FARC with money problems

Some interesting news out of Colombia earlier this week reported that the FARC is in financial trouble.

Former Defense Minister Juan Manuel Santos announced at the end of November 2009 that "there are certain disagreements between [FARC leaders] Mono Joyjoy and Alfonso Cano."

For many years, the FARC has suffered the effects of a two-way split between the younger members, led by Joyjoy, who want to go after the money through drug trafficking, and the older members, led by Cano, who are more ideological and presumably still set on overthrowing the Colombian government.

Since both factions are in need of money, a disagreement over the direction of the FARC has surfaced with a significant amount of tension, according to some reports.

It will be interesting to see how Cano and Joyjoy resolve their differences. If the FARC does split, I would imagine that the more militarized Joyjoy faction would continue on, while the ideological side of the FARC would either wither on the vine or somehow try to transform into a peaceful political party… Maybe events in 2010 will tell...

Shifting security realities in Brazil

The Brazilian military announced on 18 August that it will increase troop presence on the country's border with Colombia.

This is a conversation that has been going back and forth between the president's office and the military generals for years. Slowly but surely, the Brazilian military has begun to make a shift from its traditional focus in the southern part of the country, where the assumption is that Argentina is considered the most likely to invade and the Amazon provides the best defense from potential enemies to the north.

Closer ties with Colombia, such as the hot-pursuit fly over agreement, and generally closer cooperation on security matters, has prompted the Brazilians to think more about that border. Exactly where the troops will be concentrated remains a vague detail, but I suspect that Leticia is one destination, as well as certain areas of the infamous "Dog's Head" area.

The Dog's Head refers to the shape of a specific section of the Brazilian-Colombia border, traditionally a haven for illegal gem miners, FARC soldiers, and all sorts of ne'er-do-wells.

Overtly, the military is worried about "spillover" from Colombia's internal conflict, but I wonder to what extent that worry about Venezuela has primed the generals for spillover from that country, in the event of a political meltdown in Caracas.

Brazil would be very careful not to tip off Chavez, so where troops are placed will be very interesting. How close to the Brazilian-Venezuelan border will they go?

More here on the Brazilian-Colombian aspects of this decision. Boz explores today the "post-conflict" scenario in Colombia with the so-called emerging-groups capturing some attention as the newest threat to security in Colombia.

FARC kills eight soldiers

When I see news about the FARC killing eight soldiers in Colombia, near the Venezuelan border, I'm reminded that there is still some fight in this old revolutionary dog.

The Colombian government argues that the FARC is on the decline, with high desertion rates, and a declining revenue base.

And it's true. The FARC today is not what it was five years ago, or three years ago. I think we're looking at the "middle of the end" for the FARC.

But I have to consider the possibility that the FARC has, for years now, made concerted efforts to move beyond Colombian borders into Venezuela and Ecuador. Some time ago, we prepared a piece on the FARC's presence outside of Colombia. Venezuela is certainly a welcoming environment.

Given the country's well established role as a drug transit zone, and the ongoing allegations that at least a section of the Venezuelan National Guard is a drug smuggling organization (called the Sun Cartel by DEA agents in Venezuela before they got kicked out the first time), it is certainly a great place to operate compared to Colombia.

In Ecuador, the president is not a vocal supporter, but he is willing to look the other way, and allow the FARC to operate just inside Ecuador. Even if he isn't willing to let the FARC play on Ecuadorian soil, Correa has limited political currency, and I'm not sure he wants to spend it on making a loud and expensive campaign against the FARC.

Back to those eight soldiers. They fell under attack from the 49th front of the FARC, according to La Semana. The 49th front is known to operate on both sides of the border between Venezuela and Colombia. It is also considered the Caribbean front of the FARC, operating around the Guajira peninsula.

It will be interesting to see if Chavez answers Uribe's call to hunt down these FARC soldiers. I doubt it.

(image from colombiareports.com)

Illegal refineries in Colombia

The Latin American Herald Tribune has reported that Colombian police and army troops found and destroyed two refineries used by the FARC to process stolen oil.

