Summer slow down...

Until mid-July, I will be on the road conducting field research for my first book, a nonfiction narrative about organized crime and immigration in the United States. 

By the third week of July, I will be back with the weekly commentary, Security in Latin America.

What if Mexico's Military Doesn't Win?

For over 500 days, Mexican President Felipe Calderon has used his military to combat organized crime across the country, specifically in Tijuana, Juarez and the states of Michoacan, Sinaloa, and Tamaulipas. But the body count suggests his measures have incurred more trouble than solution.

For the past 16 months, Mexico has registered 3,600 deaths - 225 a month, or an average of 7.5 a day - related to organize crime, according to Mexican daily La Cronica. In some pockets of Mexico, such as Culiacan, where violence has spiked in recent weeks, some quietly wonder what will happen if the military cannot control what is clearly the country’s top national security threat.

Mexico’s National Security Council met in Culiacan, Sinaloa on 13 May to discuss measures needed to diminish violence in the region. The high-level emergency meeting, including the Mexican Attorney General, head of the Mexican intelligence agency, the Secretary of Public Security, the Secretary of National Defense, and the Secretary of the Navy among others. It was organized after two weeks of extended violence in Culiacan that saw a number of policemen killed as well as members of organized crime, most notably the son of alleged leader of the Sinaloa Cartel, “El Chapo” Guzman.

According to some observers, the violence in Sinaloa may be in part due to a recent division within the Sinaloa Federation between “El Chapo” Guzman and the Beltran Leyva brothers. But what is beyond conjecture are the hardened positions taken each by the state’s police and military forces, and members of organized crime that operate in Sinaloa, a strategic state in the Mexican smuggling underworld.

During a two week span from 28 April to 12 May, a number of incidents escalated violence to the point where it has spilled over into Mexico City, causing at least one assassination that has put the whole country on edge.

On 30 April, a shootout in Culiacan left three gunmen and two local police dead. Another 13 were arrested and police seized some US$370,000 along with an unspeficied number of high-caliber rifles. The next day, Edgar Millan, head of the 27,000 strong Federal Preventive Police (PFP), held a press conference to assure the public that Calderon’s government would continue fighting.

He then boarded a plan to escort the 13 captured gunmen back to Mexico City where they were likely subjected to long hours of interrogation.

The following day, 2 May, four PFP agents were killed while patrolling a small town 15 miles outside of Culiacan. Two municipal policemen were killed along with along with two more gunmen and one unidentified male who was shot in the head. The bad guys had struck back.

By 4 May, notices started appearing around Culiacan. They came in the form of macabre messages written on coarse cloth cuts dangled from public places. Some messages were from the cops, telling the criminals to watch out. Others were from the criminals in response. And some were from one of the Beltran Leyva brothers, who claimed to be the boss in Sinaloa, a curious development. The various messages, none signed except those from Beltran Leyva, continued showing up every morning on 3, 4, and 5 May. By 6 May, local police lines were jammed with dozens of anonymous calls, most fictitious, about this or that cop who had been killed.

The next day gunmen again attacked the police, but only four were wounded. That was when the governor of Sinaloa, Jesus Aguilar Padilla, asked for a National Security Council meeting to be convened in Culiacan. But before they could meet, howver, a crowning moment of violence occurred in the early evening hours of 8 May.

Most believe it had nothing to do with the police.

Coming out of a local store, Edgar Guzman, the 22 year-old son of “El Chapo” Guzman, was attacked by an onslaught of gun fire and a discharge from at least one bazooka. He was instantly killed. The son of the Sinaloa Federation’s chief financial officer was also killed in an onslaught that left over 500 shell casings littered about the parking lot.

Now, Mexican authorities fear, there is confirmation that the Beltran Leyva brothers, formerly in association with “El Chapo” Guzman, have split from the Sinaloa Federation, marking the moment with the death of Edgar.

And to drive home the point of their strength and gut for violence, the brothers orchestrated the assassination of Edgar Milla, the head of the PFP, who was killed in Mexico City only hours after the death of the son of the alleged leader of the Sinaloa Federation. In under two days, the Beltran Leyva brothers exploded onto the Mexican organized crime scene as yet another group the Mexican government will have to dismantled before peace can be won.

It is reminiscent of when a DEA agent involved in the hunt for Pablo Escobar, the head of Colombia's infamous Medellin Cartel, lamented that killing Pablo only made way for the rise of the Cali Cartel. Now, as the Mexican army squeezes the life out of the Tijuana and Juarez Cartels, could it be that it has made room in the country’s black market for the rise of the Beltran Leyva brothers? If this is the case, then the question, “what if the military can’t stop them?,” is perhaps more appropriate than we thought.

Bolivia's Internal Power Struggles

The selfish interests of a small group of upper class Bolivian families could determine the future of their country's geopolitical position in South America.

These families stand at the center of Bolivia's secessionist movement in the state of Santa Cruz, where a referendum for the state's autonomy was held on 4 May. Voters favored autonomy at 84 percent. It was a political gut shot for President Evo Morales' administration. But the outcome reaches beyond Morales and could have prolonged consequences for both Brazil and Argentina.

Bolivia supplies Brazil and Argentina with the natural gas that moves industry in Brazil and warms homes in Argentina. Disruption of the flow of gas is not an option for either country.

Two years ago, when Morales nationalized his country's natural resources, he began a long battle to redistribute the wealth of his country from the hands of the few - represented by Santa Cruz - to the hands of the many, mostly his poor constituents. Yet in Santa Cruz stands the most concentrated group of interests that has the most to lose from Morales' vision.

The recent referendum represents the culmination of a long road of shouts, protests, some street clashes, and mostly political maneuvering to avoid the power of the state, and Morales' administration, from stripping them from their long-held positions of economic power. Santa Cruz will not go quietly, and leaders there know they have some leverage.

