Irony in Bolivia

How many times has President Evo Morales criticized the US for spying on his administration? Most people who follow Bolivia know that Morales has often used public statements concerning the CIA and intelligence operations against his government to rouse local support. He even kicked out the Drug Enforcement Administration (although I suspect some agents remained in place), but his rhetoric is rarely, if ever, destined for an international audience.

So I can't help to find the following news a little ironic. The Bolivian government announced on Jan. 14 that it would create a state intelligence directorate modeled after the CIA. Bolivia's intelligence organization will fall under the control of the executive branch and focus on strategic questions. There will be some representation from Bolivia's armed forces and police.

And I suspect that the focus will be on organized crime and drug trafficking.

Lula's UNASUR Summit

Southern Pulse Intel Brief | 27 August 2009

republished here with permission from Southern Pulse editors.

Brazilian President Luis Inacio “Lula” da Silva generated the most interesting news this week, ahead of the 28 August UNASUR summit, to be hosted by Argentina in the ski-resort town of Bariloche.

On 22 August, Lula signed a raft of agreements with Bolivian President Evo Morales in Bolivia’s Chapare region. An agreement worth US$332 million underpins the construction of a 306-kilometer highway from Villa de Tunari in the Chapare to the eastern Bolivian department of Beni.

Brazil has also agreed to import tariff-free textiles worth some US$21 million, which is the same amount of money Bolivia lost due to Washington’s decision not to renew the US-Andean Trade Promotion and Drug Eradication Act (ATPDEA) last year. The two leaders also discussed changes in the Brazil-Bolivia natural gas deal, as well as cooperation for bilateral efforts to combat the drug trade, but no solid agreements surfaced.

By many accounts, this meeting was a significant win for Morales, who has been under pressure to find alternative markets for Bolivia’s textiles. The highway construction will also please Chapare leaders, who are Morales’ closest political supporters. He will need them later this year for the run up to Bolivia’s 6 December 2009 presidential elections

For his part, Lula has assured support from Bolivia, despite Morales' anti-US stance, at the UNASUR summit, which promises to be contentious with both Venezuela and Colombia in attendance, and with Ecuador currently holding the president’s chair, which Colombia will likely view as an unfair arbiter.

While Lula has voiced some concern about Colombia’s agreement to allow the US military access to seven military bases in Colombia, he does not side with Chavez, nor can he take such a hardened position against Colombia. UNASUR is widely considered Brazil’s initiative and the strongest effort towards unifying South America under Brazil’s leadership. Lula cannot lean too far to the left in criticizing Colombia and the US at the risk of distancing himself from regional moderates and Washington.

The concern over US bases in Colombia does signal that the United States can still tilt the balance of soft-power in the region, but Lula’s deft diplomacy will likely win out. He did invite President Obama to attend the summit, and while Obama will likely not attend, Lula can at least maintain an open posture towards Washington, signaling that as the de facto regional leader, Brazil has nothing to fear from the US’ increased military presence in Colombia. He also did receive assurances from Obama’s National Security Advisor, Jim Jones, in early August that there would be a “good explanation” for the US’ presence in Colombia.

But Brazil would like a commitment: Obama will not use the Colombian bases to launch missions into other countries. This request is also one made on behalf of all of Colombia’s neighbors - a conciliatory geopolitical stroke ahead of the summit to make sure that Ecuador, Colombia, and Venezuela can at least agree on something.

Iranian activity in Bolivia

My research assistant, Kelsey Price, has completed her third backgrounder for this summer. Her first detailed energy security in Russia and Turkey, and the second reviewed Sino-Brazilian relations. In her third and final piece, she reviews Iranian activity in Bolivia.

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International observers have questioned Bolivia’s ability to control crime within its borders before, especially concerning the drug trade and the Maoist terrorist group Shining Path. Four provinces are looking to separate from the central government, resulting in referendums and anti-referendum marches. Now with Iran’s increasing presence in South America, Bolivia may also be susceptible to radical Islamic activity inspired (or organized) by its new ally.

