miraflores Presidential Palace in Caracas, Venezuela on 14 April, Brazilian Defense Minister Nelson Jobim was confident the South American Defense Council (CDS) could be organized by the end of 2008.

“I believe the council can be installed by the end of the year,” he said.

Since 14 April, Jobim has moved on to visit Suriname, with visits planned for Guyana, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, Paraguay, and Argentina.

The formation of the CDS would be the headstone of a region-wide military alliance that, according to Jobim, would not be the classical military alliance as it would not involve operational units.

Yet the formation of this alliance has caused concern in Washington as it is the region’s first military alliance that explicitly does not want the involvement of the United States. This concern, however is unfounded, and if Washington tries to get involved, it would find itself undercutting Brazilian leadership, allowing Chavez room to proselytize his message and anti-American position within the military alliance.

Many observers from inside the beltway do not take two important truths into account.

Despite photo opportunities and many hugs, Lula and Chavez are not friends. Lula's administration is populated with old-school revolutionaries who share some of Chavez’s vision but have little respect for his implementation process. Lula, after years of trying and failing to be president of Brazil learned the hard way that being a die-hard Socialist is no path to power in Brazil. As a lame-duck president, he is more interested now in his legacy and in passing the torch of leadership to a hand picked successor.

Keeping Brazil at the top of the region’s geopolitical totum pole is a top priority as voters in the next election will likely remember Lula’s often stated promises to make Brazil a global player. The first step up that ladder is regional dominance. Checking Chavez is essential to that goal.

The idea for this military alliance was born in Brasilia and appeases the Brazilian military voices who have been calling out for a check on Chavez and his military spending. Bringing Chavez under the reigns of a regional military alliance, in theory, gives the Brazilians room to exert some control over Chavez in a multilateral forum of regional friends where he is least likely to employ his unsavory acts of public outrage to spark nationalist tension at home.

This alliance also allows Lula to quietly remind Chavez who is the real power house on the continent. The Venezuelan military has shiny new toys, but neither Chavez nor his generals have the persuasive pull enjoyed by Brazilian military leaders, backed up by Brazilian military factories and years of service for militaries around the region.

The Bolivian army, for example, could not mobilize without Brazilian vehicles, parts, and service. The Colombian Air Force recently used Brazilian built Supertucano aircraft to bomb the FARC camp in Ecuador. Supertucanos were used on nearly all the major bombing missions against FARC encampments in 2007. They have had a major impact on the Colombian Military's increased in air raids. Brazil has the region’s largest arms and ammunition industry in the region and is region’s leader in nuclear technology, followed closely behind by Argentina.

With Lula calling the shots for his representative at the South American Defense Council, he remains in a position to apply pressure on Chavez to keep him quiet and involved in Venezuelan domestic matters, a focus that would benefit the Venezuelan president.

The region’s other military leaders are more likely to fall into step behind Brazil and if Chavez were to pull out of the alliance, he would remain more isolated within his own region than he is today – a stated goal of US foreign policy for Venezuela.

Washington frets about a military alliance in South America, but if Washington leaders can be objective about Brazil’s goals, they would see therein an ally that can do far better in controlling Chavez. If Washington meddles in the South American Defense Council, it would find a loud voice in Chavez and the Brazilians would be forced to join in, cursing Washington all the while for not letting them take the lead.

Welcoming 2008

In the first week of the new year, there are a number of items that are worth our collective attention but too little space here to cover all of them. We'll make our way through them slowly, perhaps elucidating more on the blog, while reserving the more interesting points for this weekly newsletter.

Today I'll focus on what seems to be some of the more interesting issues at hand but want to begin with a quick mention of a radio show called Focus 580 with an NPR station out of Illinois. The host and I talked about the US and Mexico, the drug trade, and who supplies versus who demands. You can find it here about halfway down on the left.

The US Dept. of Justice has finally made public its position that Mexico has become the number one supplier of methamphetamine to the United States. It's about five years behind the ball with that one. Known as "ice" or simply "meth" this drug is probably the most damaging in terms of public health costs and the most addictive, next to heroine, in terms of how many heavy users it creates. The fact that Mexico has been for years the number one supplier is again testimony to how organized Mexican narco traffickers are when it comes to managing their US distribution networks - so much so that they managed to identify a new trend in drug demand inside the US and take over the supply chain, one that was once solely inside the US and mostly in California.

