Game Change in Mexico

This morning the Washington Post reports that after a two-hour shootout with the Mexican Navy, Arturo Beltran Leyva, known as the Boss of Bosses, died in a Cuernavaca apartment in the state of Morelos, just south of Mexico City.

This is a major victory for the Calderon administration in a month that has seen an uptick in violence across the country, as members of Los Zetas, working with Beltra Leyva, have gone on the offensive against the Sinaloa Federation in and around the Federation's traditional stronghold in the city of Culiacan, Sinaloa.

To date, Arturo Beltran Leyva is the highest ranking Mexican criminal to be killed by government forces during the Calderon administration.

Arturo's death will certainly destabilize the BLO, which will likely lead to more violence in Morelos, Guerrero, along the border and other pockets of Mexico where the BLO has held fast to its turf despite a year in which his organization saw a series of major arrests.

Zetas headed to the white market

On a few occasions I have been invited to talk about the evolution of the Zetas, from elite bodyguards for Osiel Cardenas to a powerful criminal organization in their own right.

Two men now control the Zetas, Miguel Triveño, and Heriberto Lazcano.

Lazcano is the undisputed head of the Zetas and known to keep a cool head and think strategically. Triveño is more like a traditional Mexican drug lord with his ostrich skin boots, big cowboy hat, gilded pistol, and country-time apparel. Both men will kill on a moment's notice, but between the two, I believe that Lazcano has a mind for business and a long-term strategy for his visions of what the Zetas are today and what they are evolving into for tomorrow.

He doesn't want to go out like his former boss Osiel, who was extradited to the United States, never to be heard from again. And he certainly doesn't need to go down like one of his captains, El Hummer, who was found unguarded in a house in Reynosa.

My argument has focused on the idea that the Zetas are moving out of the black market, into gray and while market activities. From traditional drug and human trafficking and kidnapping and extortion, the Zetas have moved into the gray market of protection. I believe that Lazcano's men will offer protection to anyone who is willing to pay for it - from criminals who work for the Beltran-Leyva or Carrillo Fuentes organizations, to well positioned businessmen. In both cases, the client needs protection from other criminals, the police, and everyone in between.

And the Zetas have long demonstrated that this protection is something that they do best.

On 6 December 2009, a Dallas Morning News article further backed up my argument for the Zetas movement into the white, or legal, side of business in Mexico and abroad. The Gulf Cartel, and the Zetas by extension, have always invested in small businesses, which help launder money. But this article takes this consideration a slight step farther, and I think their sources are right.

Here's an excerpt:

"Aside from money laundering, the Zetas are seeking legitimacy from those they have terrorized over the years…Investigators and civic leaders say the Zetas are trying to position themselves to become movers and shakers, even political players, in communities where they have a major presence."

At the head of this strategy is "La Compania" - a term the Zetas started using for themselves in mid-2009 (maybe sooner) to differentiate less violent activities from the criminal branding already well established by the Zetas brand.

Looking ahead, I would not be surprised to see clean cut, respectable looking businessmen working for the Zetas as the group moves from looking and acting like Triveño and more like Lazcano.

And if law enforcement is worried now, they've got a lot to consider looking toward a future where a group as sophisticated, organized, and ruthless as Los Zetas goes from hiring bullet slinging thugs to clean-cut business mans. The evolution will be slowly and difficult to detect, but I think it's already underway with a long road to go yet.

An example of criminal branding?

Today, I came across an article that appears to be an example of criminal branding.

As I've talked about before, criminal branding is an effective way for small-time crime group to leverage the fear factor already earned by larger groups.

This example is one where kidnappers claim to be a member of Los Zetas.

The story in the El Paso Times notes:

"Three of the suspects seemed to be younger than typically hardened Zetas, who often are former soldiers and ex-police officers."

It is possible that these guys were members of Los Zetas, in a way part of the organization's evolution.

