War and Trade

The Venezuelan government has replaced Colombia with the United States as a main supplier of meat, fabric, clothes, cooking oil, and pharmaceuticals among other items.

Since July 2009, when President Chavez ordered a freeze in Venezuelan-Colombian relations, diplomatic ties have been severed with commercial ties under considerable restraint.

Chavez has looked to China, Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay, Bolivia, Ecuador, and now the United States to provide goods that Colombia previously sold to the Venezuelan market.

Obviously, this is a clear case of Chavez placing political considerations over economic good sense. Transaction costs alone dictate that the farther an item has to travel before arrival in market, the higher the cost, apart from the time it takes to establish new relationships, determine which products to buy, and so on.

Replacing Colombia with Ecuador or Venezuela probably doesn't make much of a difference, and given the extremely low cost of Chinese goods, there's probably an acceptable pay off there, economically and politically.

But when Chavez turns to the "evil empire" for a long list of goods, he's increasing transaction costs and further deepening the double standard under which his government operates with the United States.

Chavez is happy to sell the US oil and buy US goods, but he's just as quick to claim that the US is about to invade.

At the core of the decision to purchase goods from everyone but Colombia, however, is that Chavez is distancing Venezuela from his western neighbor, and the de facto nature of the two country's close commercial ties has been the strongest argument for why Caracas will not go to war with Bogota.

Yet the war drums continue to beat. Rumors of war circulate, and on both sides information continues to circulate about military activity on the border, including illegal fly overs and tense troop encounters.

As I wrote before, Venezuela would not do well to enter a protracted war with Colombia, but a quick and dirty firefight that ends before even the media picks up on it would serve Chavez's rhetorical purposes well - all just in time for the September legislative elections…

Perspective

Colombian National Police released statistics earlier this week revealing that investigators registered 14,715 homicides between 1 January and 6 December 2009.

There were over 14,000 homicides registered in Venezuela in 2008.

By the end of November, authorities had registered 7,396 homicides in Mexico, passing 16,000 since December 1, 2006.

FARC with money problems

Some interesting news out of Colombia earlier this week reported that the FARC is in financial trouble.

Former Defense Minister Juan Manuel Santos announced at the end of November 2009 that "there are certain disagreements between [FARC leaders] Mono Joyjoy and Alfonso Cano."

For many years, the FARC has suffered the effects of a two-way split between the younger members, led by Joyjoy, who want to go after the money through drug trafficking, and the older members, led by Cano, who are more ideological and presumably still set on overthrowing the Colombian government.

Since both factions are in need of money, a disagreement over the direction of the FARC has surfaced with a significant amount of tension, according to some reports.

It will be interesting to see how Cano and Joyjoy resolve their differences. If the FARC does split, I would imagine that the more militarized Joyjoy faction would continue on, while the ideological side of the FARC would either wither on the vine or somehow try to transform into a peaceful political party… Maybe events in 2010 will tell...

Breaking the Silence

Posts have been thin and sporadic of late - such is the life of a freelance journalist. Wells have dried up, so like most of my brethren, I'm scrambling to keep pace with the changing nature of the media industry…

Here are some updates:

With John Sullivan, I published a piece on how Costa Rica and Panama have been caught in the middle between Mexico and Colombia, where organized criminal operatives from both countries have pushed into new territory.

Since that publication, we have seen a string of murders in Panama City, and just this past week, the head of the Sinaloa Federation in Costa Rica was arrested in Puntarenas (See Southern Pulse newsletter, Networked Intelligence tomorrow afternoon for details).

Honduras continues to provide some interesting developments. Since I published a piece on Honduras and how mainstream media should be focusing on what's going on behind the so-called coup de teat, we've seen a sharp up-tick in narco-flights landing in various points across the country.

Most of the flights, according to both Honduran and Colombian officials, originate in Venezuela, where the bulk of air traffic has shifted - it was once the purview of Colombian traffickers.

And Caracas has quietly become one of the most dangerous places on earth. With over 14,000 murders last year (country wide but many in Caracas), and police as corrupt as ever, Caracas has become a nightmarish place to visit. I'm told that you can't walk on the streets in a business suit after dark, and during the day, you should stick to the main streets. I felt this tension on my last visit to the city in November 2005.

