Game Change in Mexico

This morning the Washington Post reports that after a two-hour shootout with the Mexican Navy, Arturo Beltran Leyva, known as the Boss of Bosses, died in a Cuernavaca apartment in the state of Morelos, just south of Mexico City.

This is a major victory for the Calderon administration in a month that has seen an uptick in violence across the country, as members of Los Zetas, working with Beltra Leyva, have gone on the offensive against the Sinaloa Federation in and around the Federation's traditional stronghold in the city of Culiacan, Sinaloa.

To date, Arturo Beltran Leyva is the highest ranking Mexican criminal to be killed by government forces during the Calderon administration.

Arturo's death will certainly destabilize the BLO, which will likely lead to more violence in Morelos, Guerrero, along the border and other pockets of Mexico where the BLO has held fast to its turf despite a year in which his organization saw a series of major arrests.

Zetas headed to the white market

On a few occasions I have been invited to talk about the evolution of the Zetas, from elite bodyguards for Osiel Cardenas to a powerful criminal organization in their own right.

Two men now control the Zetas, Miguel Triveño, and Heriberto Lazcano.

Lazcano is the undisputed head of the Zetas and known to keep a cool head and think strategically. Triveño is more like a traditional Mexican drug lord with his ostrich skin boots, big cowboy hat, gilded pistol, and country-time apparel. Both men will kill on a moment's notice, but between the two, I believe that Lazcano has a mind for business and a long-term strategy for his visions of what the Zetas are today and what they are evolving into for tomorrow.

He doesn't want to go out like his former boss Osiel, who was extradited to the United States, never to be heard from again. And he certainly doesn't need to go down like one of his captains, El Hummer, who was found unguarded in a house in Reynosa.

My argument has focused on the idea that the Zetas are moving out of the black market, into gray and while market activities. From traditional drug and human trafficking and kidnapping and extortion, the Zetas have moved into the gray market of protection. I believe that Lazcano's men will offer protection to anyone who is willing to pay for it - from criminals who work for the Beltran-Leyva or Carrillo Fuentes organizations, to well positioned businessmen. In both cases, the client needs protection from other criminals, the police, and everyone in between.

And the Zetas have long demonstrated that this protection is something that they do best.

On 6 December 2009, a Dallas Morning News article further backed up my argument for the Zetas movement into the white, or legal, side of business in Mexico and abroad. The Gulf Cartel, and the Zetas by extension, have always invested in small businesses, which help launder money. But this article takes this consideration a slight step farther, and I think their sources are right.

Here's an excerpt:

"Aside from money laundering, the Zetas are seeking legitimacy from those they have terrorized over the years…Investigators and civic leaders say the Zetas are trying to position themselves to become movers and shakers, even political players, in communities where they have a major presence."

At the head of this strategy is "La Compania" - a term the Zetas started using for themselves in mid-2009 (maybe sooner) to differentiate less violent activities from the criminal branding already well established by the Zetas brand.

Looking ahead, I would not be surprised to see clean cut, respectable looking businessmen working for the Zetas as the group moves from looking and acting like Triveño and more like Lazcano.

And if law enforcement is worried now, they've got a lot to consider looking toward a future where a group as sophisticated, organized, and ruthless as Los Zetas goes from hiring bullet slinging thugs to clean-cut business mans. The evolution will be slowly and difficult to detect, but I think it's already underway with a long road to go yet.

FARC with money problems

Some interesting news out of Colombia earlier this week reported that the FARC is in financial trouble.

Former Defense Minister Juan Manuel Santos announced at the end of November 2009 that "there are certain disagreements between [FARC leaders] Mono Joyjoy and Alfonso Cano."

For many years, the FARC has suffered the effects of a two-way split between the younger members, led by Joyjoy, who want to go after the money through drug trafficking, and the older members, led by Cano, who are more ideological and presumably still set on overthrowing the Colombian government.

Since both factions are in need of money, a disagreement over the direction of the FARC has surfaced with a significant amount of tension, according to some reports.

