New Southern Pulse website online

The new Southern Pulse Networked Intelligence website is now online. We have archived all our material there. Please visit www.southernpulse.com for more information.

For a time, I will focus my energy on preparing field notes and intel briefs for the new Southern Pulse site. Please check the new site for information that would normally appear here in blog form.

Regards,
Samuel Logan

Brazil: Still Against Honduras

Brazil's Minister of Foreign Affairs, Celso Amorim, spoke out against Honduras on 16 February, claiming that elections should not be used to "wash" coup d'etats.

His remarks underline Brazil's continued chagrin over the forced removal of Zelaya, and I'm interested to see how Brazil's stand against Honduran President Lobo will play out across the region. As the US moves to support the Central American country, Brazil may find itself standing alone in the region. So far, however, many countries have yet to show support.

War and Trade

The Venezuelan government has replaced Colombia with the United States as a main supplier of meat, fabric, clothes, cooking oil, and pharmaceuticals among other items.

Since July 2009, when President Chavez ordered a freeze in Venezuelan-Colombian relations, diplomatic ties have been severed with commercial ties under considerable restraint.

Chavez has looked to China, Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay, Bolivia, Ecuador, and now the United States to provide goods that Colombia previously sold to the Venezuelan market.

Obviously, this is a clear case of Chavez placing political considerations over economic good sense. Transaction costs alone dictate that the farther an item has to travel before arrival in market, the higher the cost, apart from the time it takes to establish new relationships, determine which products to buy, and so on.

Replacing Colombia with Ecuador or Venezuela probably doesn't make much of a difference, and given the extremely low cost of Chinese goods, there's probably an acceptable pay off there, economically and politically.

But when Chavez turns to the "evil empire" for a long list of goods, he's increasing transaction costs and further deepening the double standard under which his government operates with the United States.

Chavez is happy to sell the US oil and buy US goods, but he's just as quick to claim that the US is about to invade.

At the core of the decision to purchase goods from everyone but Colombia, however, is that Chavez is distancing Venezuela from his western neighbor, and the de facto nature of the two country's close commercial ties has been the strongest argument for why Caracas will not go to war with Bogota.

Yet the war drums continue to beat. Rumors of war circulate, and on both sides information continues to circulate about military activity on the border, including illegal fly overs and tense troop encounters.

As I wrote before, Venezuela would not do well to enter a protracted war with Colombia, but a quick and dirty firefight that ends before even the media picks up on it would serve Chavez's rhetorical purposes well - all just in time for the September legislative elections…

Worth a thousand words...

Chavez, CTD?

When I worked as an emergency medical technician many years ago, we used a short-hand lingo to describe the status of victims. We used "CTD" to describe someone who didn't have long to live. Their lives, like the water in a bathtub soon to disappear down the pipes, was "circling the drain."

With all the recent protests and such in Venezuela, I've fielded a few questions here and there concerning Chavez's chances for political survival. I have to say, they still look pretty good. Students continue to protest, and they have solid grievances, from the closure of television stations to energy and water shortages, and violence. In Caracas alone, some 34 people died from 29 to 31 January.

And on 1 February, a group of former Chavez supporters published their call for him to resign. This group, known as the Polo Consitutional "urged" the ruler to resign.

Yet on the same day, Chavez opened government coffers once again to solve his problems. He has announced a US$1 billion fund for investments in Venezuela's energy infrastructure, announcing a raft of projects designed to fill the gap between the country's energy demand and stagnant supplies, focused mostly on the Guri damn hydroelectric plant.

Ahead of the September legislative elections, we've seen Chavez stumble but he has a long way to go before he falls. The recent currency devaluation doubled the amount of money he has available to spend inside Venezuela. And as the price for oil remains relatively high, Chavez continues to collect foreign exchange. We're watching a long list of items, however, to see where and when support for the embattled president will begin to deteriorate. At the top of the list is food and water. Inflation, security, and jobs round out the top four.

Chavez has his work cut out for him, but there's plenty of time before the elections. As one local journalist said, Chavez will shoot for 70% control of the National Assembly, but even if he wins 60% he'll still be happy and solidly in control of the country's legislative agenda and output.

Irony in Bolivia

How many times has President Evo Morales criticized the US for spying on his administration? Most people who follow Bolivia know that Morales has often used public statements concerning the CIA and intelligence operations against his government to rouse local support. He even kicked out the Drug Enforcement Administration (although I suspect some agents remained in place), but his rhetoric is rarely, if ever, destined for an international audience.