President Evo Morales’ track record doesn’t help Bolivia’s case either—his links to various attacks in Peru, especially, cast doubt on his ability to control (or keep away from) terrorism in the region. Morales’ former aide was accused in 2007 of assisting terrorism in Peru, specifically with the Cuban Tupac Amaru movement of the 1980’s. Deteriorating relations with Latin American neighbors combine now with right-wing opposition of Morales’ Movement Toward Socialism (MAS) party. Main opposition leader Manfred Reyes Villa, former Cochabamba Prefect, has joined forces with disgruntled indigenous rights leaders in order to form a significant alternative to Morales. More importantly, four provinces began to seek independence from La Paz in 2008: Santa Cruz, Tarlja, Beni, Pando and Chuqulsaca. The two parties reached an agreement that October, but tension still lingers over relations between Morales and the opposition-led provinces.

The conflict brought about by such a strong—and influential—opposition may create the kind of instability needed for a future crime hotbed to grow. Bolivia’s ties with Iran, especially, suggest that radical Islamic activity may begin to take root in the region.

Iran’s initiative to gain support in Latin America leads it to investing in left-wing Bolivia, second only to Venezuela in winning the Middle Eastern nation’s favor and financial support. The two partners have discussed joint venture projects in the industrial and manufacturing sectors, and critics conclude that Tehran secretly has its hands in uranium mining deals as well. Iran promised in 2008 to invest 1.1 billion dollars in Bolivia in the next five years, aimed at strengthening economic and agricultural ties while also fostering the Bolivian energy sector. So far, Tehran has lived up to its promise. Iran has funded on credit the construction of two cement and six milk-processing plants, three health clinics, and suggests potential aid in oil and other energy fields.

The Iranian administration caused an uproar in the government’s own Majlis parliament when it provided Bolivia with an unapproved loan of over 280 million dollars on July 31, 2009.Over and above the material and financial support that Iran has provided, newly installed TV and radio stations may spread Tehran’s influence at a more cultural level. Iranian radio has broadcast in-depth reports and interviews about its positive relationship to Latin America, the evils of colonialism, and anti-imperialism. “This opportunity has come up for Iran,” said Dr Massah, a university lecturer on one program, “to spread the slogans of anti colonialism, prevent the international system from becoming monopolized, and spread the sense of seeking justice, which arises from Islamic standards, in [Latin America].” Bolivia’s state-run TV channel regularly shows Iranian movies, and a Muslim preacher delivered services at a state-sponsored event in June 2009.

^{Some of Morales’ sizable opposition questions Iran’s intentions and growing influence. “We need to ask what Iran’s real interest is in Bolivia,” said dissident presidential candidate Roman Loayza. “Evo has no business entering into agreements with foreign interests at the back of the Bolivian people which could harm our environment.” Both sides of those agreements insist that Iran’s activities are harmless.}

The partnership has become more than just economic, however; Bolivia has sided with Iran in recent controversial issues, including some in which Islam influenced the decision. Bolivia joined its radical counterparts in the Israel-Palestine issue in January 2009 by breaking off relations with Israel, a move endorsed by President Ahmadinehad, Iranian MP and head of Iran-Bolivia Parliamentary Friendship Group Arsalan Farthi-Pur, and even Hamas. The support of the terrorist organization may be at least the first step in the direction of a Bolivia heavily dependant on radical Islamic groups.

Bolivia shares another political stance with these groups: its disdain for the United States. Morales even expelled the US Drug Enforcement Agency in November 2008 in a move that analysts have said was thought-out foreign policy. However, Bolivia is predicted to return for the American agency to help counter its ever-growing drug problem; the country is the third-largest producer of the coca leaf in the world.