It will be interesting to see how Cano and Joyjoy resolve their differences. If the FARC does split, I would imagine that the more militarized Joyjoy faction would continue on, while the ideological side of the FARC would either wither on the vine or somehow try to transform into a peaceful political party… Maybe events in 2010 will tell...

Human Rights and Corruption vs. Exposure in the Mx. Army

I submitted a comment on Shannon O'Neil's blog Latintelligence, and it turned out to be long enough to share here.

Her post is here.

My comment, written as the Founding Editor of SouthernPulse, is as follows:

Apart from concerns over corruption and human rights, which are both important considerations, we must also keep in mind that the Mx. military is not a sustainable option for Mexico's and indeed the sub-region' long-term security for many reasons, including the solder's exposure to the temptations of organized crime.

When you consider that there is one general for every 333 soldiers in the Mexican Army, compared to one general for every 1,720 soldiers in the US Army, we have a top-heavy scenario. These numbers coupled with the fact that generals earn US$13,000.00 a month, compared to recruits, who earn US$453 a month, spells out what we would consider a significant problem with pay for recruits.

Another consideration: the contract for a recruit is three years. But when a soldier is deployed, the Mexican Army can extend the recruit's term of service by a total of six more years. This, in part, is why we've seen a consistent number of soldiers A.W.O.L. Keep in mind that when they leave, they know that no one will hunt them down for desertion. The only real penalty, apart from foregone pay, is that their command post retains federal identification documents. These are easily forged.

Our consistent worry, apart from human rights abuses and corruption, is that the military's presence in the streets exposes soldiers to a criminal element that can pay them better, offer them better equipment, and in at least the case of the Zetas, can offer them benefits for their families and an esprit de corps that in many places has begun to falter across the Mexican Army deployments.

We don't mean to suggest that all who choose to go A.W.O.L. go rogue and join the ranks of organized crime. This is not the case. But there is an opportunity and a strong incentive. The longer the military remains in the streets, the longer soldiers will have to think about crossing to the "dark side."

Along with a discussion over human rights and corruption, we should consider this exposure, as exposure is what likely most contributes to abuses and corruption.

Guatemala: An Important Source of Weapons

This Southern Pulse Intel Brief, dated 5 September 2009, is republished here with permission from the Southern Pulse editors.

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The Mexican navy announced at the end of August 2009 that it had installed six new naval stations in Chiapas near the Suchiate and Usumacinta rivers that form part of Mexico's southern border with Guatemala. These two rivers have traditionally been where many illegal crossings into Mexico occur, so this focus on the Mexican-Guatemala border is reassuring, but for Mexico. As for Guatemala, we've received a significant amount of information that points toward Guatemala's increasing role as a secondary source of weapons for Mexican criminals, especially Los Zetas.

On 21 August 2009, authorities seized a cache of weapons and vehicles near the Mexico-Guatemala border in Huehuetenango, allegedly owned by members of Los Zetas. There was enough equipment and firepower to mount a swift attack patrol.

Just a week before that event, a small aircraft landed near Escuintla, located near Guatemala's Pacific coast, with 636 kilos of cocaine. Police who discovered the plane also found five assault rifles, a grenade launcher, and six containers of fuel (during the last week of July, Guatemalan authorities discovered a cache of 750 kilos of cocaine, reportedly valued at US$9.2 million, in the same area near Escuintla).

Perhaps the most significant weapons seizure so far in 2009 happened in April in the small village of Amatitlan, just south of Guatemala City and not too far from Escuintla. After a firefight with alleged members of Los Zetas, five federal agents had been killed, but those who remained standing seized 350 kilos of cocaine, 11 grenade launchers, nearly 600 fragmentation grenades, 11 M-16 rifles, over 5,000 rounds of ammunition, and 11 M-60 machine guns.

Another 500 fragmentation grenades and five AK-47 rifles were found during a routine sweep of "hot-spots" in Guatemala's Peten department in March 2009.

Sources in Guatemala have noted that fragmentation grenades can be sold for as much as US$38 a unit, while AK-47 rifles sell for around US$315 a unit if used or US$1,255 new.