So I can't help to find the following news a little ironic. The Bolivian government announced on Jan. 14 that it would create a state intelligence directorate modeled after the CIA. Bolivia's intelligence organization will fall under the control of the executive branch and focus on strategic questions. There will be some representation from Bolivia's armed forces and police.

And I suspect that the focus will be on organized crime and drug trafficking.

Game Change in Mexico

This morning the Washington Post reports that after a two-hour shootout with the Mexican Navy, Arturo Beltran Leyva, known as the Boss of Bosses, died in a Cuernavaca apartment in the state of Morelos, just south of Mexico City.

This is a major victory for the Calderon administration in a month that has seen an uptick in violence across the country, as members of Los Zetas, working with Beltra Leyva, have gone on the offensive against the Sinaloa Federation in and around the Federation's traditional stronghold in the city of Culiacan, Sinaloa.

To date, Arturo Beltran Leyva is the highest ranking Mexican criminal to be killed by government forces during the Calderon administration.

Arturo's death will certainly destabilize the BLO, which will likely lead to more violence in Morelos, Guerrero, along the border and other pockets of Mexico where the BLO has held fast to its turf despite a year in which his organization saw a series of major arrests.

Zetas headed to the white market

On a few occasions I have been invited to talk about the evolution of the Zetas, from elite bodyguards for Osiel Cardenas to a powerful criminal organization in their own right.

Two men now control the Zetas, Miguel Triveño, and Heriberto Lazcano.

Lazcano is the undisputed head of the Zetas and known to keep a cool head and think strategically. Triveño is more like a traditional Mexican drug lord with his ostrich skin boots, big cowboy hat, gilded pistol, and country-time apparel. Both men will kill on a moment's notice, but between the two, I believe that Lazcano has a mind for business and a long-term strategy for his visions of what the Zetas are today and what they are evolving into for tomorrow.

He doesn't want to go out like his former boss Osiel, who was extradited to the United States, never to be heard from again. And he certainly doesn't need to go down like one of his captains, El Hummer, who was found unguarded in a house in Reynosa.

My argument has focused on the idea that the Zetas are moving out of the black market, into gray and while market activities. From traditional drug and human trafficking and kidnapping and extortion, the Zetas have moved into the gray market of protection. I believe that Lazcano's men will offer protection to anyone who is willing to pay for it - from criminals who work for the Beltran-Leyva or Carrillo Fuentes organizations, to well positioned businessmen. In both cases, the client needs protection from other criminals, the police, and everyone in between.

And the Zetas have long demonstrated that this protection is something that they do best.

On 6 December 2009, a Dallas Morning News article further backed up my argument for the Zetas movement into the white, or legal, side of business in Mexico and abroad. The Gulf Cartel, and the Zetas by extension, have always invested in small businesses, which help launder money. But this article takes this consideration a slight step farther, and I think their sources are right.

Here's an excerpt:

"Aside from money laundering, the Zetas are seeking legitimacy from those they have terrorized over the years…Investigators and civic leaders say the Zetas are trying to position themselves to become movers and shakers, even political players, in communities where they have a major presence."

At the head of this strategy is "La Compania" - a term the Zetas started using for themselves in mid-2009 (maybe sooner) to differentiate less violent activities from the criminal branding already well established by the Zetas brand.

Looking ahead, I would not be surprised to see clean cut, respectable looking businessmen working for the Zetas as the group moves from looking and acting like Triveño and more like Lazcano.

And if law enforcement is worried now, they've got a lot to consider looking toward a future where a group as sophisticated, organized, and ruthless as Los Zetas goes from hiring bullet slinging thugs to clean-cut business mans. The evolution will be slowly and difficult to detect, but I think it's already underway with a long road to go yet.

Perspective

Colombian National Police released statistics earlier this week revealing that investigators registered 14,715 homicides between 1 January and 6 December 2009.

There were over 14,000 homicides registered in Venezuela in 2008.

By the end of November, authorities had registered 7,396 homicides in Mexico, passing 16,000 since December 1, 2006.

Chavez: Going out with a bang

During a lecture I gave yesterday on Mexican DTOs and criminal insurgencies, one of the students brought up President Chavez and the civilian militias in Venezuela.

He wondered out loud about how civilians with little training and a handgun could - over time - contribute to insecurity in the South American country. And that got me thinking...