Santa Cruz is the engine of the Bolivian economy, representing 50 percent of the country's GDP and some 90 percent of the country's industrial strength. The state can easily stand alone, and without Santa Cruz, the rest of Bolivia would wither on the vine. Morales knows this but rather than fight the secessionist movement head on, he has simply regarded their referendum and clamor as illegal and the fruit of "imperialist" conniving.

Since the Bolivian Congress has made any secessionist referendum illegal, Morales has the legal upper hand, but he could not ignore Santa Cruz if state leaders decide to unilaterally act on their recent vote. The referendum vote, theoretically, gives state leaders more autonomy, allowing them to control their own state police, form a parliament, enter into binding agreements with sovereign nations, and control all land redistribution.

Three other provinces, Pando and Beni to the north of Santa Cruz, and Tarija on the southern border with Argentina, will hold secession referendums in June. While not as economically important as Santa Cruz, a successful referendum in these countries would form a strong oppositionist block using the voice of the people: the same tactic Morales has used to push forward his own political agenda.

Most importantly, Tarija and Santa Cruz both lie on significant natural gas deposits. Tarija sits on some 85 percent of the country's proven gas reserves. Depending on how this power struggle progresses, the leaders of both Brazil and Argentina could find themselves pulled into Bolivia's domestic problems to secure supplies of natural gas, a matter of national security.

Bolivia's military has remained at a distance from the political dispute, although most presume it will remain loyal to Morales. The Bolivian military is the most interesting component of this situation. If the generals' loyalty remains with Morales, he will have the necessary tools to force the unruly upstarts into line. If not, the secessionists, led by Santa Cruz, would force the hands of Argentina and Brazil.

It is unlikely that any war breaks out over control of Bolivia's natural gas resources. But as one group struggles to preserve its power against a government that has a democratically elected right to redistribute that power, Bolivia's neighbors can't help but pay attention. The decisions of a small group of families could very well change their future.

The International Element of Argentine Domestic Problems

The recent food riots in Haiti were just the tip of an iceberg that extends as far south as Argentina. Brazil and Argentina are the world’s top producers of soy, after the United States, and Argentina is the world’s top wheat producer.

Both countries are under increasing pressure to reduce exports to safe guard the economy and the county’s own food stuffs. But Argentina is in a very difficult position where the government is at the beginning of what may prove to be a long and nasty process of readjusting food supplies, prices, and the balance between international demand and local needs. It will be a process felt across the world.

The 30-day truce between farmers and the Argentine government will end on 2 May. So far, negotiations have not gone well, as farmers are reluctant to pay even higher export taxes – the third tax hike on soy, for example. As the personal grudge the Kirchners have against the Argentine mega-farm aristocracy wages on, it is likely further disruptions in export for meat, soy, and wheat will continue into the near future.

Argentina’s internal wheat demand is some five million tons a year. It produces 15 million tons of wheat annually, exporting ten.

The battle over food exports in Argentina and the spike in food prices world wide has exacerbated a far deeper problem the country has with inflation. The country’s Agricultural Minister recently resigned, in part, due to his decision not to be a member of an administration that actively works to hide the truth about inflation.

As the real value of the Argentine peso against the dollar continues to slip, food prices in Argentina will rise. It is one thing to work a month and not be able to buy a luxury item. It is entirely another to work full time and not be able to buy food.

Expect the situation in Argentina to rapidly decline into street-level protests, perhaps even riots if the prices continue to scale up. The effects Argentina’s internal problems will have on the international level will be felt in the poorest countries most dependent on Argentine wheat. West African countries are at the top of this list.

Well aware of the situation in Argentina, Brazilian President Lula announced on 25 April that his country will increase wheat production to reduce dependency on Argentina. Lula’s announcement is in part politics, but it also reveals his take on the Argentine crisis. It is one the Brazilian leader expects will not improve for months, perhaps even years, to come.

Meanwhile, Venezuela simmers. Chavez said on 24 April that one day Venezuela will be a food exporter. Today, however, it is one of the region’s few net food importers. Chavez is likely worried about supply from Argentina as well as international food prices in general as his price controls may slip as government subsidies are not able to keep up with the rising price of food.

If price controls on the retail side do slip, many Venezuelans would find themselves waiting in long lines for basic foodstuffs only to realize they can’t afford them now – not an ideal combination for stability.

Brazil will again take the lead to do what it can to fight the rising cost of corn, wheat, soy, and other foodstuffs, as demonstrated by its recent donation of money for food to Haiti. But Brazil cannot act alone. If Argentina is unable to meet the world’s demand for wheat and soy, the ripple effect will reach from the middle class outlets in the United States to the smallest market in West Africa and beyond.

South American Defense Council

Speaking from the Miraflores Presidential Palace in Caracas, Venezuela on 14 April, Brazilian Defense Minister Nelson Jobim was confident the South American Defense Council (CDS) could be organized by the end of 2008.

“I believe the council can be installed by the end of the year,” he said.

Since 14 April, Jobim has moved on to visit Suriname, with visits planned for Guyana, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, Paraguay, and Argentina.

The formation of the CDS would be the headstone of a region-wide military alliance that, according to Jobim, would not be the classical military alliance as it would not involve operational units.

Yet the formation of this alliance has caused concern in Washington as it is the region’s first military alliance that explicitly does not want the involvement of the United States. This concern, however is unfounded, and if Washington tries to get involved, it would find itself undercutting Brazilian leadership, allowing Chavez room to proselytize his message and anti-American position within the military alliance.

Many observers from inside the beltway do not take two important truths into account.

Despite photo opportunities and many hugs, Lula and Chavez are not friends. Lula's administration is populated with old-school revolutionaries who share some of Chavez’s vision but have little respect for his implementation process. Lula, after years of trying and failing to be president of Brazil learned the hard way that being a die-hard Socialist is no path to power in Brazil. As a lame-duck president, he is more interested now in his legacy and in passing the torch of leadership to a hand picked successor.