When we consider that some 1,100 fragmentation grenades, 11 M-60 machine guns, around a dozen grenade-launchers, and at least 20 assault rifles have been seized in Guatemala between March and August of this year, the conclusion is disturbing. The black market for guns, and especially grenades, in Guatemala is hot. The Zetas, however, have added stealing weapons as a procurement option.

Between July 2007 and January 2008, members of Los Zetas stole an estimated 500 weapons from the Mariscal Zavala military base - a random assortment of pistols, rifles, machine guns, grenade launchers, and grenades are missing.

Finally, on 20 August 2009, alleged members of the Zetas stole a shipment of weapons en route from Guatemala to Mexico. Grenade launchers, rocket launchers, grenades, assault rifles, and magazines were included in the heist.

Texas Sheriff Sentenced to Five Years

Former Starr County (map)Sheriff Reymundo Guerra was sentenced to 64 months in prison and four years of supervised release yesterday (27 August). He was found guilty of disrupting justice and facilitating Gulf Cartel smuggling operations into Texas.

A few months ago, when I was in Cochise Cty., Arizona, the local sheriff there told me that taking a bribe from mexican criminals amounted to a "sin of omission." That is, men and women who protect the border can choose not to do something that they can and should do.

On the border, they can choose not to stop a car that they know is full of contraband. Border sheriffs, likewise, may choose not to focus their investigative force on specific subjects, or a specific hot spot in the county, because their criminal employers have asked him to simply look the other way. In the criminal world, there is likely no other job that is easier than looking the other way...

Kudos for the FBI on taking this guy out. He is a disgrace to all men and women who wear a badge, and, unfortunately, stands as yet another example of how our law enforcement officials here in the US are not immune to the corruptive force of Mexican drug trafficking.

One of my favorite Texas bloggers concluded a similar post with the same thought I'd like to put forward:

"How many more officers are out there on the take is anybody's guess."

Lula's UNASUR Summit

Southern Pulse Intel Brief | 27 August 2009

republished here with permission from Southern Pulse editors.

Brazilian President Luis Inacio “Lula” da Silva generated the most interesting news this week, ahead of the 28 August UNASUR summit, to be hosted by Argentina in the ski-resort town of Bariloche.

On 22 August, Lula signed a raft of agreements with Bolivian President Evo Morales in Bolivia’s Chapare region. An agreement worth US$332 million underpins the construction of a 306-kilometer highway from Villa de Tunari in the Chapare to the eastern Bolivian department of Beni.

Brazil has also agreed to import tariff-free textiles worth some US$21 million, which is the same amount of money Bolivia lost due to Washington’s decision not to renew the US-Andean Trade Promotion and Drug Eradication Act (ATPDEA) last year. The two leaders also discussed changes in the Brazil-Bolivia natural gas deal, as well as cooperation for bilateral efforts to combat the drug trade, but no solid agreements surfaced.

By many accounts, this meeting was a significant win for Morales, who has been under pressure to find alternative markets for Bolivia’s textiles. The highway construction will also please Chapare leaders, who are Morales’ closest political supporters. He will need them later this year for the run up to Bolivia’s 6 December 2009 presidential elections

For his part, Lula has assured support from Bolivia, despite Morales' anti-US stance, at the UNASUR summit, which promises to be contentious with both Venezuela and Colombia in attendance, and with Ecuador currently holding the president’s chair, which Colombia will likely view as an unfair arbiter.

While Lula has voiced some concern about Colombia’s agreement to allow the US military access to seven military bases in Colombia, he does not side with Chavez, nor can he take such a hardened position against Colombia. UNASUR is widely considered Brazil’s initiative and the strongest effort towards unifying South America under Brazil’s leadership. Lula cannot lean too far to the left in criticizing Colombia and the US at the risk of distancing himself from regional moderates and Washington.

The concern over US bases in Colombia does signal that the United States can still tilt the balance of soft-power in the region, but Lula’s deft diplomacy will likely win out. He did invite President Obama to attend the summit, and while Obama will likely not attend, Lula can at least maintain an open posture towards Washington, signaling that as the de facto regional leader, Brazil has nothing to fear from the US’ increased military presence in Colombia. He also did receive assurances from Obama’s National Security Advisor, Jim Jones, in early August that there would be a “good explanation” for the US’ presence in Colombia.