This story caught my eye because I've never heard of the FARC using oil refineries, but it's certainly something that makes sense.

The refineries could produce up to 11 gallons of fuel an hour, and were reportedly under the control of the 29th Front.

Authorities seized 1,849 gallons of fuel and 11 steel drums, each able to hold about a barrel of crude oil.

These illegal refineries were found in the Nariño department, on the border with Ecuador.

Weekend News Review - FARC, Customs corruption, and grenades

1) Colombian President Alvaro Uribe said that if the FARC keeps quiet and avoids any skirmishes with anyone for "three or four" months, then he will consider peace talks.

Up until now, Uribe has been staunchly against talking to the FARC. History has shown that the FARC is not always the most honest negotiators. But that was when the rebel army was much stronger. In its weakened state, peace might not be a bad idea.

Semana article here.

2) One of the conclusions of the 20th annual meeting of Interpol (held in Chile this year) was that Al-Qaeda (or any terrorist organization, really) could infiltrate Latin America because of lenient or in some cases (Ecuador and Nicaragua) non-existent immigration controls.

Of the 150 million or so annual visits to Latin America from other countries around the world, only 50 million passports are scanned, according to Ronald Noble, Interpol Secretary General.

Interpol is specifically worried about Central America.

3) Texas authorities seized some $120,000, gun parts, and "grenades" from a car headed south on Interstate-35, according to the San Antonio News.

Obviously the grenades are interesting. My sources mostly agree that grenades used in Mexico come from Guatemala. To sell grenades in the US, a merchant must operate a class two license, I believe, which is a very strict legal regime.

The article notes these grenades are "improvised".

4) A 34 year-old Customs agent was arrested this past Friday (April, 3rd) on charges that he arranged to "wave immigrant and drug smugglers through his inspection booth for money." If convicted he could serve up to 35 years in prison - ouch!

As a Sheriff in southern Arizona recently told me, this is a "sin of omission." To break the law, these men don't actually do anything. It's what they don't do - i.e. stop a car stuffed with coke - that breaks the law. To wave the right car and receive thousands a week for doing so, with little chance of apprehension, so long you don't flash the money or act out, is a tough thing to turn down. I often wonder about this kind of "soft" corruption, and whether or not the border is littered with these guys...

5) Not surprisingly, Chihuahua State Governor, Jose Reyes Baeza, was attacked on 22 February. One of his bodyguards was killed during the attack, and two were wounded. Two of the men allegedly responsible were arrested in the city of Chihuahua on 31 March. They were caught with AR-15 rifles stolen from the wounded bodyguards.

This news only came out in English on 5 April... That in itself is interesting.

What was lost with Reyes' Death - one year ago

Colombia's weekly news magazine, La Semana, recently published an interesting and insightful piece about the five things the FARC lost with Raul Reyes' death.

At the time of his death, one year ago on 1 March, 2008, Reyes was considered the FARC's number two leader; he commanded a considerable amount of respect around the world as a moderate, well spoken, and deeply committed member of the FARC's leadership council.

What was lost:

1. The FARC lost Reyes' international contacts. Reyes was close with a number of older members of Germany's Stasi - secret police from the Communist days in Eastern Germany. Through many of these contacts, Reyes was able to procure arms through the black market.

He was also the FARC's spokesman with many international organizations, and was responsible for rallying international support for the FARC's position when it came to negotiating with the Colombian government.

2. Many of the organizations that kept in touch with the FARC through Reyes were exposed when the Colombian government reviewed files recovered from his computer. These groups were subsequently forced to retreat from their supportive role, further isolating the FARC on the international stage, especially in Europe.

3. Also through a thorough review of Reyes' files, the Colombian government learned how the FARC communicated on both a domestic and international level. The guerrilla organization's communications protocols, what the leaders knew, and what the leaders didn't know was also disclosed. Without this knowledge, the deception used to rescue Ingrid Betancourt and the US captives, among others, would not have been possible.

4. The information on Reyes' computer also alerted the Colombian diplomatic corps to the linkages between the FARC and a long list of illegal organizations around the world. With these proven ties, Colombia's international efforts to stymie the FARC's support within illegal realms, especially the black market, have received a boost.