It's also possible that these guys operate with the permission of Los Zetas, and have been told that if they are caught, that they should tell the police and press that they are Zetas, which expands the perception of this group's presence across Mexico.

Southern Pulse Intel Brief - wk of 29 June

The week of 29 June 2009 saw two very interesting developments in Mexico, with the continuation of a third very important economic indicator.

First, remittances from the United States to Mexico continue to drop. In the first six months of 2009, we have seen remittances drop by 19.9%, compared to the first half of 2008. This decline represents some US$1.9 billion dollars.

A new vigilante group has emerged. The “Mata Zetas” is one of the latest of the so-called splinter groups we’ve seen surface. At the end of June, when police discovered three bodies in Cancun, they also discovered a note that read: “We are the new group, Mata Zetas, and we are against kidnapping and extortion and we are going to fight against them in all of the state for a cleaner Mexico."

Just a few days later, police arrested eleven members of a separate splinter group known as “La Contra”. Mexican authorities suspect this group has formed to fill gaps opened by arrested members of the Los Zetas and La Familia.

Analysis:

After petroleum exports, remittances make up the largest source of foreign currency in Mexico. And from January to April, total remittances added up to US$7.3 million. This number continues to drop as a direct function of the economy. Indirect effects, however, may be seen in Mexico, where individuals who relied on these remittances have little option but to turn to organized crime to pay the bills.

Consider three converging realities. Last year, 17,772 minors were deported from the United States to Mexico. It is likely that many of them landed in a crime-controlled municipality. Between 60 and 65% percent of all Mexican municipalities suffer from organized crime infiltration. This adds up to about 1,500 cities.

Finally, there are a reported 980 zones of impunity across the country. Also called “criminal enclaves” the political leadership is either directly involved in organized crime, or is somehow compromised.

We’re not surprised by the presence of La Contra and Mata Zetas. We expect more such groups to surface before the end of the year.

Cross-posted with Southern Pulse blog, Networked Intelligence

Zeta and Gulf Cartel Relationship Revealed

An interesting piece from Jeremy Roebuck in The Monitor about the relationship between the Zetas and the Gulf Cartel.

This is information based on court documents.

And a few interesting paragraphs follow below:

"The extradition of alleged former Gulf Cartel chief Osiel Cárdenas Guillén from Mexico in 2006 set off a leadership crisis within the organization...

In Cárdenas' absence, three leaders have emerged to helm the drug trafficking organization, the June 9 indictment states. His brother - Antonio Ezequiel "Tony Tormenta" Cárdenas Guillén , 47 - took the reins after his sibling's arrest along with fellow cartel leader 37-year-old Jorge Eduardo "El Coss" Costilla Sánchez, federal investigators say. Zeta commander Heriberto "Lazca" Lazcano Lazcano, 34 - a founding member of the paramilitary group believed to be one of its most violent members - also took on a prominent role.

...[The] triumvirate comes together to decide matters ranging from payments owed to plaza bosses to the price The Company will charge for its drugs, U.S. federal authorities say."

As Mexican DTOs go, cooperation never a lasts. A showdown between the Gulf Cartel and the Zetas could very likely spark another round of violence - one that possibly would play out in a number of cities across the US where the Zetas and the Gulf Cartel work in tandem - Dallas, Houston, New Orleans, Atlanta, Charlotte, Baltimore to name only a few...

Finally, here's a map of where the Gulf Cartel operates in the US (a little dated), but it gives you an idea of where some of the violence in the US could happen if the Zetas and Gulf Cartel alliance ruptures.

Zetas in Belize and Texas

A contact in Mexico told me this morning that according to his 2008 research, 67 "operational Zeta bases" were located on the Mexican border with Belize.

He went back in April 2009, and counted 78 operational bases that "specialized in criminal activity".

The border between Mexico and Belize is an underreported transit zone, one more likely to be used as the Guatemalan military works with the Mexicans to seal Guatemala's northern border in the Peten department (more on the Peten here, here and here).