Keeping Brazil at the top of the region’s geopolitical totum pole is a top priority as voters in the next election will likely remember Lula’s often stated promises to make Brazil a global player. The first step up that ladder is regional dominance. Checking Chavez is essential to that goal.

The idea for this military alliance was born in Brasilia and appeases the Brazilian military voices who have been calling out for a check on Chavez and his military spending. Bringing Chavez under the reigns of a regional military alliance, in theory, gives the Brazilians room to exert some control over Chavez in a multilateral forum of regional friends where he is least likely to employ his unsavory acts of public outrage to spark nationalist tension at home.

This alliance also allows Lula to quietly remind Chavez who is the real power house on the continent. The Venezuelan military has shiny new toys, but neither Chavez nor his generals have the persuasive pull enjoyed by Brazilian military leaders, backed up by Brazilian military factories and years of service for militaries around the region.

The Bolivian army, for example, could not mobilize without Brazilian vehicles, parts, and service. The Colombian Air Force recently used Brazilian built Supertucano aircraft to bomb the FARC camp in Ecuador. Supertucanos were used on nearly all the major bombing missions against FARC encampments in 2007. They have had a major impact on the Colombian Military's increased in air raids. Brazil has the region’s largest arms and ammunition industry in the region and is region’s leader in nuclear technology, followed closely behind by Argentina.

With Lula calling the shots for his representative at the South American Defense Council, he remains in a position to apply pressure on Chavez to keep him quiet and involved in Venezuelan domestic matters, a focus that would benefit the Venezuelan president.

The region’s other military leaders are more likely to fall into step behind Brazil and if Chavez were to pull out of the alliance, he would remain more isolated within his own region than he is today – a stated goal of US foreign policy for Venezuela.

Washington frets about a military alliance in South America, but if Washington leaders can be objective about Brazil’s goals, they would see therein an ally that can do far better in controlling Chavez. If Washington meddles in the South American Defense Council, it would find a loud voice in Chavez and the Brazilians would be forced to join in, cursing Washington all the while for not letting them take the lead.

The Other Border

With so much focus on the US-Mexico border, it is easy to forget about Mexico’s border with Guatemala. It is one that in the coming months and years will likely become a concern and a serious problem if Mexico is forced to fight a two-front war against organized crime.

Two problematic areas have been established.

One is in southern Guatemala where the Suchiate river largely defines the Guatemala-Mexico border. This is an illegal immigrant corridor through which hundreds of thousands of undocumented Central Americans pass into the Mexican state of Chiapas.

And it is not just Latinos. On 3 April, six adult male Iraqis were apprehended after having crossed the Suchiate river on a raft holding falsified Dutch and Greek passports purchased in Guatemala. A total of 29 Iraquis were arrested in Chiapas in 2007.

Those who help Central Americans and other cross Mexico’s two borders are called “polleros” or sometimes “coyotes”. From 2000 to 2005, some 15,000 polleros were arrested in Mexico, and according to the Mexican National Migration Institute, 3,739 were prosecuted. The gap between arrests and prosecutions indicates a high level of complicity between polleros and the authorities tasked with stopping them.

A similar high number of arrests and low number of prosecutions continues through today, indicating the reports published concerning arrests of polleros or illegal migrants should be taken lightly as it is likely arresting officers will take a bribe. This system if catch and release then has served to enrich corrupt police officers more than it has to stop illegal border crossings into Mexico.

The other problematic area is in northern Guatemala in the department of Peten, where a largely lawless border area facilitates the ongoing construction of clandestine airstrips and the resulting movement of illicit cargo across the border into Mexico. It is an ideal smuggling route as there is relatively little government presence in the Peten and even less on the border.

Five principle border crossing routes have been identified by Guatemalan authorities: Pipiles, Santa Rosita, Bonanza, crossing into Chiapas, and El Repasto and El Sacrificio crossing into Campeche state. Near these border crossings in Guatemala are any number of landing strips, where men connected with Mexican trucking companies arrive at prescheduled times to pick up the cargo and transport to distribution centers further inside Mexico.

The Guatemalan government believes the Sinaloa Federation, the Gulf Cartel, and the Juarez Cartel all have agents working in the Peten region to move drugs into Mexico. These groups and others have worked in the Peten with near impunity for nearly a decade. So far, the Guatemalan government is powerless to stop them and help from the United States and Mexico is not on the horizon.

Together, both of these corridors represent the number one reason why Guatemala is a magnet for drug trafficking and illegal immigration. The combined result is more than the state of Chiapas, historically one of the most poor Mexican states, can handle.

With all eyes fixated to the north where President Calderón has focused the might of the Mexican military to combat organized crime, there is little help coming from the federal level to assist with what is clearly another major national problem in Mexico. It is one that has a clear spillover effect in the United States, the ultimate destination of both the drugs and humans that pass from Central America across Mexico’s other border to ultimately arrive on the northern shores of the Rio Grande.

Lula-Chavez Recife Summit Summary

Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez arrived in the northern Brazilian city of Recife on 25 March to review with Brazilian President Lula the Abreu e Lima petroleum refinery, to be built under an agreement between Petrobras and PDVSA. The meeting itself resulted in little more than photo opportunities, but it did reveal a growing weakness in Chavez’s position. By the end of the summit, Chavez revealed he doesn’t have the money to pay for his end of the refinery. He agreed in principle to a regional military alliance, and signed deals that open up more trade flowing from Brazil to Venezuela.

Contrary to what many believe, Lula and Chavez are not good friends. They do have some ideological overlap, but Lula is interested in seeing his country take the regional leadership role for good. And if he has to crush Chavez to make that happen, so be it. But Lula’s tactics are not direct. He’d rather smile and hug Chavez, and only afterwards use Petrobras, a military alliance, and an unequal trade balance to pull Venezuela into a dependency that forces Chavez to acquiesce to Brazil’s political leadership in the region.