Another interesting revelation, as some members of the Southern Pulse network have mentioned, is the nature of Mexican drug traffickers and how it is changing. The Tijuana Cartel, as we have pointed out in the past, has become more of a black market financial institution as it's muscle and strong-arm presence within Mexican drug trafficking has diminished. The question is whether or not the TJ Cartel will give up their control of that border crossing into the United States. Might they "lease" it to the highest bidder?

Both the Sinaloa and Gulf Cartels have long been involved in politics on a local level, pressuring specific candidates to get out of the race, killing others who have won, and on a more popular level, sponsoring marches against the "military occupation" of certain towns and small villages in northern Mexico. We're researching this trend in preparation for a forthcoming report on Drug Trafficking in Mexico, our third. We will let you know when it is ready, hopefully by the end of the month.

Is it true that Guatemalan president Alvaro Colom will take orders from organized crime? This is an answer we will try to find over the duration of his first hundred days in office, to kick off soon. Elsewhere in Central America, ten people have died in the past 24 hours in El Salvador, most of them when gunmen separated themselves from a crowd watching a soccer game when they began shooting, apparently at random. What will it take to subdue the violence there? We think part of the problem is US deportation policies and a lack of information sharing between the US and its Central American colleagues.

Finally, how will South America take shape in 2008? Will Brazilian president Lula re-assert his regional leadership as Chavez begins to look toward cleaning his own house? Already we've seen Lula working to bring Bolivia, Ecuador, and Peru closer. And it's clear Brazil and Colombia are friendly. Argentina is up in the air. Could it be that President Cristina allows Venezuela to buy her support as her husband did?

2007 Wrap Up and a peek at 2008

As this will be our last newsletter of 2007, we wanted to review briefly some of the year’s highlights and then take a peek into 2008.

Highlighted themes in 2007 include Chavez’s reach for more power and the resulting international friction between himself and Lula in Brazil. Bolivia has struggled with a Constituent Assembly. Truth telling in Colombia has unveiled a host of close ties between politicians and paramilitaries, but nothing yet has touched President Uribe.

Ecuador is flirting with China and the idea of a new port in Manta, where the US currently operates a military Forward Operating Location. And Kirchner succeeded in placing his wife in the president’s seat in Argentina.

Political violence in Guatemala underlines the strengthening grip of organized crime on that country’s political class. And ongoing violence in Mexico, as well as violence across the border into the United States, has prompted the discussion and now debate over the Merida Initiative.

In 2008, many of these ongoing themes will evolve and likely come to a head. We’re most interested in observing how the Merida Initiative is actually implemented. Will private contractors such as Blackwater USA or Dyncorp actually be used? Could increased pressure on drug trafficking organizations in Mexico lead to a spill over effect into Central America?

The last thing Guatemala needs is more Mexican criminals. Already, President-elect Colom has his hands full. His first 100 days will undoubtedly be marked by attempts from Guatemalan organized crime to show him – overtly or covertly – just how much they control wide swaths of his country.

We’re also interested to see how the humanitarian exchange process plays out in Colombia. Might Betancourt see freedom? We hear that Uribe invited Lula to mediate a humanitarian exchange process during President Cristina Fernández de Kirchner’s inauguration. For Lula it would be an opportunity to show the region and the world that he can succeed where Chavez has failed – a perfect maneuver for what appears to be an indirect approach to usurp Chavez from his regional leadership role.It is one he has purchased, not earned.

What will happen when the Venezuelan Bolivar drops two zeros (or three for that matter) in January? This slight change in the Venezuelan currency is certainly more cosmetic than economically sensible, as is the recently adjusted Venezuelan hour. It doesn’t make much sense to move the clock by half an hour, does it? Inside Venezuela a galvanized opposition has some momentum. In 2008, we will see how and where this momentum is used. May we see Chavez’s political core crumble? Not likely, but it will be interesting to see if the military takes a more active role in checking the president.

Can Morales hold his country together? The recent declaration of autonomy from the low-lands provinces seems serious enough, but Morales has – as of this printing – not sent in any troops to force order or obedience. He took the time to travel to the MercoSur meeting, so he cannot be too worried about the apparent mess at home.