But Brazil would like a commitment: Obama will not use the Colombian bases to launch missions into other countries. This request is also one made on behalf of all of Colombia’s neighbors - a conciliatory geopolitical stroke ahead of the summit to make sure that Ecuador, Colombia, and Venezuela can at least agree on something.

The Pressure for Results in Mexico

When corruption undercuts good police work, pressure to falsify results builds to the point where innocent men and women are tagged and persecuted for crimes they did not commit.

What's worse is when torture is involved.

On the 21st of June, 2008, 30 members of the Mexican federal police (PFP) interrupted a child's party in Tijuana and arrested 58 guests and the lead singer of the hired band. Now, over a year later, information has surfaced to suggest that every single one of these "suspects" were innocent. Beyond the horror of being falsely accused and forgotten in a Mexican prison, many of these people were tortured and forced to admit that they were members of the Arellano-Felix Organization (AFO), the drug trafficking organization that operates out of Tijuana.

One man's story is particularly disturbing. He was the godfather of the birthday child.

Cristian Jesus Sotelo Mendoza, along with the rest, found himself in the basement of a military base somewhere in Tijuana. For a period of time he cannot remember, he was tortured, threatened, and ultimately forced to admit that he was someone called "El Muletas" a wanted criminal and member of the AFO.

Sotelo Mendoza told Ricardo Ravelo of Proceso magazine in this week's latest issue that he was taken into a separate room from the others where both members of the police and soldiers punched and kicked him.

Then they placed a wet hood on his head with a second bag covering the hood. The aggressors then began hitting him in the stomach with a rod so he would inhale deeply and choke on the wet hood, shouting and threatening to kill him.

Sotelo Mendoza was handcuffed and forced to sit in a chair. The bag and hood was removed. The interrogators then took a wet shirt and stretched it across his face before throwing buckets of water in his face and kicking him in the stomach to force him to breathe in the water.

The torture didn't stop there. The forced chili peppers up his nose before taking him to another room where he was stripped naked pushed to the floor and forced to endure long secessions of physical attacks.

The next day, together with his brother-in-law, Sotelo Mendoza was forced to run to the end of a hall and into a room packed with Mexican press. When Sotelo Mendoza opened his eyes, he faced the Mexican press, standing behind a table of weapons he had never seen.

He, along with his brother-in-law, was presented as one of the lieutenants of the AFO, known as El Muletas. His brother-in-law was presented as "La Perra." The third man in the room was the vocalist from the band hired to perform at the birthday party. He was presented as "El Gordo Villarreal."

After the press conference, the three men along with another 37 of the original 59 who were arrested at the party were transferred to a separate military prison where they were held for another 40 days, without charge. When a charge did come through, all but 22 were let go.

And those 22 people, who apparently did nothing wrong more than attend a little girl's party have spent the past year in prison, apart from being tortured and presented as people they are not.

By now, most of these people have been released, except for the father of the birthday girl, who is still in prison, accused of being La Perra despite the fact that the Mexican Attorney General's office announced on 6 July 2009 that the real man, known as La Perra, had been captured.

Serious Extortion in Guerrero

La Jornada de Guerrero reports that a group of mayors from all political parties in the Mexican state of Guerrero reported on 26 July that they were the targets of an elaborate and expensive extortion scheme carried out by organized criminal groups in that state.

Fees as high as US$50,000 are required for family and personal "protection."

The mayors said that, together, their budget is some US$1.8 million, and if forced to pay the extortion fees, they would run out of money within four months.

Poaching military soldiers in Mexico

A Mexican judge ordered to prison a retired Mexican Army First Captain for ties to the Beltran Leyva organization. The Captain was accused of organized crime, drug offenses, and conspiracy, and, more interestingly, was found to be guilty of "enabling" active and retired soldiers to act as hired assassins and bodyguards.

There had long been talk of the revolving door between the rank and file of the Mexican military and organized crime. This is the first case I've seen of a middle-management military officer actively recruiting from his own rolodex for Mexican organized crime.