Side streets, apparently, are teeming with young thieves. Dairy products and meat are hard to come by, and soon the entire city will begin rationing water, with rolling "water cut offs," scheduled by the government in 48 hour segments. Can you imagine being mugged for a bottle of water? Back in Mexico, we continue to watch an ever-changing situation. Many of the country's states remain in solid control of one of the many DTOs there, but the agreements between various groups form and break like ice melting and re-freezing from one day to the next.

From what I understand, the Beltran-Leyva Organization (BLO) has hired Los Zetas to strengthen its fight against the Sinaloa Federation. The Carrillo-Fuentes Organization (CFO) cooperates with BLO and the Zetas, and remains very active with its own group of sicarios.

Los Zetas, meanwhile, have targeted Sinaloa and Michoacan.

The Arellano-Felix Organization continues to crumble, and now faces a very real threat from inside Tijuana. The tit-for-tat murder and dismemberment of cops and others in the state of Michoacan indicates that the Zetas are pressuring members of La Familia, who have initiated La Familia Guerrense for the state of Guerrero. The Zetas are also pushing into Sinaloa, and the recent kidnapping if nearly two dozen ranch workers outside of Culiacan indicates that the powers that be in that area are worried about Zeta infiltration. After all, these guys - and their trainees - are well versed in training locals to act on their behalf…

I'll also add that I recently published a piece on diamond smuggling in South America, with a focus on Guyana, Venezuela, and Brazil. The Panamanians will soon open the region's only diamond trading hub, and some are worried that it will become a funnel for illegal diamonds leaving the region.

Lula's UNASUR Summit

Southern Pulse Intel Brief | 27 August 2009

republished here with permission from Southern Pulse editors.

Brazilian President Luis Inacio “Lula” da Silva generated the most interesting news this week, ahead of the 28 August UNASUR summit, to be hosted by Argentina in the ski-resort town of Bariloche.

On 22 August, Lula signed a raft of agreements with Bolivian President Evo Morales in Bolivia’s Chapare region. An agreement worth US$332 million underpins the construction of a 306-kilometer highway from Villa de Tunari in the Chapare to the eastern Bolivian department of Beni.

Brazil has also agreed to import tariff-free textiles worth some US$21 million, which is the same amount of money Bolivia lost due to Washington’s decision not to renew the US-Andean Trade Promotion and Drug Eradication Act (ATPDEA) last year. The two leaders also discussed changes in the Brazil-Bolivia natural gas deal, as well as cooperation for bilateral efforts to combat the drug trade, but no solid agreements surfaced.

By many accounts, this meeting was a significant win for Morales, who has been under pressure to find alternative markets for Bolivia’s textiles. The highway construction will also please Chapare leaders, who are Morales’ closest political supporters. He will need them later this year for the run up to Bolivia’s 6 December 2009 presidential elections

For his part, Lula has assured support from Bolivia, despite Morales' anti-US stance, at the UNASUR summit, which promises to be contentious with both Venezuela and Colombia in attendance, and with Ecuador currently holding the president’s chair, which Colombia will likely view as an unfair arbiter.

While Lula has voiced some concern about Colombia’s agreement to allow the US military access to seven military bases in Colombia, he does not side with Chavez, nor can he take such a hardened position against Colombia. UNASUR is widely considered Brazil’s initiative and the strongest effort towards unifying South America under Brazil’s leadership. Lula cannot lean too far to the left in criticizing Colombia and the US at the risk of distancing himself from regional moderates and Washington.

The concern over US bases in Colombia does signal that the United States can still tilt the balance of soft-power in the region, but Lula’s deft diplomacy will likely win out. He did invite President Obama to attend the summit, and while Obama will likely not attend, Lula can at least maintain an open posture towards Washington, signaling that as the de facto regional leader, Brazil has nothing to fear from the US’ increased military presence in Colombia. He also did receive assurances from Obama’s National Security Advisor, Jim Jones, in early August that there would be a “good explanation” for the US’ presence in Colombia.

But Brazil would like a commitment: Obama will not use the Colombian bases to launch missions into other countries. This request is also one made on behalf of all of Colombia’s neighbors - a conciliatory geopolitical stroke ahead of the summit to make sure that Ecuador, Colombia, and Venezuela can at least agree on something.

DEA scores extradition victory

The DEA successfully extradited the first Colombian drug trafficker from Sierra Leon, a country considered to be at the top of the list of West African countries where Colombians, Venezuelans, and others are deeply involved in moving drugs from South America into Europe.