^{Bolivia’s only reported brush with radical Islamic activity was a group of Shi’ite missionaries sent by Iranian fundamentalist group Hezbollah to convert indigenous Latin American tribes, according to a Bolivian journalist in 2007. At the time of the report, the group had successfully installed bases in other areas, mostly along the Venezuelan-Colombian border, and was spreading to the Quechua and Aymara Indians of Bolivia. The real threat, however, comes from Hugo Chavez’s role in the Hezbollah group’s presence. Considering the strong relationship between Iran and Venezuela, especially among its populist leaders, the possibility of Morales’ involvement in something like the Hezbollah missionary project seems likely. Bolivia, with its Iran-sponsored health clinics and TV channels, may adopt the same relationship to Tehran’s more controversial groups.}

Notes:

“Peru seeks extradition of terrorism-accused ex-Bolivian aide.” Global Insight. 25 October 2007.

“Bolivian candidate forms alliance with indigenous leader.” Bolivian newspaper La Razon websitre, 7 July 2009. Translated by BBC World Monitoring.

Barbel, Marion. “Andean bloc, European Union offer mediation services to tense Bolivia.” 14 April, 2008. Global Insight.

“Bolivians resist Iran's search for uranium; Mountain holds mineral prospects.” Washington Times. 27 July 2009.

Kazemi, Azadeh. “Iran wants to ‘exploit’ Bolivian uranium.” Iranian newspaper Kargozaran. 22 September, 2008.

“Iran confirms plans to install television channel in Bolivia.” Bolivian newspaper La Razon website. 20 May 2009. Linked by BBC World Monitoring.

“Iran MPs slam government over loan to Bolivia.” Iranian news agency Mehr. 3 August 2009.

“Iranian Esfahan TV airs programme on Iran-Latin America relationships.” 7 October 2008. Iranian Esfahan provincial TV station. Supplied by BBC World Monitoring.

“Bolivians resist Iran's search for uranium; Mountain holds mineral prospects” Washington Times. 27 July 2009.

See “Bolivians resist…” Washington Times, 27 July 2009.

“Iranian President praises Venezuela, Bolivia for break with Israel.” Venezuelan newspaper El Universal website. 22 January 2009. Linked by BBC World Monitoring.

“Iranian MP thanks Bolivia for condemning Israel’s ‘war crimes.’” Iranian official government news agency IRNA website. 20 May 2009. Linked by BBC World Monitoring.

“Hamas welcomes Bolivian decision to sever ties with Israel.” Pro-Hamas Palestinian Information Centre. 15 January 2009. Linked by BBC World Monitoring.

“Expulsion of US agency ‘well thought out foreign policy.’” Bolivian newspaper Los Tiempos. 4 November 2008. Linked by BBC World Monitoring.

Volkel, Christian. “Anti-Narcotics Co-Operation to Continue between US and Bolivia.” Global Insight. 8 April 2009.

“Hezbollah Missionaries Operate in Amazonia.” Peruvian newspaper La Razon, 29 October 2007. Provided by BBC World Monitoring.

An Opening for Obama to Engage Brazil

The new administration will seek to engage Brazil in an unprecedented way. This is one of the strongest conclusions made by nearly everyone I spoke with while preparing a recently published piece on Obama’s plans for Latin America.

The specifics of how, when, where, etc are yet to come. As many have already noted, there is a (long) short list of people on deck to take over for Tom Shannon. And Cuba will certainly be the first LatAm country to receive some long overdue attention, setting the tone for the Obama administration’s efforts south of the border.

But when it comes to Brazil, there are few in DC who can put their finger on exactly how the US can answer Brazil’s biggest question: so what? So what if you want to work with us, the Brazilians might say to Obama’s team. What’s in it for us?

From Brazil’s point of view, the US is not a free trader. Brazil has perennially confronted – and defeated over a cotton subsidies issue – the US at the WTO. Sugar and ethanol subsidies further exacerbate trade challenges, and to date there has been little to no support from the US on any matters concerning Brazil’s desire to become a player on the UN Security Council (never mind it’s one of the most defunct multilateral forums in existence today).

But let’s say that whoever replaces Tom Shannon has a keen ability to break through to Lula’s people, winning over the especially skeptical Celso Amorim, Brazil’s Foreign Minister and a strong advisor to the president. Then what?