Ideally, this case will dissuade others from doing the same, but it's hard to deny the economic incentive offered by organized crime versus the salary paid, often late, by the Mexican government.

Desperation Route - investigative series on the border

In March, I traveled to Arizona and Sonora to research a series on border culture for the International Relations and Security Network.

We've completed the piece, christened Desperation Route, and it is now available on the ISN Special Reports site.

There are four parts: Drugs and Vengeance; Armed for Corruption; Getting Across; and, Meeting the Smugglers. Each piece is a stand alone but considered a four-part investigation.

Thank you to the editors at ISN for your hard work!

Now, back to the MS-13 blog...

This is for the Mara Salvatrucha - book trailer no. 1

A little coverage: This is for the Mara Salvatrucha

I've been on the road for work this week, so before the weekend I wanted to share here a few spots on the Internet where there has been a little early coverage of my book on the MS-13.

One of the few bloggers I read regularly, Zen Pundit, received an early copy of my book from my publisher. He was kind enough to devote some time for a post. Thanks!

Over at the Dallas Morning News' bookblog, reporter Diane Solis put up a brief review on my book and a related book by Tom Diaz. I've not read Tom's book, but I'll be sure to buy it. He operates a blog called Fairly Civil.

Our friends at Mexidata.info also posted a note on the book release.

And investigative reporter Jonathan Franklin, who recently published a piece - The Real Con Air - on deportation, interviewed me for this piece, and was nice enough to get the book's title in there. Thanks Jonathan!

Finally, my book is available for Kindle readers, and will be on stands July 7th.

This is for the Mara Salvatrucha, the blog

We've finally finished tweaking the blog for my book's website, focused on the MS-13.

The blog will serve as extra space for media items, announcements, speaking engagements, and a catch all for thoughts, observations, etc, on the Mara Salvatrucha, immigration, deportation, street gangs and organized crime.

Zetas in Belize and Texas

A contact in Mexico told me this morning that according to his 2008 research, 67 "operational Zeta bases" were located on the Mexican border with Belize.

He went back in April 2009, and counted 78 operational bases that "specialized in criminal activity".

The border between Mexico and Belize is an underreported transit zone, one more likely to be used as the Guatemalan military works with the Mexicans to seal Guatemala's northern border in the Peten department (more on the Peten here, here and here).

Moving to Texas, a San Antonio paper reported today that the FBI is circulating to local and state authorities a report that gives a vague reference to the presence of a Zetas cell in Texas, complete with a ranch, inside Texas, where Zetas train others in the art of kidnapping, such as how to run a car off the road to kidnap the driver and/or passengers, surveillance, small groups tactics, etc.

The Zetas continue to evolve, and may even have become something of a criminal brand. It will be interesting to see how this news in Texas pans out.

We already know what will happen (or already has happened) in Belize - a new transshipment route from the Caribbean into southern Mexico...

Honduras: "En route to a failed state"

Friends with NARBPO sent over a translated piece of an interesting editorial out of Honduras. The title "En route to a failed state" indicates, at least, that some people in Honduras are looking at a bleak future.

I would aruge that these spikes in violence are a combination of an ongoing street gang problem and spillover from Mexico.

Here's the translation El Heraldo (5/14/09):

The slaughter of seven workers Tuesday in the town of Arizona (no connection with state of Arizona in the U.S.) , Department (read : state) of Atlantida, on the same day that various more persons were assassinated in different events in the country, is a bloody indication of the increase in criminality to levels never before seen. One day before, on Monday, four policemen lost their lives, two in Olancho and two in Tegucigalpa, which once again manifests that insecurity affects everyone equally, even law enforcement agents. It’s unacceptable that every time more and more Hondurans of all social classes are victims of assassinations, extortions, robberies and all type of criminal acts and that the immense majority of the cases remain an absolute mystery and go unpunished. If the political and administrative chaos continues and nothing is done to combat organized crime, which each time carries out more daring activities, we shall go from being a poor and underdeveloped nation to being a failed state.