You don't know who Geraldo Quintana Pérez is because he did a good job keeping a low profile, at least for a while. (picture shows his plane and load of coke.)

He arrived in Sierra Leon about two years ago, but when he made an unauthorized landing in Freetown, Sierra Leon on 13 July, 2008, it was his last.

His plane had left Venezuela, making stops in Trinidad and Tobago, Grenada, Barbados, and Santa Lucia before flying across the Atlantic to Sierra Leon.

He, along with his partner, was busted with 600 kilos of coke (worth about 125 million Euros), and two rifles, an AK-47, and an AK-48

From the DEA press release:

QUINTANA-PEREZ, 51, and PEREZ, 30, were arrested in Freetown, Sierra Leone on July 13, 2008 on Sierra Leonean charges, following the seizure of approximately 600 kilograms of cocaine. Upon their arrest in Sierra Leone, the defendants were tried there on drug trafficking charges, of which they were convicted on April 20, 2009. Thereafter, the Government of Sierra Leone transferred the defendants to American custody.

More details here, in Spanish.

Congratulations.

Now, will we see any extraditions from Guinea-Bissau?

FARC kills eight soldiers

When I see news about the FARC killing eight soldiers in Colombia, near the Venezuelan border, I'm reminded that there is still some fight in this old revolutionary dog.

The Colombian government argues that the FARC is on the decline, with high desertion rates, and a declining revenue base.

And it's true. The FARC today is not what it was five years ago, or three years ago. I think we're looking at the "middle of the end" for the FARC.

But I have to consider the possibility that the FARC has, for years now, made concerted efforts to move beyond Colombian borders into Venezuela and Ecuador. Some time ago, we prepared a piece on the FARC's presence outside of Colombia. Venezuela is certainly a welcoming environment.

Given the country's well established role as a drug transit zone, and the ongoing allegations that at least a section of the Venezuelan National Guard is a drug smuggling organization (called the Sun Cartel by DEA agents in Venezuela before they got kicked out the first time), it is certainly a great place to operate compared to Colombia.

In Ecuador, the president is not a vocal supporter, but he is willing to look the other way, and allow the FARC to operate just inside Ecuador. Even if he isn't willing to let the FARC play on Ecuadorian soil, Correa has limited political currency, and I'm not sure he wants to spend it on making a loud and expensive campaign against the FARC.

Back to those eight soldiers. They fell under attack from the 49th front of the FARC, according to La Semana. The 49th front is known to operate on both sides of the border between Venezuela and Colombia. It is also considered the Caribbean front of the FARC, operating around the Guajira peninsula.

It will be interesting to see if Chavez answers Uribe's call to hunt down these FARC soldiers. I doubt it.

(image from colombiareports.com)

Illegal refineries in Colombia

The Latin American Herald Tribune has reported that Colombian police and army troops found and destroyed two refineries used by the FARC to process stolen oil.

This story caught my eye because I've never heard of the FARC using oil refineries, but it's certainly something that makes sense.

The refineries could produce up to 11 gallons of fuel an hour, and were reportedly under the control of the 29th Front.

Authorities seized 1,849 gallons of fuel and 11 steel drums, each able to hold about a barrel of crude oil.

These illegal refineries were found in the Nariño department, on the border with Ecuador.

Weekend News Review - FARC, Customs corruption, and grenades

1) Colombian President Alvaro Uribe said that if the FARC keeps quiet and avoids any skirmishes with anyone for "three or four" months, then he will consider peace talks.

Up until now, Uribe has been staunchly against talking to the FARC. History has shown that the FARC is not always the most honest negotiators. But that was when the rebel army was much stronger. In its weakened state, peace might not be a bad idea.

Semana article here.

2) One of the conclusions of the 20th annual meeting of Interpol (held in Chile this year) was that Al-Qaeda (or any terrorist organization, really) could infiltrate Latin America because of lenient or in some cases (Ecuador and Nicaragua) non-existent immigration controls.

Of the 150 million or so annual visits to Latin America from other countries around the world, only 50 million passports are scanned, according to Ronald Noble, Interpol Secretary General.

Interpol is specifically worried about Central America.

3) Texas authorities seized some $120,000, gun parts, and "grenades" from a car headed south on Interstate-35, according to the San Antonio News.