A friend who travels to Caracas regularly has told me that even in the light of day you can't walk through the middle of town in a suit without feeling like you might be mugged at any moment. I felt the same way the last time I was there.

And as SouthernPulse has reported, there were over 14,000 murders in Venezuela during 2008 - compared to a little under 14,500 murders in Mexico between December 2006 and December 2008.

After a quick look, I found an interesting piece on Venezuela's civilian militias, recently published by Colombia's Semana Magazine.

The "Milicia Bolivariana" is a fifth fighting force made up of civilians. A presidential decree formally inaugurated this militia in October of this year, and plans to have at the least a million individuals prepared to repel any invasion of Venezuela.

Chavez tried to slip the creation of this militia in the 2007 referendum, but it was not approved. Only when the National Assembly approved the "lye organica" for Venezuela's military was his militias finally added as part of Venezuela's fighting forces.

The militias will have two components. One referred to as territorial, and the other combat. The territorial component will be made up of what amounts to domestic spies, something similar to the revolutionary defense committees in Cuba, which have had everyone in Cuba speaking in a whisper for decades.

The combat component seems to be little more than a formal expansion of the so-called "circles bolivarianos", which are made up of uber-Chavez supporters (see photo), armed to defend his policies across the country capital city, especially in the slums of Caracas, and some would argue in countries across South America such as Bolivia, Ecuador, Colombia, Argentina, and Peru.

These men essentially formed street gangs that have over time become quietly marginalized by the Chavez government, some argue, because Chavez realizes that they were a mistake, one that today cannot be controlled. And here I must recall the high murder rate in Caracas, as I would suspect that homicides have a lot to do with what left of the circles bolivarianos."

Venezuelan security analysts agree that there are between nine and 15 million illegal weapons in circulation in Venezuela today. That is, there is little control over stockpiles or any efforts to remove these arms from circulation.

Add to that reality one where normal civilians are armed, waiting to be called to war by their president, and we have an extremely volatile situation, especially around election time.

As we watch Chavez's popularity slip, I'm becoming more convinced that when he goes, not if, he'll go out with a bang, or perhaps a few million "bangs."

FARC with money problems

Some interesting news out of Colombia earlier this week reported that the FARC is in financial trouble.

Former Defense Minister Juan Manuel Santos announced at the end of November 2009 that "there are certain disagreements between [FARC leaders] Mono Joyjoy and Alfonso Cano."

For many years, the FARC has suffered the effects of a two-way split between the younger members, led by Joyjoy, who want to go after the money through drug trafficking, and the older members, led by Cano, who are more ideological and presumably still set on overthrowing the Colombian government.

Since both factions are in need of money, a disagreement over the direction of the FARC has surfaced with a significant amount of tension, according to some reports.

It will be interesting to see how Cano and Joyjoy resolve their differences. If the FARC does split, I would imagine that the more militarized Joyjoy faction would continue on, while the ideological side of the FARC would either wither on the vine or somehow try to transform into a peaceful political party… Maybe events in 2010 will tell...

Human Rights and Corruption vs. Exposure in the Mx. Army

I submitted a comment on Shannon O'Neil's blog Latintelligence, and it turned out to be long enough to share here.

Her post is here.

My comment, written as the Founding Editor of SouthernPulse, is as follows:

Apart from concerns over corruption and human rights, which are both important considerations, we must also keep in mind that the Mx. military is not a sustainable option for Mexico's and indeed the sub-region' long-term security for many reasons, including the solder's exposure to the temptations of organized crime.

When you consider that there is one general for every 333 soldiers in the Mexican Army, compared to one general for every 1,720 soldiers in the US Army, we have a top-heavy scenario. These numbers coupled with the fact that generals earn US$13,000.00 a month, compared to recruits, who earn US$453 a month, spells out what we would consider a significant problem with pay for recruits.

Another consideration: the contract for a recruit is three years. But when a soldier is deployed, the Mexican Army can extend the recruit's term of service by a total of six more years. This, in part, is why we've seen a consistent number of soldiers A.W.O.L. Keep in mind that when they leave, they know that no one will hunt them down for desertion. The only real penalty, apart from foregone pay, is that their command post retains federal identification documents. These are easily forged.

Our consistent worry, apart from human rights abuses and corruption, is that the military's presence in the streets exposes soldiers to a criminal element that can pay them better, offer them better equipment, and in at least the case of the Zetas, can offer them benefits for their families and an esprit de corps that in many places has begun to falter across the Mexican Army deployments.