Lula recently visited with promise of more Petrobras investment. He also told Morales to have “patience, patience, and more patience” with the opposition. Sometimes all it takes are a few words. Lula will likely work to bring Bolivia back into the Brazilian sphere of influence, further asserting his regional leadership role over Chavez.

Meanwhile, inside Brazil, we will be watching two important issues. First, the aviation crisis is still not resolved. How will Lula manage to keep Brazil’s skies safe? Might there be another accident? We’ve seen on many occasions reports of near misses in Brazilian media that some how doesn’t make it to the international scene. Just as important is Lula’s recent loss in the Brazilian Congress over the CPMF tax – one that taxes the movement of money through Brazilian banks. The bottom line is Lula’s administration will have roughly US$ 20 billion less to spend on social programs to pass along to state and municipal budgets in 2008.

Internationally this loss could hurt Brazil’s investment grade, we’re told by the Financial Times and sources in Brasilia, but what does it mean for the Brazilian economy in the long run?

Overall, 2008 promises to be another interesting year in Latin America. For now, and through the end of 2007, we will simply observe...

Hitting the highlights after a long absence

This is number 6/2007. My apologies for the long absence. We are back. I will endeavor to produce this newsletter once a month at the very least. Since March, I have been working with a European company, Riskline, covering political risk and security in the region. We also have a developing blog. It has been time consuming but rewarding work! My own website, where you may find commentary and analysis on politics, security, and energy in the region, has been updated (mostly) as of this posting.

In this edition:

So many items are worth mention. I will try to cover the highlights here and get into more detail in future posts.

The Brazilian president's response to the worst aircraft accident in Brazilian history was dismal at best. The country suffers from a significant lack of infrastructure development, and the bureaucracy that supervises commercial aviation in Brazil is complicated and stuffed with political appointees. Many have little to no experience with matters of aviation security.

In Argentina, a couple recent scandals, one involving US$ 800,000 illegally brought to Argentina by a Venezuelan businessman on a private jet chartered by the Argentine national energy company, have tainted president Nestor Kirchner's popularity a little. But they seem to have not affected his wife's campaign for president. Elections are set for October. All expect Kirchner's wife to win, which means little by way of a chance in governance or economic policy - not a good sign for the country's long term growth and stability.

In Ecuador and Bolivia, presidents Rafael Correa and Evo Morales continue to push forward with a Constituent Assembly to rewrite the country's constitution, re-founding it to reflect the needs of the poor. In Bolivia, the process has been met with widespread protests, some for others against the government. Lately, Evo's left flank has become rankled over their perception of his soft stance on reform, a trend that might force Morales into the middle of protests from the both ends of the Bolivian political spectrum. In Ecuador, Correa remains popular but he has only just begun the process.

Venezuela's Hugo Chavez continues to push forward with Socialist reforms at home while purchasing support abroad. He has encountered significant resistance in trying to reform Venezuela's political system under one party, and a string of corruption scandals pointing at Venezuelan energy company PDVSA have begun to attract negative attention at the domestic level. The latest scandal involving the Venezuelan businessman in Argentina has also chilled relations between the two countries. To save face, Kirchner is demanding that Chavez investigate the corruption on his end, but that would force Chavez to face the ugly truth about corruption in his country. It's a stand off, but Kirchner will grow quiet soon. After all, it was Chavez who was just in Argentina to buy yet another US$ 500 million in Argentine government bonds.

In Guatemala, presidential and congressional elections set for September have grown ugly. Over 50 people have been killed in a string of events that points to the close involvement of organized crime in the Guatemalan political field. Financial support of municipal and departmental candidates will ensure a leap forward for organized crime in terms of controlling Guatemalan politicians. The future for this Central American country does not look good. I suspect it will become a much more violent place in the very near future.

Meanwhile, presidents George W. Bush and Felipe Calderon of Mexico are expected to announce the latest developments of a closely guarded plan for the two countries to cooperate in the latest front for Washington's War on Drugs. It has become hard to ignore the violence along the US-Mexico border. And since Calderon has come into office (December 2006), he has proven his determination to take the fight to his country's criminals, a posture that has earned him some respect in Washington. There are many challenges ahead for a US-Mexico plan, but both sides are seriously talking and Mexican security is on President Bush's agenda - something that never happened during the administration of Vicente Fox.