Obviously the grenades are interesting. My sources mostly agree that grenades used in Mexico come from Guatemala. To sell grenades in the US, a merchant must operate a class two license, I believe, which is a very strict legal regime.

The article notes these grenades are "improvised".

4) A 34 year-old Customs agent was arrested this past Friday (April, 3rd) on charges that he arranged to "wave immigrant and drug smugglers through his inspection booth for money." If convicted he could serve up to 35 years in prison - ouch!

As a Sheriff in southern Arizona recently told me, this is a "sin of omission." To break the law, these men don't actually do anything. It's what they don't do - i.e. stop a car stuffed with coke - that breaks the law. To wave the right car and receive thousands a week for doing so, with little chance of apprehension, so long you don't flash the money or act out, is a tough thing to turn down. I often wonder about this kind of "soft" corruption, and whether or not the border is littered with these guys...

5) Not surprisingly, Chihuahua State Governor, Jose Reyes Baeza, was attacked on 22 February. One of his bodyguards was killed during the attack, and two were wounded. Two of the men allegedly responsible were arrested in the city of Chihuahua on 31 March. They were caught with AR-15 rifles stolen from the wounded bodyguards.

This news only came out in English on 5 April... That in itself is interesting.

What was lost with Reyes' Death - one year ago

Colombia's weekly news magazine, La Semana, recently published an interesting and insightful piece about the five things the FARC lost with Raul Reyes' death.

At the time of his death, one year ago on 1 March, 2008, Reyes was considered the FARC's number two leader; he commanded a considerable amount of respect around the world as a moderate, well spoken, and deeply committed member of the FARC's leadership council.

What was lost:

1. The FARC lost Reyes' international contacts. Reyes was close with a number of older members of Germany's Stasi - secret police from the Communist days in Eastern Germany. Through many of these contacts, Reyes was able to procure arms through the black market.

He was also the FARC's spokesman with many international organizations, and was responsible for rallying international support for the FARC's position when it came to negotiating with the Colombian government.

2. Many of the organizations that kept in touch with the FARC through Reyes were exposed when the Colombian government reviewed files recovered from his computer. These groups were subsequently forced to retreat from their supportive role, further isolating the FARC on the international stage, especially in Europe.

3. Also through a thorough review of Reyes' files, the Colombian government learned how the FARC communicated on both a domestic and international level. The guerrilla organization's communications protocols, what the leaders knew, and what the leaders didn't know was also disclosed. Without this knowledge, the deception used to rescue Ingrid Betancourt and the US captives, among others, would not have been possible.

4. The information on Reyes' computer also alerted the Colombian diplomatic corps to the linkages between the FARC and a long list of illegal organizations around the world. With these proven ties, Colombia's international efforts to stymie the FARC's support within illegal realms, especially the black market, have received a boost.

5. Colombia attacked Reyes in a FARC camp located within Ecuador, disrespecting that country's sovereignty while maintaining that if the Ecuadorians had been in on the operation, then the FARC would have found out. Colombia's relations with Ecuador have been severely damaged well into the future with a poor prognosis for any improvement, at least during Correa's mandate.

One year after Reyes' death, on 1 March, 2009, we still find two Andean countries with no diplomatic ties. But the FARC has been forever crippled.

If you ask Uribe if it was worth it, he would not hesitate to tell you yes.

More Coke to EU

Poland's Internal Security Agency confiscated a ton of coke late last week. Along with EU organized criminal groups, members of an unnamed Colombian drug trafficking organization were also arrested.

Poland has been used as yet another gateway into Europe from Colombia and Venezuela. Apart from Project Reckoning, implemented by the DEA, I haven't seen any significant arrests of Latinos inside the EU over the past few years until today, and they're bummed.

Moving a ton of coke from Colombia to Poland is serious work - logistics, money, heavy lifting, and bribes. Money lost is not as valuable as time for these guys.

If the old rule stands - that the amount seized is roughly one third of the actual flow - then Poland is a serious player in the Colombia-EU coke trade.

The "middle" of the end for the FARC?

Colombia's Semana news magazine posted an interesting piece yesterday. Four Colombians presented themselves to Panama's Servicio Nacional de Fontera, located some 50 kilometers from the Panama/Colombia border.