Border Patrol on the wrong side of the Law

I was on the FBI's San Antonio press releases page for 2009, and I was struck by the five stories I saw about Customs and Border Patrol officers or inspectors in Texas who have either plead guilty or have been convicted of bribery, corruption, smuggling, etc.

Doesn't that seem like a lot?

I'll also share a story I came across some time ago about another Border Patrol Agent who fell on the wrong side of the law:

BROWNSVILLE — A former Border Patrol agent was sentenced Wednesday to 14 years in federal prison for helping drug smugglers move a 44-pound cocaine load.

Prosecutors showed that 30-year-old Leonel Morales, of Zapata County, took $9,000 in exchange for telling drug smugglers how to avoid sensors and drawing a map of the best routes for shepherding drugs through the county. He also bragged he could keep other Border Patrol agents out of the way.

Morales made the drug smuggling deal during the summer of 2008, unaware he was being recorded. He pleaded guilty to bribery in January.

The sentencing judge in Laredo also ordered him to pay an $11,000 fine.

FBI press release on Morales here.

El Goyo captured

Arrests and seizures in Mexico are part of my daily news diet, but when police capture an old-school member of the Gulf Cartel, it's something I have to post.

Gregiorio Sauceda Gamboa, aka "El Goyo," was an original member of the Gulf Cartel as it was molded under the leadership of Osiel Cardenas, dating back to 1996 (pictured in the middle).

He was a heavy hitter, often asked to perform some of the more risky assignments hunting down members of the El Chapo's organization for kidnap, torture, and murder. This guy was a former investigative police officer, and likely had close contacts with many police in Tamaulipas, where he was arrested in Matamoros, with his wife, while sitting in a stash house stocked with thousands of rounds of ammunition, a number of long guns, and a M72A3 rocket launcher.

At different times in his narco career, El Goyo ran operations in Nuevo Laredo, Reynosa, and Matamoros.

According to a Houston Chronicle article, El Goyo moved an averaged 10 tons of cocaine and 30 tons of marijuana a month at the height of his drug trafficking activity, although recently, he's been "less" involved.

He'll probably be extradited to the US, and we'll never hear from him again.

FARC kills eight soldiers

When I see news about the FARC killing eight soldiers in Colombia, near the Venezuelan border, I'm reminded that there is still some fight in this old revolutionary dog.

The Colombian government argues that the FARC is on the decline, with high desertion rates, and a declining revenue base.

And it's true. The FARC today is not what it was five years ago, or three years ago. I think we're looking at the "middle of the end" for the FARC.

But I have to consider the possibility that the FARC has, for years now, made concerted efforts to move beyond Colombian borders into Venezuela and Ecuador. Some time ago, we prepared a piece on the FARC's presence outside of Colombia. Venezuela is certainly a welcoming environment.

Given the country's well established role as a drug transit zone, and the ongoing allegations that at least a section of the Venezuelan National Guard is a drug smuggling organization (called the Sun Cartel by DEA agents in Venezuela before they got kicked out the first time), it is certainly a great place to operate compared to Colombia.

In Ecuador, the president is not a vocal supporter, but he is willing to look the other way, and allow the FARC to operate just inside Ecuador. Even if he isn't willing to let the FARC play on Ecuadorian soil, Correa has limited political currency, and I'm not sure he wants to spend it on making a loud and expensive campaign against the FARC.

Back to those eight soldiers. They fell under attack from the 49th front of the FARC, according to La Semana. The 49th front is known to operate on both sides of the border between Venezuela and Colombia. It is also considered the Caribbean front of the FARC, operating around the Guajira peninsula.

It will be interesting to see if Chavez answers Uribe's call to hunt down these FARC soldiers. I doubt it.

(image from colombiareports.com)

Most Dangerous Cities in the US

Just a quick note here to share the Forbes.com "Most Dangerous Cities" article, which made note that ten cities on the list overlap with Mexican organized criminal activity:

Though nationwide crime was down 3.5% year over year in the first six months of 2008, the cities atop our list illustrate a disturbing trend: All 10 of the most dangerous cities were among those identified by the Department of Justice as transit points for Mexican drug cartels.

The whole article is here.