It is no secret that PDVSA has a cash flow problems. Chavez has outspent his enormous oil windfall and despite the high price of Venezuelan heavy crude, PDVSA cannot keep up with the production necessary to sustain Chavez’s expenditure appetite. It’s a matter of expertise and the ability to run an efficient refinery. Petrobras has both.

The Abreu e Lima refinery will have the capacity to produce some 200,000 barrels of oil a day with the potential of expansion to 400,000. Talk of the refinery has been ongoing since 2005 with no formal agreement in place.

During the presidential summit, no formal agreement was reached, indicating that Chavez simply doesn’t have the cash to put up his part the US$4 billion price tag for the refinery.

Most in Brazil expect Petrobras to build the refinery itself, scrapping the proposed 60-40 split between Petrobras and PDVSA. Lula’s bet is that by 2010, when construction of the refinery is expected to be complete, Chavez will have no choice but to do what it takes to get PDVSA crude oil into the Petrobras heavy crude oil refinery.

Lula has also moved to arrange agreements to continue exporting to Venezuela. Milk, beef, and other foodstuffs are at the top of the list, and trade between the two countries is expected to rise from US$5 billion in 2007 to US$8 billion in 2008. This increase in trade will undoubtedly become unbalanced in Brazil’s favor as Venezuela continues to import the food its own farmers and merchants can no longer sell Venezuelans at competitive prices.

Finally, with talk of the South American Defense Council on the regional agenda, it is likely Venezuela will sign onto the agreement. Brazil’s Defense Minister will travel to Caracas in the middle of April, and it is possible he obtains backing from the Venezuelan military. It would pave the way to bring other countries on board. Along with Venezuela, there is some indication that Brazil will pull in Bolivia, Colombia, Guyana, Ecuador, Peru, and Paraguay.

This summit did little for Chavez. He did manage to secure more foodstuffs for Venezuela and indicate that he’s at least interested in the military alliance. For Brazil, the summit was enough to solidify in Lula’s mind what many in Brazil have been thinking all along. It was wise to let Chavez act like the regional leader for a time. He had the money and some interesting ideas. But he burned hot and fast. In the coming months and years, it will become undeniably clear to Chavez and the rest of South America that Brazil is coming into its own and that Chavez was just a fad

Coca in Brazil

When satellite images revealed a small coca plantation some 150 kilometers south of Tabatinga in the Brazilian state of Amazonas on 14 March, both the Brazilian military and local members of the civil police immediately headed to intercept.

They found roughly two hectares of coca bushes and a small cocaine processing lab filled with all the necessary chemicals and other materials required to process coca leaves to coca paste and from paste to the pure powder.

According to analysts, Brazil consumes roughly 40 tons of cocaine a year, while another 40 tons annually pass through the county and on to West Africa where the shipments are downsized and carried into Europe, mostly through the work of dozens of mules.

Given the size of the two hectare plot, the bushes growing there could yield up to 12 kilos of pure cocaine, hardly enough to warrant Brazil as a source country.

The small plantation’s location was along the banks of the Javari river, south of Tabatinga, a lawless town that sits on the Brazil-Peruvian border. The location suggests cooperation between Brazilian and Peruvian elements, and confirms the use of the Javari river as a waterway used to transport cocaine from the remote jungles of the Amazon to the city of Manaus and possibly onto Belem on the coast for export, or south to Sao Paulo for distribution and local consumption.

The discovery of the plantation indicates that there are likely more, but most importantly, it confirms a long-held suspicion that coca bushes have been genetically engineered to grow at low altitudes.

According to local reports, the leaves of the coca bushes that grew along the banks of the Javari were thicker than the leaves found on bushes growing at higher altitudes in the Andes. Some point to the leaves’ thickness as a sign that this new strain can produce more coca paste per bush.

Tabatinga has long been known as a port town where drugs, guns, and the precursor chemicals used to produce cocaine meet and are swapped between interested parties coming south from Colombia, east from Peru, or west from Brazil. The Brazilian criminal Fernandinho Biera-Mar, considered to be running a multi-million dollar smuggling business from his prison cell, pioneered the links between organized crime in Rio and Colombia’s FARC. The cocaine for guns barter system he put in place is considered very much alive today.

It’s possible that his associates are involved in the creation of coca plantations in Brazil. Such an evolution is certainly not a surprise, as the Brazilian Amazon would be the perfect place to expand coca production.

Reporting the discovery of the camp, the Brazilian military called it a triumph of superior intelligence gathering. Others quietly regard it as a lucky break. With barely enough man power to operate the air-bridge denial program that Brazil maintains in the Amazon through a series of radar posts, and a Navy that refuses to patrol rivers, Brazilian authorities are hardly in a position to crack down on the proliferation of more coca bush plantations in the Amazon.

There is simple saying in Portuguese that goes, “In the Amazon, anything grows.” Apparently coca does too.

Mexicans in the FARC & the FARC in Mexico

After the Colombian Air Force (FAC) bombed the camp of FARC leader Raul Reyes with Brazilian airplanes and Israeli guidance systems, the camp lay destroyed in the early morning hours of 2 March. When the Colombian military special forces picked through the bodies just moments after the dust settled, they came across an interesting find.

Mexicans figured among the dead.

Six days later, the Colombian vice president, Francisco Santos, said that there were “several” Mexican youths being trained by the FARC while residing at Reyes’ camp. At least one Mexican, Lucia Morett Alvarez, was taking a course on explosives. This fact resonates with the as yet unconfirmed rumors that Raul Reyes had been in contact with a Mexican insurgent off-shoot called the Ricardo Flores Magon - Insurgent Militias. Other information connecting the FARC with insurgencies inside Mexico is likely on the recovered computers, but so far has not been leaked.

According to the Colombian government, however, at least four Mexicans have been confirmed as dead from the bombing of Reyes’ camp.