What can Obama possibly offer that doesn’t have to go through Congress or be subjected to the geopolitical strategies of other UN Security Council members? The most clear answer is to support Brazil’s efforts to combat South America’s drug trade.

In a recently released policy paper on Brazil’s new national defense posture, the Brazilian military announced that it will begin shifting its focus from the southern borders to the Amazon basin, specifically to its borders with Bolivia, Peru, and Colombia. To date, the “Cobra” operation, run by Brazil’s Federal Police to patrol the Colombia-Brazil border, has met limited success, largely due to inadequate resources.

With the military high command united behind securing Brazil’s most porous borders, Brazil is in a position to provide support in material and man power to her neighbors that have the desire but not the ability to stop drugs flowing from their countries to flourishing markets in the US and Europe.

And I was waiting for the news to come out. I knew it was a matter of time before Lula would make public his first offer of assistance to combat drug trafficking in the region. It happened on 15 January in a small border town between Brazil and Bolivia, where an international road that connects the Atlantic to the Pacific will be finalized later this year (and the Chinese are happy about that).

Lula said, “he would grant Morales’ request for helicopters and other logistics support to patrol the porous frontier that is a major cocaine-trafficking route from the Andes…”

And this is where Obama’s people – and the Drug Enforcement Administration – should tread carefully. Lula is reaching out in an unprecedented way to assist Bolivia with an international challenge that Brazil now realizes is in its national best interests to combat.

The State Department under Clinton and the DEA should recognize Brazil’s political abilities in the region, and follow her lead. If Obama wants to appease Brazil, the best way is to whole heartedly support the region’s true leader – one with the ability to influence both Colombia and Bolivia (and Venezuela).

With enough support, Brazil could be encouraged to assist Peru, Colombia, and Venezuela with the region’s drug trafficking challenge. The US need not be the region’s policeman when a capable and ready Brazil is in place. It would be folly to try and force a reversal to the days when the US’ agents crawled all over the place poking around behind the backs of local police.

Finally, two caveats: I do not want to down play the DEA's important role in the region, but it is important the DEA remains a team player, as hard as it is sometimes due to concerns over corruption and operational integrity.

And second, I do not wish to promote the use of the military to do police work. The Brazilian Federal Police should take the lead on combating drug trafficking in the region. But I must recognize that in Latin America security sector reform is more of a dream than a reality. And the reality now is that if Brazil’s military will step forward to assist Bolivia and stop the cocaine and coca paste leaking out of that country and through Brazil into Europe and the US, we – and Obama – should welcome that initiative and do what we can to support it.

Thankfully, Lula has committed the Brazilian military before Obama’s team could come in and make that suggestion, which would have been a mistake and bad start considering Brazil’s sensitivities over issues of sovereignty – like what its military does and does not do.

With this announcement in place, the Obama administration has a clear hand to play. Let’s hope they do.

A few words on Bolivia

In the best interests of maintaining a balance between work and play, I decided many months ago to stop trying to cover the whole region. Bolivia is one of the countries I have allowed slip off my radar. I do receive quite a bit of information from sources in the country, but I can no longer take the time to sift through that information and try to present a sensible analysis for my readers.

But I cannot ignore how much Bolivia has distanced itself from Washington in the past few months.

Bolivia has lost trade preferences for a long list of its export products, meaning the US is no longer an export market for Bolivia. This decision hinged mostly on Bolivia’s ongoing cooperation in the War on Drugs. Seizures and the arrest of drug traffickers makes up part of what seems to be a largely subjective decision, mostly based on how much Washington “likes” the current administration in Bolivia.

Morales has been very clear about using the United States as a scapegoat in his domestic battle to keep the whole country under his control. I believe that when he expels the US ambassador and USAID, he does so mostly to keep his core constituency happy. Unfortunately the fallout on the international level is one where Washington will not stand by and let a Bolivian leader sling mud.