Most speculate the four Colombians were members of the FARC. Reading the story, I was reminded of the FARC's desertion rate, and how in the past couple years, we have seen this rate rise, slowly but steadily.

Meanwhile, on 10 February, El Tiempo reported that a joint force of Colombian police and military apprehended Jesus Antonio Garcia Largo (aka Chucho Mapurilla) in Putumayo, near the border with Ecuador. At 51 years old, he is a 35 year FARC veteran who spent some time with the 48th Front . Chucho was also one of the FARC's remaining ideological leaders...

These two news items, when taken together with the conciliatory position the FARC has taken recently (apart from the Indian massacre in Nariño), points towards what I would call the "middle" of the end for the FARC as an armed threat inside Colombia.

I say "middle" because I've already considered the beginning of the end, here, as well as questioning if they were even still revolutionaries in 2005, here.

Moving forward, I think it is important to note the desertion and attrition rate - measured both by what the Colombian military says (see last to paragraphs in this piece) and by what we see reported, like Panama yesterday.

It is anyone's guess how much longer the FARC will remain as an organization that closely resembles what it was during the Pastraña administration, but I think we can all agree that the FARC has peaked and is now on its way down.

Border Surge and Unintended Consequences in Spain

A colleague of mine who writes for Latin American Thought recently sent over an interesting article from El Espectador, a Colombian print weekly.

The article outlines how Colombian organized crime has installed itself inside Spain.

Citing the recent murder of a Sr. Leonidas Vargas, killed while resting in a hospital bed in Madrid, the author pointed out that in the past the assassin would have been sent from Colombia - most certainly on his way home before the Spanish authorities could respond to the crime. Today, however, the assassin probably didn't even leave Madrid, asserts the author. I completely agree.

For years now, Spanish police have done away with the idea that Colombian assassins travel from Colombia to do their work in Spain. Today, these men live and work in Madrid, perfectly blending in with Madrid's business class.

The are called "debt collectors," and are sent to force their targets to pay a drug trafficking debt - often marked in dollars - with their own life.

"You pay or you die."

There is very little about this scenario that we haven't seen in Latin America. There is even little novelty of this occurrence in Spain, especially for those of us who follow the trends of Latin American drug trafficking.

But what I find interesting is how Spain may become over time a new battle ground for rival trafficking groups who seek to use the Iberian peninsula as a spring board into the rest of Europe.

Until now, we haven't seen blood shed between the Colombian and Mexican drug trafficking organizations (DTOs). There is a business agreement in place, one forged many years ago. But this agreement considers only the movement of product into the United States. When the EU is under consideration, all bets are off.

Spain becomes a more important transit country when we consider Venezuela's role in moving bulk quantities of cocaine from Colombia to Europe, as much of it flows through Spain.

Spain is a stopping point on the drug route from Western Africa into the EU, and places such as Guinea-Bissau and Senagal, which have become reception points for drugs flowing out of Brazil and Argentina.

Finally, if all the talk of a "border surge" turns into reality, then we will see Spain, again, become a hot transit zone.

The Colombians are already in place. And I recently read that street gangs such as the Mara Salvatrucha are heavily networked throughout Spanish cities. What, then, will happen once the Mexicans come into town?

A spike of violence in Spain on the heels of any border surge, I think, would be the text book definition of unintended consequences.

Russian Subs and Echoes of War

By now talk of Venezuelan military purchases from Russia has become a repetition of Chavez’s shopping list with the occasional mention of a new item. In light of the current situation between Venezuela and Colombia, Chavez’s interest in purchasing three Varshavianka-class submarines for an unofficial amount of one billion dollars becomes slightly more interesting.

Echoes of war between the two countries resound more in Chavez’s rhetoric and Colombian newspapers than they do in the offices of Colombia’s political and military leaders. But those who pay close attention to the matter have become more alarmed than usual. Chavez’s rhetoric appears especially fierce. Close cooperation between his government and the FARC, as well as the possible presence of Venezuelan ammunition in the hands of FARC guerrillas, underline an interesting observation made by Adam Isacson, Director of Programs with the Center for International Policy Studies in Washington.

In a recent conversation, he mentioned that when you’ve got two neighbors with one – Venezuela - that allegedly supplies arms and ammunition to the guerrilla army of the other – the FARC in Colombia – you’ve got a tense situation, one that is not present anywhere else in the world, save sections of Africa, and maybe the Middle East.