We don't mean to suggest that all who choose to go A.W.O.L. go rogue and join the ranks of organized crime. This is not the case. But there is an opportunity and a strong incentive. The longer the military remains in the streets, the longer soldiers will have to think about crossing to the "dark side."

Along with a discussion over human rights and corruption, we should consider this exposure, as exposure is what likely most contributes to abuses and corruption.

Brazil takes a step closer to Iran

Iranian president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and Brazilian president Luis Inacio "Lula" ad Silva signed a raft of 13 agreements on 24 November 2009 that encompassed just about everything except military and energy.

The most notable agreement signed detailed the loosening of visa restrictions. As those of you who have traveled from Brazil to the US know, Brazil maintains a reciprocal visa policy, which simply reciprocates for foreign nationals the procedure required for Brazilians to enter any given country.

So if Iran agrees to allow Brazilians to visit Iran and receive a three-month tourist visa upon entry, then the same would be true for Iranians visiting Brazil. I haven't seen the wording of that particular agreement, but I suspect it might be something similar to a three-month tourist visa stamp upon arrival.

Ahmadinejad also won an important position statement from Lula, who has now announced that Brazil supports Iran's right to peaceful nuclear energy. This is classic Lula, who likes to talk one way and act another. Given Brazil's desire to reform the UN Security Council, such positions are not tenable in an environment where Iran is considered a "non-aligned" country.

It's also worth mention that Brazil has had its own disagreements with the IAEA, so Lula's position in support of Iran is also one that supports Brazil's long history with the IAEA, one that promotes sovereignty and peaceful nuclear development. But then again, Brazil is not Iran, nor is it a "non-aligned" country.

When push comes to shove, I don't think Brazil will choose supporting Iran over its UN goals.

And on that note, Petrobras announced on 16 November that it's conducting an evaluation of its operations in Iran to determine if the energy company should pull completely out of Iran. The excuse? Discoveries have not been commercially viable...

La Familia in Chicago

The New York Times reported today that prosecutors indicted 15 members of La Familia DTO out of Michoacan, Mexico.

Here's an excerpt:

"The investigation, officials said, uncovered a “command and control” group distributing thousands of pounds of cocaine for La Familia Michoacana, a major cartel in Mexico known for its messianic leaders and propensity to behead enemies. Last month, Attorney General Eric H. Holder Jr. announced federal charges against 300 people linked to the organization in 19 states."

La Familia is one of the smallest and least established Mx. DTOs in the US. If the organization is in 19 states with some 300 people, and at least 15 operating a "command and control" post in Chicago, what does that mean for the Zetas or the Sinaloa Federation's activities in the US?

Breaking the Silence

Posts have been thin and sporadic of late - such is the life of a freelance journalist. Wells have dried up, so like most of my brethren, I'm scrambling to keep pace with the changing nature of the media industry…

Here are some updates:

With John Sullivan, I published a piece on how Costa Rica and Panama have been caught in the middle between Mexico and Colombia, where organized criminal operatives from both countries have pushed into new territory.

Since that publication, we have seen a string of murders in Panama City, and just this past week, the head of the Sinaloa Federation in Costa Rica was arrested in Puntarenas (See Southern Pulse newsletter, Networked Intelligence tomorrow afternoon for details).

Honduras continues to provide some interesting developments. Since I published a piece on Honduras and how mainstream media should be focusing on what's going on behind the so-called coup de teat, we've seen a sharp up-tick in narco-flights landing in various points across the country.

Most of the flights, according to both Honduran and Colombian officials, originate in Venezuela, where the bulk of air traffic has shifted - it was once the purview of Colombian traffickers.

And Caracas has quietly become one of the most dangerous places on earth. With over 14,000 murders last year (country wide but many in Caracas), and police as corrupt as ever, Caracas has become a nightmarish place to visit. I'm told that you can't walk on the streets in a business suit after dark, and during the day, you should stick to the main streets. I felt this tension on my last visit to the city in November 2005.

Side streets, apparently, are teeming with young thieves. Dairy products and meat are hard to come by, and soon the entire city will begin rationing water, with rolling "water cut offs," scheduled by the government in 48 hour segments. Can you imagine being mugged for a bottle of water? Back in Mexico, we continue to watch an ever-changing situation. Many of the country's states remain in solid control of one of the many DTOs there, but the agreements between various groups form and break like ice melting and re-freezing from one day to the next.