Moving to Texas, a San Antonio paper reported today that the FBI is circulating to local and state authorities a report that gives a vague reference to the presence of a Zetas cell in Texas, complete with a ranch, inside Texas, where Zetas train others in the art of kidnapping, such as how to run a car off the road to kidnap the driver and/or passengers, surveillance, small groups tactics, etc.

The Zetas continue to evolve, and may even have become something of a criminal brand. It will be interesting to see how this news in Texas pans out.

We already know what will happen (or already has happened) in Belize - a new transshipment route from the Caribbean into southern Mexico...

El Goyo captured

Arrests and seizures in Mexico are part of my daily news diet, but when police capture an old-school member of the Gulf Cartel, it's something I have to post.

Gregiorio Sauceda Gamboa, aka "El Goyo," was an original member of the Gulf Cartel as it was molded under the leadership of Osiel Cardenas, dating back to 1996 (pictured in the middle).

He was a heavy hitter, often asked to perform some of the more risky assignments hunting down members of the El Chapo's organization for kidnap, torture, and murder. This guy was a former investigative police officer, and likely had close contacts with many police in Tamaulipas, where he was arrested in Matamoros, with his wife, while sitting in a stash house stocked with thousands of rounds of ammunition, a number of long guns, and a M72A3 rocket launcher.

At different times in his narco career, El Goyo ran operations in Nuevo Laredo, Reynosa, and Matamoros.

According to a Houston Chronicle article, El Goyo moved an averaged 10 tons of cocaine and 30 tons of marijuana a month at the height of his drug trafficking activity, although recently, he's been "less" involved.

He'll probably be extradited to the US, and we'll never hear from him again.

Zetas as a Criminal Brand Name

On 11 March, I published a piece on how the Zetas are evolving.

One of the most common evolutions is the use of the name "Los Zetas" as a criminal brand.

Armed thugs across Mexico have begun calling themselves Zetas simply to provoke fear in their victims - a useful tool for control when attacking a small village to search for and then carry away targets for ransom kidnapping.

The Houston Chronicle published a piece on 22 March that underlines exactly what I was talking about.

Here is an excerpt:

Solis said he and other townspeople suspect those who raided Cuauhtémoc in early February, kidnapping the 23-year-old son of a bean-and-grain trader, are simply “bad characters from the area who have just taken the Zeta name.”

Fear of the Zetas borders on hysteria in this corner of Durango state, residents and officials agreed. Village boys playing with toy trucks have taken to shouting “here come the Zetas” when staging chases, Solis said.

When a rumor started March 10 in a town nearby that scores of Zetas were planning to attack, stores in the area closed, classes were canceled and people fled.

“A psychosis prevails across the whole region,” said Isidro Aguilar, the police chief of Guadalupe Victoria, a market town 25 miles from Cuauhtemoc, who otherwise denied that the area faces a crime plague. “There are people who are taking advantage of it.”

Zetas Threaten President of Guatemala

The Guatemalan National Police made public on 1 March that Los Zetas have made a threat against the life of President Alvaro Colom.

Someone representing Los Zetas made the phone call to the police emergency line - 110 - on February 28.

The President's security has been doubled.

More on this news as events develop...

Inside Los Zetas

On the last day of 2008, Mexico’s El Universal paper published an interesting summary entitled “Los Zetas” por dentro. Its author had obtained a document prepared by the Mexican PGR (Attorney General), based on interviews conducted with former members of Los Zetas. As someone who has followed this group for some time, I was pleased to learn something new.

Many understand that the Los Zetas is a well organized drug trafficking organization, formed by members of a group of Mexican soldiers who deserted their unit, known as the Grupo Aeromóvil de Fuerzas Especiales (GAFES).