5. Colombia attacked Reyes in a FARC camp located within Ecuador, disrespecting that country's sovereignty while maintaining that if the Ecuadorians had been in on the operation, then the FARC would have found out. Colombia's relations with Ecuador have been severely damaged well into the future with a poor prognosis for any improvement, at least during Correa's mandate.

One year after Reyes' death, on 1 March, 2009, we still find two Andean countries with no diplomatic ties. But the FARC has been forever crippled.

If you ask Uribe if it was worth it, he would not hesitate to tell you yes.

The "middle" of the end for the FARC?

Colombia's Semana news magazine posted an interesting piece yesterday. Four Colombians presented themselves to Panama's Servicio Nacional de Fontera, located some 50 kilometers from the Panama/Colombia border.

Most speculate the four Colombians were members of the FARC. Reading the story, I was reminded of the FARC's desertion rate, and how in the past couple years, we have seen this rate rise, slowly but steadily.

Meanwhile, on 10 February, El Tiempo reported that a joint force of Colombian police and military apprehended Jesus Antonio Garcia Largo (aka Chucho Mapurilla) in Putumayo, near the border with Ecuador. At 51 years old, he is a 35 year FARC veteran who spent some time with the 48th Front . Chucho was also one of the FARC's remaining ideological leaders...

These two news items, when taken together with the conciliatory position the FARC has taken recently (apart from the Indian massacre in Nariño), points towards what I would call the "middle" of the end for the FARC as an armed threat inside Colombia.

I say "middle" because I've already considered the beginning of the end, here, as well as questioning if they were even still revolutionaries in 2005, here.

Moving forward, I think it is important to note the desertion and attrition rate - measured both by what the Colombian military says (see last to paragraphs in this piece) and by what we see reported, like Panama yesterday.

It is anyone's guess how much longer the FARC will remain as an organization that closely resembles what it was during the Pastraña administration, but I think we can all agree that the FARC has peaked and is now on its way down.

Mexicans in the FARC & the FARC in Mexico

After the Colombian Air Force (FAC) bombed the camp of FARC leader Raul Reyes with Brazilian airplanes and Israeli guidance systems, the camp lay destroyed in the early morning hours of 2 March. When the Colombian military special forces picked through the bodies just moments after the dust settled, they came across an interesting find.

Mexicans figured among the dead.

Six days later, the Colombian vice president, Francisco Santos, said that there were “several” Mexican youths being trained by the FARC while residing at Reyes’ camp. At least one Mexican, Lucia Morett Alvarez, was taking a course on explosives. This fact resonates with the as yet unconfirmed rumors that Raul Reyes had been in contact with a Mexican insurgent off-shoot called the Ricardo Flores Magon - Insurgent Militias. Other information connecting the FARC with insurgencies inside Mexico is likely on the recovered computers, but so far has not been leaked.

According to the Colombian government, however, at least four Mexicans have been confirmed as dead from the bombing of Reyes’ camp.

Beyond insurgent activity, and the reported resurgence of FARC activities among Mexico’s universities, the presence of the FARC in the Mexican drug trade has been well established. As businessmen, FARC operatives have taken no sides in Mexico’s internal struggles. They are known to have worked with all of the major Mexican drug trafficking organizations. Where there is a Mexican buyer, it seems, so there is a FARC seller.

Echoing the Colombian vice president’s public claim of Mexicans taking classes from the FARC, the Mexican Attorney General, Eduardo Medina-Mora, said on 10 March that the FARC maintains a strong presence in Mexico. He claims the FARC sells some US$780 million worth of cocaine to the world market every year, of which Mexican drug trafficking organizations purchase some US$428 million or 55 percent.

While it is difficult to determine the true dollar amount of FARC cocaine sales to Mexico, it’s possible that this number may soon grow if the recently released older brother of the Arellano-Felix drug trafficking organization (AFO), Felipe, decides to get back into the cocaine buying business.