From what I understand, the Beltran-Leyva Organization (BLO) has hired Los Zetas to strengthen its fight against the Sinaloa Federation. The Carrillo-Fuentes Organization (CFO) cooperates with BLO and the Zetas, and remains very active with its own group of sicarios.

Los Zetas, meanwhile, have targeted Sinaloa and Michoacan.

The Arellano-Felix Organization continues to crumble, and now faces a very real threat from inside Tijuana. The tit-for-tat murder and dismemberment of cops and others in the state of Michoacan indicates that the Zetas are pressuring members of La Familia, who have initiated La Familia Guerrense for the state of Guerrero. The Zetas are also pushing into Sinaloa, and the recent kidnapping if nearly two dozen ranch workers outside of Culiacan indicates that the powers that be in that area are worried about Zeta infiltration. After all, these guys - and their trainees - are well versed in training locals to act on their behalf…

I'll also add that I recently published a piece on diamond smuggling in South America, with a focus on Guyana, Venezuela, and Brazil. The Panamanians will soon open the region's only diamond trading hub, and some are worried that it will become a funnel for illegal diamonds leaving the region.

In September, narco-executions surpass 2008 numbers

Iran and Venezuela: The 2009 Dosado

This Southern Pulse Intel Brief, dated 24 September 2009, is republished here with permission from the Southern Pulse editors.

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In a recent interview with conservative French newspaper Le Fiargo, Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez thanked Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad for the technology transfer required to develop a nuclear energy program in Venezuela. The agreement, Chavez claims, was signed in early September, and serves as a capstone for the tightening of relations between the two countries over the course of 2009.

While visiting Ahmadinejad on his eighth trip to Iran during the week of 5 September, Chavez reportedly followed up on 186 separate agreements formed between the two countries since 2005. A 10-year strategic alliance was proposed, as well as joint plans for the construction of a oil refinery in Syria with an expected capacity of processing 150,000 barrels of oil a day.

Venezuela has also agreed to sell Iran 20,000 barrels of gasoline a day beginning in October 2009, but Chavez declined to disclose the duration of the US$800 million agreement. To further support Iran’s energy needs, PDVSA has also agreed to establish operations at Iran’s South Pars 12 gas field, with estimated reserves of some 12.6 billion cubic meters of natural gas

Iran has reciprocated with the announcement that its government will validate educational qualifications and academic titles awarded in 47 Venezuelan universities.

The September meeting comes only five months after Chavez’s last visit to Tehran in the first week of April, when he travelled with a selected group of Venezuelan businessmen. They were on hand to witness the inauguration of a joint Venezuelan-Iranian development bank, reportedly capitalized with US$200 million, with half to be provided by each government. Iranian Kourahs Parvizian will become the president of the bank, while Venezuelan Nelson Ortega will become the vice president.

While in Tehran, Chavez also called into a Venezuela Television show, Contragolpe, to describe plans for a joint Venezuelan-Iranian mining company to formalize five years of mining operations shared with Iran in Venezuela. Chavez noted that the new mining company would focus on six minerals and some precious stones, including diamonds.

Later in April, the Iranian Defense Minister Mostafa Mohammad Majjar landed in Caracas for a short trip to sign a series of “unspecified agreements.” Presumably, these agreements facilitated the 29 April signature of a memorandum of understanding between the Venezuelan and Iranian armed forces.

Within the remaining months of 2009, Venezuela and Iran are likely to expand on their peaceful nuclear initiative, one that France has already flagged as a violation of UN Security Council resolution 1737.

Traffic accidents as leading cause of death

With all the talk and focus on organized crime and other matters of security in Latin America, I wanted to take pause to underscore one often over-looked fact: traffic accidents are the leading cause of death in many Latin American countries.

Most of these "accidents" are due to driving under the influence of alcohol.

In Mexico, for example, a consultant for the Pan American Health Organization, and the World Health Organization, says that Mexico ranks 7th in the world for deaths caused by vehicle accidents. The total surpasses 20,000 a year, averaging about 55 a day.

Compared to the swine flu, the consultant states that for every one death caused by the swine flu, some 20 deaths are caused by automobile accidents.

Murders related to organized crime in Mexico, while by no means benign, have yet to surpass 5,000 a year.

In a city such as Rio de Janeiro, traditionally considered one of the most violent in the region, automobile accident deaths have outpaced murder for well over a decade. Last year, for example, a car full of teenagers speeding home after a long night at some of the city's most expensive dance clubs, jumped a curve and hit a pedestrian before wrapping itself around a tree. Body parts were found strewn across the accident scene.