Now the Peace Core is packing up and leaving, as is the Drug Enforcement Administration.

I would argue that Bolivia is now firmly inside the Venezuelan orbit. Morales has effectively cut himself off from any would be channels of dialogue or mutual support with Washington and has apparently placed his bets with the success of the Chavez regime – a considerable risk simply considering that all his geopolitical eggs should not be in one basket.

I wouldn’t venture to guess what will happen next in Bolivia, but wanted to point out Bolivia’s current status to call attention to a situation I think will seriously deteriorate over the coming months and could likely explode before the end of 2009, if not before.

Best case scenario: Morales manages to keep the low lands under his control and moves the country forward on shaky legs.

Worst case scenario: Bolivia slides into civil war, with Chavez backing Morales in a fight to keep control of the low lands. If this were to unfold, it will be interesting to see how Brazil and Argentina react – both receive a significant portion of gas imports from Bolivia’s low land regions.

Bolivia's Internal Power Struggles

The selfish interests of a small group of upper class Bolivian families could determine the future of their country's geopolitical position in South America.

These families stand at the center of Bolivia's secessionist movement in the state of Santa Cruz, where a referendum for the state's autonomy was held on 4 May. Voters favored autonomy at 84 percent. It was a political gut shot for President Evo Morales' administration. But the outcome reaches beyond Morales and could have prolonged consequences for both Brazil and Argentina.

Bolivia supplies Brazil and Argentina with the natural gas that moves industry in Brazil and warms homes in Argentina. Disruption of the flow of gas is not an option for either country.

Two years ago, when Morales nationalized his country's natural resources, he began a long battle to redistribute the wealth of his country from the hands of the few - represented by Santa Cruz - to the hands of the many, mostly his poor constituents. Yet in Santa Cruz stands the most concentrated group of interests that has the most to lose from Morales' vision.

The recent referendum represents the culmination of a long road of shouts, protests, some street clashes, and mostly political maneuvering to avoid the power of the state, and Morales' administration, from stripping them from their long-held positions of economic power. Santa Cruz will not go quietly, and leaders there know they have some leverage.

Santa Cruz is the engine of the Bolivian economy, representing 50 percent of the country's GDP and some 90 percent of the country's industrial strength. The state can easily stand alone, and without Santa Cruz, the rest of Bolivia would wither on the vine. Morales knows this but rather than fight the secessionist movement head on, he has simply regarded their referendum and clamor as illegal and the fruit of "imperialist" conniving.

Since the Bolivian Congress has made any secessionist referendum illegal, Morales has the legal upper hand, but he could not ignore Santa Cruz if state leaders decide to unilaterally act on their recent vote. The referendum vote, theoretically, gives state leaders more autonomy, allowing them to control their own state police, form a parliament, enter into binding agreements with sovereign nations, and control all land redistribution.

Three other provinces, Pando and Beni to the north of Santa Cruz, and Tarija on the southern border with Argentina, will hold secession referendums in June. While not as economically important as Santa Cruz, a successful referendum in these countries would form a strong oppositionist block using the voice of the people: the same tactic Morales has used to push forward his own political agenda.

Most importantly, Tarija and Santa Cruz both lie on significant natural gas deposits. Tarija sits on some 85 percent of the country's proven gas reserves. Depending on how this power struggle progresses, the leaders of both Brazil and Argentina could find themselves pulled into Bolivia's domestic problems to secure supplies of natural gas, a matter of national security.

Bolivia's military has remained at a distance from the political dispute, although most presume it will remain loyal to Morales. The Bolivian military is the most interesting component of this situation. If the generals' loyalty remains with Morales, he will have the necessary tools to force the unruly upstarts into line. If not, the secessionists, led by Santa Cruz, would force the hands of Argentina and Brazil.

It is unlikely that any war breaks out over control of Bolivia's natural gas resources. But as one group struggles to preserve its power against a government that has a democratically elected right to redistribute that power, Bolivia's neighbors can't help but pay attention. The decisions of a small group of families could very well change their future.