He was the organizations top cocaine smuggler in the early 1990s and is considered the front man who made contact with the FARC, establishing the insurgency as a reliable cocaine supplier. The AFO has been credited with being the first Mexican drug trafficking organization to have engaged the FARC as a cocaine supplier. Now, it seems, there is a chance to renew old ties, bringing the FARC deeper into Mexico.

Two Fronts Against Colombia

Colombian relations with Ecuador chilled after Colombia delivered a bomb strike on the Ecuadorian side of the border. The FARC’s number two, known as Raul Reyes, was killed, making the strike justifiable for Colombia but still inexcusable for Ecuador.

Speaking more to a domestic audience than the Colombians, Ecuadorian President Rafael Correa reacted strongly to the Colombian incursion. He has sent a cursory amount of troops to the Colombian border for a show of strength, not intimidation. He has also begun a regional tour to seek support for his cause, and is scheduled to meet with Hugo Chavez on 5 March after his current meetings with Alan Garcia in Peru have been concluded.

Chavez, who has maintained a rhetorical offensive against Colombia since November last year, has taken advantage of Ecuador’s ire to propel his rhetoric and actions to a new level of war mongering. Chavez has now sent troops and tanks to the Venezuelan-Colombian border, has closed a major border crossing point, and promises that trouble will come if Colombia makes any move to invade.

Uribe will not send Colombian troops to either border, however. Interesting though is his abrupt change in tact. Until 4 March, Uribe had resisted playing into Chavez’s game of name calling and public argument. Now Uribe has announced that he will sue Chavez at the International Criminal Court for financing genocide.

Few doubt that Uribe has the information to back up his claims. Colombian intelligence agents have been planting the seeds of intelligence gathering in Venezuela for over a decade. Rumors that Chavez has in one way or another loaned or granted the FARC 300 million are likely supported by as yet undisclosed evidence. Already information has been leaked to Colombian media, which has taken the mantel for its country and is currently in full attack mode against Chavez – likely allowing Uribe to keep out of the public eye as Colombian journalists lambaste the Venezuelan leader with a number of accusations.

Not the least of which has been a recent accusation that Chavez offered a “stake” in oil companies to the FARC. The nature of this agreement is unclear, but if true, its ramifications for the state sponsorship of an internationally recognized terrorist group and insurgent army are serious enough to potentially cause Chavez some serious trouble at home.

Correa’s ruffled feathers are little more than a show of national unity and a savvy politician seeing an opportunity to gather support. Correa knows that Raul Reyes’ death benefits his country nearly as much as it benefits Colombia. And it is Chavez, not Uribe, that is in the most precarious position. Uribe appears to have lost his patience and will now push forward with a credible smear campaign that may loosen tight blocks of “chavista” support inside Venezuela, further reducing Chavez’s already dwindling support base.

With 24 percent inflation, scarce supplies of basic foodstuffs and a soaring crime rate around the country, it behooves Chavez to keep his supporters’ attention focused elsewhere. Yet if by chasing after war with Colombia, Chavez actually brews a conflict, he must be careful to control blood shed and come out a clear winner. If not, there is a significant chance he will lose the conflict and his presidency...

Russian Subs and Echoes of War

By now talk of Venezuelan military purchases from Russia has become a repetition of Chavez’s shopping list with the occasional mention of a new item. In light of the current situation between Venezuela and Colombia, Chavez’s interest in purchasing three Varshavianka-class submarines for an unofficial amount of one billion dollars becomes slightly more interesting.

Echoes of war between the two countries resound more in Chavez’s rhetoric and Colombian newspapers than they do in the offices of Colombia’s political and military leaders. But those who pay close attention to the matter have become more alarmed than usual. Chavez’s rhetoric appears especially fierce. Close cooperation between his government and the FARC, as well as the possible presence of Venezuelan ammunition in the hands of FARC guerrillas, underline an interesting observation made by Adam Isacson, Director of Programs with the Center for International Policy Studies in Washington.

In a recent conversation, he mentioned that when you’ve got two neighbors with one – Venezuela - that allegedly supplies arms and ammunition to the guerrilla army of the other – the FARC in Colombia – you’ve got a tense situation, one that is not present anywhere else in the world, save sections of Africa, and maybe the Middle East.