In Peru, where many people die due to bus accidents, investigations in 2007 found that many of the bus drivers were drinking behind the wheel. One particularly nasty accident in December, 2006 sparked the accident. A bus had slipped off the side of a high Andean road and plunged well over 1,200 feet to the valley floor below, killing 45 passengers. A five-year-old boy and the bus driver were the only two survivors.

Some 4,000 people die and another 40,000 are injured in traffic accidents every year in Peru.

Buenos Aires, surprisingly, was the only city where I found that death caused by traffic accidents did not surpass other causes of death. I say surprisingly because Argentine drivers in the capital drive offensively like just about every other driver in Latin America.

Apart from that small slice of life in Latin America, across the region, from Mexico south, you will find many examples of drunk-driving deaths. With all the focus on organized crime and violent death, it's important to consider the leading, rather than the most news-worthy, cause of death in Latin America.

Guatemala: An Important Source of Weapons

This Southern Pulse Intel Brief, dated 5 September 2009, is republished here with permission from the Southern Pulse editors.

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The Mexican navy announced at the end of August 2009 that it had installed six new naval stations in Chiapas near the Suchiate and Usumacinta rivers that form part of Mexico's southern border with Guatemala. These two rivers have traditionally been where many illegal crossings into Mexico occur, so this focus on the Mexican-Guatemala border is reassuring, but for Mexico. As for Guatemala, we've received a significant amount of information that points toward Guatemala's increasing role as a secondary source of weapons for Mexican criminals, especially Los Zetas.

On 21 August 2009, authorities seized a cache of weapons and vehicles near the Mexico-Guatemala border in Huehuetenango, allegedly owned by members of Los Zetas. There was enough equipment and firepower to mount a swift attack patrol.

Just a week before that event, a small aircraft landed near Escuintla, located near Guatemala's Pacific coast, with 636 kilos of cocaine. Police who discovered the plane also found five assault rifles, a grenade launcher, and six containers of fuel (during the last week of July, Guatemalan authorities discovered a cache of 750 kilos of cocaine, reportedly valued at US$9.2 million, in the same area near Escuintla).

Perhaps the most significant weapons seizure so far in 2009 happened in April in the small village of Amatitlan, just south of Guatemala City and not too far from Escuintla. After a firefight with alleged members of Los Zetas, five federal agents had been killed, but those who remained standing seized 350 kilos of cocaine, 11 grenade launchers, nearly 600 fragmentation grenades, 11 M-16 rifles, over 5,000 rounds of ammunition, and 11 M-60 machine guns.

Another 500 fragmentation grenades and five AK-47 rifles were found during a routine sweep of "hot-spots" in Guatemala's Peten department in March 2009.

Sources in Guatemala have noted that fragmentation grenades can be sold for as much as US$38 a unit, while AK-47 rifles sell for around US$315 a unit if used or US$1,255 new.

When we consider that some 1,100 fragmentation grenades, 11 M-60 machine guns, around a dozen grenade-launchers, and at least 20 assault rifles have been seized in Guatemala between March and August of this year, the conclusion is disturbing. The black market for guns, and especially grenades, in Guatemala is hot. The Zetas, however, have added stealing weapons as a procurement option.

Between July 2007 and January 2008, members of Los Zetas stole an estimated 500 weapons from the Mariscal Zavala military base - a random assortment of pistols, rifles, machine guns, grenade launchers, and grenades are missing.

Finally, on 20 August 2009, alleged members of the Zetas stole a shipment of weapons en route from Guatemala to Mexico. Grenade launchers, rocket launchers, grenades, assault rifles, and magazines were included in the heist.

DHS sets a goal for border interdictions in 2010

I'm on the road, but wanted to share a quick note.

According to the Gov't Accountability Office (GAO), the Dept. of Homeland Security (DHS) has set a goal for fiscal year 2010 to apprehend around 30 percent of all criminals and contraband that flows into the US from Mexico.

Here's an excerpt:

"At the ports of entry, Customs and Border Patrol has both increased training for agents and enhanced technology. However, the DHS Annual Performance Report for fiscal years 2008-2010 sets a goal for detecting and apprehending about 30 percent of major illegal activity at ports of entry in 2009, indicating that 70 percent of criminals and contraband may pass through the ports and continue on interstates and major roads to the interior of the United States."

More detail here.

I'll be back to more regular posting next week.