The GAFES deserters, totaling around 40 men, stuck together and offered their services to the Gulf Cartel, and Osiel Cárdenas, specifically. But once he was extradited around two years ago today, Heriberto Lazcano, aka El Lazca, took absolute control of Los Zetas. The group slowly but surely took complete command and control over all of the drug trafficking corridors formerly operated by the Gulf Cartel, primarily the plazas from Nuevo Laredo to Matamoros, across the border from Brownsville, Tx in the lower Rio Grande Valley.

When El Lazca took over the Gulf Cartel’s operations, Mexico experienced a cascading moment in the country’s drug trade. For the first time in Mexican history, we had a military unit operating like a drug trafficking organization (DTO). In Mexico, it’s normally the other way around.

And based on what we know from Colombian history, when you have a disciplined military unit operating as a DTO, it’s very hard to dislodge entrenched soldiers. The Zetas differ in one very important aspect: they are willing to take the Mexican military head on – and so far, the Mexican military has, at best, disrupted only a fraction of the group’s operations.

The men who stuck with El Lazco, who were part of the original Zetas, are referred to as the Zetas Viejos within the DTO. They are the men who work as commanders and operate from command/control positions in the group’s various hard points within its drug trafficking network. One very clear example is Miguel Triveño, aka El 40, who runs the Nuevo Laredo plaza – perhaps still the most lucrative drug trafficking corridor in the Americas.

El 40 and El Lazco clearly are Zetas Viejos. They are also known as Cobras Viejos, or L Viejos. Logically, the younger recruits, and next down in the line of command, are called Zetas Nuevos. These men include Mexican military deserters, former policemen, family members of Los Zetas, and – most notably – men trained within the Guatemalan Special Forces, known as Kaibiles. The Zetas Nuevos operate on the frontlines, take orders only from the Zeta Viejo commander they serve under, and act with the utmost brutality and lethal force.

These are the guys you read about when there’s a story that claims two trucks pulled up to a stopped car and unloaded a full clip into the target – overkill. Their calling card includes lots of brass bullet casings littered on the ground, kidnap and torture, decapitation, disfiguration, and in some cases very professional “double-tap” styled assassinations. In this regard, they differ little from the enforces who work for La Familia, the Beltran Leyva brothers, or the Tijuana Cartel.

But where the Zetas differ, I think, is again with the military order that reigns throughout the organization and the crisp, clean nature of many of the group’s operations. There are documented cases of paramilitary training for new Zetas, especially those with little to no military experience. Training camps dot the landscape in Tamaulipas and Nuevo Leon, hidden within large acre ranches.

The Cobras Nuevos, or L Nuevos, form the next level down the chain of command. These are the men who serve the Zetas Viejos directly as bodyguards. When the Zetas Viejos travel, they take a trusted contingent of gunslingers, and those men are the Cobras Nuevos. According to the PGR, sometimes Zetas Nuevos join them as the drivers to back up the Cobra Nuevos. They are all armed with one long barrel rifle, likely automatic, and a sidearm.

The next level down is where we get into the Zetas’ money laundering and business operations. A nation-wide network of men are in place with the sole purpose of covering up all the illicit business operated by members of Los Zetas. It’s not clear in the article, but it makes sense to consider that each Zeta Viejo operates his own group of business owners and accountants. Within the Zetas DTO, the members of this group are appropriately referred to as productividad.

The lowest members within the Zetas DTO chain of command are called halcones. These men serve as the eyes and the ears of Los Zetas wherever they may be. I’ve read stories that recount how in states like Tamaulipas, where Los Zetas have complete control, the halcones stand on overpasses that cross major highways just to take note of the traffic flowing in and out of town. These men likely work in business, politics, at bars, at hospitals, anywhere, and everywhere. These men are likely part of the Mexican “blue collar” infrastructure that keeps the country running. Makes me think of the movie The Fight Club – these guys are everywhere.

In addition to potentially thousands of halcones and members of the productividad who operate both in Mexico and in the United States, we can’t forget that the Zetas Viejos have any number of police commanders, politicians, high-level businessmen, judges, lawyers, military soldiers and mid- to high-level commanders, etc. on the payroll.