Beyond insurgent activity, and the reported resurgence of FARC activities among Mexico’s universities, the presence of the FARC in the Mexican drug trade has been well established. As businessmen, FARC operatives have taken no sides in Mexico’s internal struggles. They are known to have worked with all of the major Mexican drug trafficking organizations. Where there is a Mexican buyer, it seems, so there is a FARC seller.

Echoing the Colombian vice president’s public claim of Mexicans taking classes from the FARC, the Mexican Attorney General, Eduardo Medina-Mora, said on 10 March that the FARC maintains a strong presence in Mexico. He claims the FARC sells some US$780 million worth of cocaine to the world market every year, of which Mexican drug trafficking organizations purchase some US$428 million or 55 percent.

While it is difficult to determine the true dollar amount of FARC cocaine sales to Mexico, it’s possible that this number may soon grow if the recently released older brother of the Arellano-Felix drug trafficking organization (AFO), Felipe, decides to get back into the cocaine buying business.

He was the organizations top cocaine smuggler in the early 1990s and is considered the front man who made contact with the FARC, establishing the insurgency as a reliable cocaine supplier. The AFO has been credited with being the first Mexican drug trafficking organization to have engaged the FARC as a cocaine supplier. Now, it seems, there is a chance to renew old ties, bringing the FARC deeper into Mexico.

Two Fronts Against Colombia

Colombian relations with Ecuador chilled after Colombia delivered a bomb strike on the Ecuadorian side of the border. The FARC’s number two, known as Raul Reyes, was killed, making the strike justifiable for Colombia but still inexcusable for Ecuador.

Speaking more to a domestic audience than the Colombians, Ecuadorian President Rafael Correa reacted strongly to the Colombian incursion. He has sent a cursory amount of troops to the Colombian border for a show of strength, not intimidation. He has also begun a regional tour to seek support for his cause, and is scheduled to meet with Hugo Chavez on 5 March after his current meetings with Alan Garcia in Peru have been concluded.

Chavez, who has maintained a rhetorical offensive against Colombia since November last year, has taken advantage of Ecuador’s ire to propel his rhetoric and actions to a new level of war mongering. Chavez has now sent troops and tanks to the Venezuelan-Colombian border, has closed a major border crossing point, and promises that trouble will come if Colombia makes any move to invade.

Uribe will not send Colombian troops to either border, however. Interesting though is his abrupt change in tact. Until 4 March, Uribe had resisted playing into Chavez’s game of name calling and public argument. Now Uribe has announced that he will sue Chavez at the International Criminal Court for financing genocide.

Few doubt that Uribe has the information to back up his claims. Colombian intelligence agents have been planting the seeds of intelligence gathering in Venezuela for over a decade. Rumors that Chavez has in one way or another loaned or granted the FARC 300 million are likely supported by as yet undisclosed evidence. Already information has been leaked to Colombian media, which has taken the mantel for its country and is currently in full attack mode against Chavez – likely allowing Uribe to keep out of the public eye as Colombian journalists lambaste the Venezuelan leader with a number of accusations.

Not the least of which has been a recent accusation that Chavez offered a “stake” in oil companies to the FARC. The nature of this agreement is unclear, but if true, its ramifications for the state sponsorship of an internationally recognized terrorist group and insurgent army are serious enough to potentially cause Chavez some serious trouble at home.

Correa’s ruffled feathers are little more than a show of national unity and a savvy politician seeing an opportunity to gather support. Correa knows that Raul Reyes’ death benefits his country nearly as much as it benefits Colombia. And it is Chavez, not Uribe, that is in the most precarious position. Uribe appears to have lost his patience and will now push forward with a credible smear campaign that may loosen tight blocks of “chavista” support inside Venezuela, further reducing Chavez’s already dwindling support base.

With 24 percent inflation, scarce supplies of basic foodstuffs and a soaring crime rate around the country, it behooves Chavez to keep his supporters’ attention focused elsewhere. Yet if by chasing after war with Colombia, Chavez actually brews a conflict, he must be careful to control blood shed and come out a clear winner. If not, there is a significant chance he will lose the conflict and his presidency...

Border corruption and a 73 million dollar question

In a number of recent conversations the topics of corruption and border patrol agents has surfaced. On both sides of the border, it seems, taking bribes to allow the passage of certain trucks or certain individuals has become more of an issue. As media attention continues to focus on border violence between Mexico and the United States, many are aware that border agents on the Mexican side of the border have often taken bribes. Those that do not usually take a bullet.

On the US side of the border, however, such “plata o plomo” decisions have not been forced upon Border Patrol Agents, at least not that the media is aware. Corruption remains a concern, however, and when officials along the border talk about how Mexican organized crime will initially be felt inside the United States, the first answer is not what many expect. Firefights between members of Los Zetas and US Border Patrol are less likely than the clandestine offer of a white envelope stuffed with cash.

During his congressional testimony on 14 February, the Secretary of Homeland Security, Michael Chertoff, sat before the appropriate Senate Committee and explained why the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) needs US$50.5 billion dollars for fiscal year 2009. Within this amount, there is a request for US$442.4 million for the Border Patrol. DHS wants to hire, train and equip 2,200 new Border Patrol agents in an effort to reach President Bush’s goal of adding a total of 6,000 new Border Patrol agents by the end of 2009.

The total would surpass 20,000 Border Patrol agents, more than double the amount used in 2001, according to Chertoff.

Could it be that a handful of those new agents working on the US-Mexico border may be corrupted along the way? Could it be that as the Border Patrol has ramped up from 10,000 to over 20,000 agents, some moles have been placed by Mexican DTOs?

Meanwhile, another interesting question was raised a week earlier in early February by House Representative Eliot Engel, Chairman of the Western Hemisphere Subcommittee of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs.