On top of that, add Chavez’s rhetoric, and the possibility of both Venezuelan and Colombian troop presence on a shared border known to be, in large swathes, FARC-controlled territory. In a dense forest, where a gun shot could come from any one of the three groups, causing an immediate reaction, it is not a far stretch to see how the current echoes of war could descend to something quite different.

Chavez’s announced trip to Russia to sign the contract for these three subs certainly does not help reduce tension. Once the contract for Russian attack subs has been signed, Chavez will likely make lightly-veiled statements to bristle the Colombian president flanked by a stoic background of Russian officials.

The Varshavianka-class submarine is a patrol submarine capable of taking out targets on land, on the surface or underwater. Along with the purchase of three submarines, Chavez will discuss his long-term plans to purchase another hundred patrol boats of various sizes.

Currently Colombian officials assert little worry over Chavez’s war-mongering. Claims that his speeches are designed to keep Venezuelans focus away from many domestic problems may be accurate for now. But the day may come when the Venezuelan military could pose a serious threat to Colombia. What’s more worrying than the possibility of war today is the likelihood of strained relations over the long-term due to Chavez’s completely understandable military upgrade.

As usual, it will be the citizens of both countries that will suffer, especially along the border where the local economy is so closely tied together that even slight interruptions of cross-border traffic is enough to cause a small violent outbreaks on a local level. Problem is, such a small spark might be all it takes to set fire to a much larger conflict.

The FARC's pulse and Mexican army hemmorage

With so much chatter on the international wires about the FARC hostages in Colombia, what will become of Ingred Bettencourt, and other issues revolving around the dance between Colombian president Alvaro Uribe, Hugo Chavez, and the FARC leadership, it is interesting to take a reading on the health of the FARC itself.

For many years, the FARC survived through kidnapping. As it has obviously become more involved in the drug trade, exporting cocaine from Colombia became a substantial portion of the insurgency’s revenue. Some argue that money earned from selling drugs indirectly to US consumers has by far surpassed revenue earned from collected kidnapping ransoms, to the point where kidnapping has become more of a political tool and less of a business. Given the current back and forth with Hugo Chavez, a geopolitical dance that has significantly raised awareness of the FARC on an international level, it seems this strategy, if indeed it is a strategy, may be working.

Yet within the FARC itself, a number of set backs from the death of key tactical leaders in 2007 to the loss of territory inside Colombia has hobbled the group. Despite the fact that the FARC’s founder has said that 2007 will be an offensive year for the FARC, it is hard to see just how the FARC can improve its position through the use of military force. Guns and ammunition aside, the FARC needs soldiers, yet according to the Colombian military, some six members of the FARC and the other insurgency, the ELN, abandon the rank and file every day. This is, admittedly, a biased source for information on the FARC, but it allows for an interesting numbers game.

If both the FARC and the ELN lose six soldiers a day, then it is possible that the FARC itself loses at least three a day, or 21 a week, 84 a month, and 1,008 a year. This number may seem small, but it gives an idea of how the ideology within the rank and file, the personal reasons to remain a member of the FARC, has perhaps faltered within the group itself. Do insurgent soldiers sign up because they believe in the same values shared by the FARC founders over forty years ago? Or maybe they sign up because it’s the best option in a world of limited opportunity. Either way, the rank and file of the FARC seems to be wavering. Do FARC footsoldiers have the heart to take an offensive stance that will likely lead to direct confrontation with a highly professional Colomban army?

Finally, a point of comparison: when FARC soldiers run away, where do they go? Likely not to the Colombian army, but when members of the Mexican army run away, it is possible, even likely in some cases, that they join the rank and file of Mexican drug trafficking organizations (DTOs).

According to some sources, new recruits sign up for military training already knowing that after training and sometime in the field they will switch sides to join the DTOs. Between 2002 and 2006, some 150,333 Mexican soldiers decided to desert their post. There is little doubt many of them now fight for the Sinaloa Federation, the Gulf Cartel, or one of the many, smaller DTOs in Mexico.