All that information funnels through the Zeta intelligence network, and is likely the principle reason why no man who betrays this group is safe in Mexico or the United States, or anywhere really. It’s very much like when Pablo Esobar in Colombia would send his assassinations to kill people who tried to flee from him in Spain, Russia, or even Turkey.

The Zetas’ counter intelligence organization has no peer in the Americas, and it begins with the halcones. Like most intelligence organizations, gathering information is easy, shifting through it to make sense of what’s important and what’s not is where the work gets tricky.

Obviously, this network is not without faults. A high-level Zeta leader has already been captured this year. Miguel Angel Soto Parra, who oversaw Zeta activities in central Mexico, is now in custody. He will likely join some of his other Zeta Viejo buddies caught last year, and join the list of those to be extradited to the US.

The bottom line, however, is that the Zetas is a well trained, well informed, and absurdly rich organization that will take more than the Mexican military to bring down. We tend to focus on just the top members, but when you consider all the levels within the organization that I’ve described above, the whole Zeta DTO expands into a massive criminal organization that likely employs thousands in a country where finding a legitimate job is very difficult, if not next to impossible in today’s economic climate.

It will be very interesting to watch how Mexico’s organized criminal map unfolds in 2009. I’ll make one safe prediction: Los Zetas will still be around in 2010, and quite possibly beyond Calderon and Obama’s respective administrations.

A new map for the US?

The FBI recently released information (see Washington Times article) that their agents in Texas believe Los Zetas have extended their operational control to north of the Mexico-Texas border. Zetas operating in Texas each operate in distinct areas, organized and divided to reflect the various border crossings or "plazas" at Juarez, Nuevo Laredo, Reynosa, Matamoros, and others.

In light of this not-very-surprising-information, I thought I would post here a new map of the US, sent over by a friend in Texas.

Pictures are worth a thousand words...

Drugs & Guns: Numbers in Mexico

In the past week, we have noted a surge in weapon seizures around Mexico. These numbers do not necessarily represent an increase in the movement of guns from the United States to Mexico, nor do they underline the efficiency of Mexican policing efforts. It is simply a snap shot of a particularly interesting week in a conflict with a sordid past and a long future.

On 8 February, Mexican officials captured the largest haul of weapons that according to the Mexican Attorney General’s office is the largest single weapon seizure made in the past 20 years. The ranch was located in the municipality of Miguel Alemán, where local politician Antonio Guajardo Anzaldúa was shot to death by alleged members of Los Zetas on 29 November 2007 for speaking out against the Gulf Cartel and its ties to PRI political party bosses in Tamaulipas.

Authorities were led to a ranch on the US-Mexico border where they found:

• 89 long barrel rifles, mostly AK-47 and AR-15;
• five pistols;
• a .30 caliber sub-machine gun with tripod;
• B-4 plastic explosives;
• 83,365 rounds of ammunition;
• nine tons of marijuana;
• and, a large number of black and camouflage uniforms.

Given the ranch location, we can be certain this equipment belonged to Los Zetas.

Recently released numbers from the Mexican government illustrate the massive amounts of drugs moving through the country. Consider that the numbers below for 2007 and 2008 represent only a fraction of the actual amounts (thank you to the NAFBPO for some of this information).

2007 totals:

Drugs

• 50,737 kilos of cocaine
• 312 kilos of opium paste
• 298 kilos of heroin
• 37.5 tons of ephedrine and pseudoephedrine (precursor chemical used to make methamphetamines)

Weapons

• 4,451 handguns
• 4,447 “shoulder” firearms – including assault rifles such as AK-47s and AR-15s
• 663,913 rounds of ammunition
• 484 grenades

2008 totals as of February 6, 2008.

Drugs

• 777 kilos of cocaine
• 11.8 tons of marijuana

Weapons

• 183 handguns
• 204 “high-powered” rifles
• 16 rocket launchers
• 110 fragmentation grenades
• 80 stun grenades