On top of that, add Chavez’s rhetoric, and the possibility of both Venezuelan and Colombian troop presence on a shared border known to be, in large swathes, FARC-controlled territory. In a dense forest, where a gun shot could come from any one of the three groups, causing an immediate reaction, it is not a far stretch to see how the current echoes of war could descend to something quite different.

Chavez’s announced trip to Russia to sign the contract for these three subs certainly does not help reduce tension. Once the contract for Russian attack subs has been signed, Chavez will likely make lightly-veiled statements to bristle the Colombian president flanked by a stoic background of Russian officials.

The Varshavianka-class submarine is a patrol submarine capable of taking out targets on land, on the surface or underwater. Along with the purchase of three submarines, Chavez will discuss his long-term plans to purchase another hundred patrol boats of various sizes.

Currently Colombian officials assert little worry over Chavez’s war-mongering. Claims that his speeches are designed to keep Venezuelans focus away from many domestic problems may be accurate for now. But the day may come when the Venezuelan military could pose a serious threat to Colombia. What’s more worrying than the possibility of war today is the likelihood of strained relations over the long-term due to Chavez’s completely understandable military upgrade.

As usual, it will be the citizens of both countries that will suffer, especially along the border where the local economy is so closely tied together that even slight interruptions of cross-border traffic is enough to cause a small violent outbreaks on a local level. Problem is, such a small spark might be all it takes to set fire to a much larger conflict.

Spies, sovereignty, and drug trafficking

Media coverage of the Merida Initiative (Plan Mexico) continues as strong as ever. The IHT completed an interesting piece on the money laundering component, suggesting that Mexican organized crime launders up to USD 10 billion in US banks every year. The Washington Post did a piece on gun smuggling, which was not well received in some circles. I also did a piece on the same topic, here.

Most cannot deny that as many as 2,000 guns were smuggled from the US to Mexico a day during the six-year administration of former Mexican president Vicente Fox, but many will disagree over how the US plays a role in this very important aspect of the US-Mexico drug trade. Adam Isacson has completed an interesting comparison of the proposed Mexico aid package with Plan Colombia. The Mexican package, by many accounts, is a great start but could use more money and less focus on the military solution.

One thing is for sure. The front-line of what Washington calls the “War on Drugs” has moved from Colombia to the US-Mexico border. The enforcement arm of the Gulf Cartel, Los Zetas, paid a man in Laredo, Texas some USD 15,000 to kill an American citizen in 2006, for example. Members of Los Zetas are rumored to have taken control of the I-35 interstate corridor, maintaining a presence of many three-man cells that carry out orders from car theft to distribution and, at times, assassination.

Their presence in Texas and other US states was, in part, what prompted the Bush administration to meet with Mexican president Felipe Calderon in Merida, Mexico last year to discuss a bilateral policy to combat drug trafficking – hence the “Merida Initiative”.

Meanwhile, both the United States and Colombia have for some time now operated spies on Mexican soil both with and without the permission of the Mexican Justice department.

One FBI agent, Samuel Martinez, managed to infiltrate Mexican organized criminal rings and remain there for years. He worked this beat for 26 years in total. The DEA has also placed undercover agents, and as one anonymous DEA official told a Mexican daily, sometimes they can’t tell the Mexican government everything because the agent must react to the situation at hand, which sometimes means entering Mexico unannounced. His priority is to maintain his cover, not respect Mexican sovereignty – an understandable position I think.

When Colombian Attorney General, Marioo Iguarán, told CNN en Español that Colombian spies have entered Mexico as undercover agents without alerting Mexican officials, it prompted a strong denial from the Mexican Attorney General and Minister of Foreign Affairs. To be clear, in most cases, Mexican officials are alerted. But sometimes they cannot be.

Iguaran pointed out a very relevant fact: drug trafficking organizations are now more international than ever. Years ago, there were clear lines between the Colombians, Mexicans, and those in between in the Caribbean or Central America. But as the drug trade has been democratized to a level where many smaller organizations work with a number of specialists from smugglers and money launderers to distributors, producers and chemical importers, the international nature of the drug trade has placed a very real strain on sovereignty. Moving forward with any transnational plan to combat drug trafficking organizations must take into account that at times sovereignty must be ignored, otherwise the traffickers have already won.