Noting that in President Bush’s 2009 fiscal year budget request, another US$73 million has been removed from money set aside for drug use prevention programs inside the United States, Rep. Engel asked his guests – leaders from the DEA, DOS, ATF, FBI, etc:

“Why are we cutting demand side spending at a time when we have promised the Mexican government to intensify our efforts on the demand side of the drug war? This is absolutely shocking to me and is no way to show our commitment to our partners in Mexico, Central America, and elsewhere who are combating narco-traffickers on a daily basis.”

None of the witnesses that day came up with an adequate answer.

Drugs & Guns: Numbers in Mexico

In the past week, we have noted a surge in weapon seizures around Mexico. These numbers do not necessarily represent an increase in the movement of guns from the United States to Mexico, nor do they underline the efficiency of Mexican policing efforts. It is simply a snap shot of a particularly interesting week in a conflict with a sordid past and a long future.

On 8 February, Mexican officials captured the largest haul of weapons that according to the Mexican Attorney General’s office is the largest single weapon seizure made in the past 20 years. The ranch was located in the municipality of Miguel Alemán, where local politician Antonio Guajardo Anzaldúa was shot to death by alleged members of Los Zetas on 29 November 2007 for speaking out against the Gulf Cartel and its ties to PRI political party bosses in Tamaulipas.

Authorities were led to a ranch on the US-Mexico border where they found:

• 89 long barrel rifles, mostly AK-47 and AR-15;
• five pistols;
• a .30 caliber sub-machine gun with tripod;
• B-4 plastic explosives;
• 83,365 rounds of ammunition;
• nine tons of marijuana;
• and, a large number of black and camouflage uniforms.

Given the ranch location, we can be certain this equipment belonged to Los Zetas.

Recently released numbers from the Mexican government illustrate the massive amounts of drugs moving through the country. Consider that the numbers below for 2007 and 2008 represent only a fraction of the actual amounts (thank you to the NAFBPO for some of this information).

2007 totals:

Drugs

• 50,737 kilos of cocaine
• 312 kilos of opium paste
• 298 kilos of heroin
• 37.5 tons of ephedrine and pseudoephedrine (precursor chemical used to make methamphetamines)

Weapons

• 4,451 handguns
• 4,447 “shoulder” firearms – including assault rifles such as AK-47s and AR-15s
• 663,913 rounds of ammunition
• 484 grenades

2008 totals as of February 6, 2008.

Drugs

• 777 kilos of cocaine
• 11.8 tons of marijuana

Weapons

• 183 handguns
• 204 “high-powered” rifles
• 16 rocket launchers
• 110 fragmentation grenades
• 80 stun grenades

Russian Subs and Echoes of War

By now talk of Venezuelan military purchases from Russia has become a repetition of Chavez’s shopping list with the occasional mention of a new item. In light of the current situation between Venezuela and Colombia, Chavez’s interest in purchasing three Varshavianka-class submarines for an unofficial amount of one billion dollars becomes slightly more interesting.

Echoes of war between the two countries resound more in Chavez’s rhetoric and Colombian newspapers than they do in the offices of Colombia’s political and military leaders. But those who pay close attention to the matter have become more alarmed than usual. Chavez’s rhetoric appears especially fierce. Close cooperation between his government and the FARC, as well as the possible presence of Venezuelan ammunition in the hands of FARC guerrillas, underline an interesting observation made by Adam Isacson, Director of Programs with the Center for International Policy Studies in Washington.

In a recent conversation, he mentioned that when you’ve got two neighbors with one – Venezuela - that allegedly supplies arms and ammunition to the guerrilla army of the other – the FARC in Colombia – you’ve got a tense situation, one that is not present anywhere else in the world, save sections of Africa, and maybe the Middle East.

On top of that, add Chavez’s rhetoric, and the possibility of both Venezuelan and Colombian troop presence on a shared border known to be, in large swathes, FARC-controlled territory. In a dense forest, where a gun shot could come from any one of the three groups, causing an immediate reaction, it is not a far stretch to see how the current echoes of war could descend to something quite different.

Chavez’s announced trip to Russia to sign the contract for these three subs certainly does not help reduce tension. Once the contract for Russian attack subs has been signed, Chavez will likely make lightly-veiled statements to bristle the Colombian president flanked by a stoic background of Russian officials.

The Varshavianka-class submarine is a patrol submarine capable of taking out targets on land, on the surface or underwater. Along with the purchase of three submarines, Chavez will discuss his long-term plans to purchase another hundred patrol boats of various sizes.

Currently Colombian officials assert little worry over Chavez’s war-mongering. Claims that his speeches are designed to keep Venezuelans focus away from many domestic problems may be accurate for now. But the day may come when the Venezuelan military could pose a serious threat to Colombia. What’s more worrying than the possibility of war today is the likelihood of strained relations over the long-term due to Chavez’s completely understandable military upgrade.

As usual, it will be the citizens of both countries that will suffer, especially along the border where the local economy is so closely tied together that even slight interruptions of cross-border traffic is enough to cause a small violent outbreaks on a local level. Problem is, such a small spark might be all it takes to set fire to a much larger conflict.

100 Days of Security?

Since Guatemalan president Alvaro Colom entered office earlier this month, there have been at least 170 murders. That’s around 13 a day. Compared to all of 2007, where nearly 16 people were killed a day for a total of 5,781 murders, we could say Colom is off to a good start.

The day after he was inaugurated, Colom initiated a security plan to run for the first 100 days, called the “Plan de Seguridad de los Cien Dias,” or the 100 Day Security Plan. It appears to be a quick patch to test the water and give him some time to fine tune a more robust plan while benefiting from observing how the country reacts in the short-term. By all accounts, the plan has increased violence, a predictable result.

The headline in Guatemalan papers on 28 January was that 1,314 alleged criminals have been apprehended since Colom came into office, an impressive number. But it wasn’t long before Colom had to reply to a sharp criticism about his judicial system. Apparently one of those captured, a notorious street gang member known as Miguel Garcia or “The Dwarf”, was let go within hours of his arrest. He was wanted in connection with the massacre of 19 minors on the 19^th of January.

As mentioned in previous commentaries, Colom is in a tight spot. During the campaign leading up to his election, the man was hounded by former associated who threatened to kill him if he didn’t follow through on promises made years ago when he sold his political soul to his country’s organized crime bosses. As president, Colom must still attend to the shadow elements of his political party, but the question remains whether or not he will let these elements dictate policy on a national level or simply be content with Colom looking the other way.

At the same time, he must appear tough on crime. The 100 days plan is evidence of his desire to show the constituency that his administration will be tough. In Guatemala, however, the administration is dealing with a two-front battle. On one side he has organized crime that moves anything that earns money, from drugs and humans to organs and guns. But this group is not the most immediate threat to security. It’s the street gangs with swelling numbers not necessarily from local recruitment but from arriving deportees.

Wave after wave of deported criminal arrives in Guatemala where, despite the best efforts of the US Department of Homeland Security, Interpol, and the Guatemalan National Police, all the criminals who arrive in Guatemala can’t simply be detained, as we can see from the recent release of “The Dwarf”. As I’ve said before, Guatemala will be a very interesting place to watch over the next 70 days and on into the future. Right now, it’s hard to see how Colom can pull Guatemala out of this downward spiral without significant help from the international community – help that heretofore has not been exactly forthcoming…

The FARC's pulse and Mexican army hemmorage

With so much chatter on the international wires about the FARC hostages in Colombia, what will become of Ingred Bettencourt, and other issues revolving around the dance between Colombian president Alvaro Uribe, Hugo Chavez, and the FARC leadership, it is interesting to take a reading on the health of the FARC itself.

For many years, the FARC survived through kidnapping. As it has obviously become more involved in the drug trade, exporting cocaine from Colombia became a substantial portion of the insurgency’s revenue. Some argue that money earned from selling drugs indirectly to US consumers has by far surpassed revenue earned from collected kidnapping ransoms, to the point where kidnapping has become more of a political tool and less of a business. Given the current back and forth with Hugo Chavez, a geopolitical dance that has significantly raised awareness of the FARC on an international level, it seems this strategy, if indeed it is a strategy, may be working.

Yet within the FARC itself, a number of set backs from the death of key tactical leaders in 2007 to the loss of territory inside Colombia has hobbled the group. Despite the fact that the FARC’s founder has said that 2007 will be an offensive year for the FARC, it is hard to see just how the FARC can improve its position through the use of military force. Guns and ammunition aside, the FARC needs soldiers, yet according to the Colombian military, some six members of the FARC and the other insurgency, the ELN, abandon the rank and file every day. This is, admittedly, a biased source for information on the FARC, but it allows for an interesting numbers game.

If both the FARC and the ELN lose six soldiers a day, then it is possible that the FARC itself loses at least three a day, or 21 a week, 84 a month, and 1,008 a year. This number may seem small, but it gives an idea of how the ideology within the rank and file, the personal reasons to remain a member of the FARC, has perhaps faltered within the group itself. Do insurgent soldiers sign up because they believe in the same values shared by the FARC founders over forty years ago? Or maybe they sign up because it’s the best option in a world of limited opportunity. Either way, the rank and file of the FARC seems to be wavering. Do FARC footsoldiers have the heart to take an offensive stance that will likely lead to direct confrontation with a highly professional Colomban army?

Finally, a point of comparison: when FARC soldiers run away, where do they go? Likely not to the Colombian army, but when members of the Mexican army run away, it is possible, even likely in some cases, that they join the rank and file of Mexican drug trafficking organizations (DTOs).

According to some sources, new recruits sign up for military training already knowing that after training and sometime in the field they will switch sides to join the DTOs. Between 2002 and 2006, some 150,333 Mexican soldiers decided to desert their post. There is little doubt many of them now fight for the Sinaloa Federation, the Gulf Cartel, or one of the many, smaller DTOs in Mexico.

Barrio Azteca borderland gang

Five leaders of the Barrio Azteca gang were arrested on 10 January in a sting operation organized on intelligence gathered from a four-year long operation to unravel prison gangs on the US-Mexico border. The Barrio Azteca gang started in the southwest Texas prison system and quickly spread to the streets of El Paso and the prison system in Ciudad Juarez, across the border. Linked to the Carrillo-Fuentes drug trafficking organization, also known as the Juarez Cartel, this gang is exemplary of how powerful organized criminal groups in Mexico outsource their security and dirty work to local gangs.

But the Barrio Azteca is not exactly small time. It was founded in 1986 within the US prison system and quickly spread to the Segundo Barrio neighborhood of El Paso, where it boosted membership among the Mexican immigrant community there before moving into the prison system in Ciudad Juarez, where it may have up to 2,000 members by now.

After making a link with the Carrillo-Fuentes DTO, based in Ciudad Juarez, the Barrio Azteca gang negotiated a deal to receive drugs at a discounted rate and the right to charge a fee to any retail-level dealer working on their turf in exchange for providing security services for the Mexican DTO as well as helping with north-south movement of drugs, people, guns, etc as the DTO needed.

Through the Carrillo-Fuentes DTO, the Barrio Azteca gang is loosely connected with the Sinaloa Federation, a grouping of a number of powerful drug trafficking organizations, making its role in El Paso all the more important. Much of the black tar heroin coming out of Mexico is smuggled through El Paso and on to Los Angeles, Dallas, New York, and Chicago.

Considering Barrio Azteca’s ties with the Sinaloa Federation in El Paso, it is not a jump to consider how other street gangs in other border towns, such as San Diego, or Laredo, have become options for outsourcing security and local-level drug dealing as well as intelligence gathering. The Mara Salvatrucha in Texas and the L-Street gang in Los Angeles come to mind.

Meanwhile, in neighboring Arizona, any illegal immigrants caught in the ArizonaMexico will be subjected to due process and could receive up to 180 days in prison for their efforts before being deported. The minimum is fifteen days. This program, called “Streamline” by the Border Patrol, seems to already be headed toward the realm of unintended consequences. desert on the border with

Already underway in the Yuma region of Arizona and the Del Rio region of Texas, this program feeds illegal immigrants into the local prison populations may serve best to offer gangs like the Barrio Aztecas a buffet of menu options for new recruits. In Arizona alone, this program and others placed 378,000 illegal immigrants in prison between 30 September 2006 and 30 September 2007. After 180 days, converted deportees will likely cross the border again, this time not to find a low wage job, but as mules for crossing drugs into the United States.

Welcoming 2008

In the first week of the new year, there are a number of items that are worth our collective attention but too little space here to cover all of them. We'll make our way through them slowly, perhaps elucidating more on the blog, while reserving the more interesting points for this weekly newsletter.

Today I'll focus on what seems to be some of the more interesting issues at hand but want to begin with a quick mention of a radio show called Focus 580 with an NPR station out of Illinois. The host and I talked about the US and Mexico, the drug trade, and who supplies versus who demands. You can find it here about halfway down on the left.

The US Dept. of Justice has finally made public its position that Mexico has become the number one supplier of methamphetamine to the United States. It's about five years behind the ball with that one. Known as "ice" or simply "meth" this drug is probably the most damaging in terms of public health costs and the most addictive, next to heroine, in terms of how many heavy users it creates. The fact that Mexico has been for years the number one supplier is again testimony to how organized Mexican narco traffickers are when it comes to managing their US distribution networks - so much so that they managed to identify a new trend in drug demand inside the US and take over the supply chain, one that was once solely inside the US and mostly in California.

Another interesting revelation, as some members of the Southern Pulse network have mentioned, is the nature of Mexican drug traffickers and how it is changing. The Tijuana Cartel, as we have pointed out in the past, has become more of a black market financial institution as it's muscle and strong-arm presence within Mexican drug trafficking has diminished. The question is whether or not the TJ Cartel will give up their control of that border crossing into the United States. Might they "lease" it to the highest bidder?

Both the Sinaloa and Gulf Cartels have long been involved in politics on a local level, pressuring specific candidates to get out of the race, killing others who have won, and on a more popular level, sponsoring marches against the "military occupation" of certain towns and small villages in northern Mexico. We're researching this trend in preparation for a forthcoming report on Drug Trafficking in Mexico, our third. We will let you know when it is ready, hopefully by the end of the month.

Is it true that Guatemalan president Alvaro Colom will take orders from organized crime? This is an answer we will try to find over the duration of his first hundred days in office, to kick off soon. Elsewhere in Central America, ten people have died in the past 24 hours in El Salvador, most of them when gunmen separated themselves from a crowd watching a soccer game when they began shooting, apparently at random. What will it take to subdue the violence there? We think part of the problem is US deportation policies and a lack of information sharing between the US and its Central American colleagues.

Finally, how will South America take shape in 2008? Will Brazilian president Lula re-assert his regional leadership as Chavez begins to look toward cleaning his own house? Already we've seen Lula working to bring Bolivia, Ecuador, and Peru closer. And it's clear Brazil and Colombia are friendly. Argentina is up in the air. Could it be that President Cristina allows Venezuela to buy her support as her husband did?

2007 Wrap Up and a peek at 2008

As this will be our last newsletter of 2007, we wanted to review briefly some of the year’s highlights and then take a peek into 2008.

Highlighted themes in 2007 include Chavez’s reach for more power and the resulting international friction between himself and Lula in Brazil. Bolivia has struggled with a Constituent Assembly. Truth telling in Colombia has unveiled a host of close ties between politicians and paramilitaries, but nothing yet has touched President Uribe.

Ecuador is flirting with China and the idea of a new port in Manta, where the US currently operates a military Forward Operating Location. And Kirchner succeeded in placing his wife in the president’s seat in Argentina.

Political violence in Guatemala underlines the strengthening grip of organized crime on that country’s political class. And ongoing violence in Mexico, as well as violence across the border into the United States, has prompted the discussion and now debate over the Merida Initiative.

In 2008, many of these ongoing themes will evolve and likely come to a head. We’re most interested in observing how the Merida Initiative is actually implemented. Will private contractors such as Blackwater USA or Dyncorp actually be used? Could increased pressure on drug trafficking organizations in Mexico lead to a spill over effect into Central America?

The last thing Guatemala needs is more Mexican criminals. Already, President-elect Colom has his hands full. His first 100 days will undoubtedly be marked by attempts from Guatemalan organized crime to show him – overtly or covertly – just how much they control wide swaths of his country.

We’re also interested to see how the humanitarian exchange process plays out in Colombia. Might Betancourt see freedom? We hear that Uribe invited Lula to mediate a humanitarian exchange process during President Cristina Fernández de Kirchner’s inauguration. For Lula it would be an opportunity to show the region and the world that he can succeed where Chavez has failed – a perfect maneuver for what appears to be an indirect approach to usurp Chavez from his regional leadership role.It is one he has purchased, not earned.

What will happen when the Venezuelan Bolivar drops two zeros (or three for that matter) in January? This slight change in the Venezuelan currency is certainly more cosmetic than economically sensible, as is the recently adjusted Venezuelan hour. It doesn’t make much sense to move the clock by half an hour, does it? Inside Venezuela a galvanized opposition has some momentum. In 2008, we will see how and where this momentum is used. May we see Chavez’s political core crumble? Not likely, but it will be interesting to see if the military takes a more active role in checking the president.

Can Morales hold his country together? The recent declaration of autonomy from the low-lands provinces seems serious enough, but Morales has – as of this printing – not sent in any troops to force order or obedience. He took the time to travel to the MercoSur meeting, so he cannot be too worried about the apparent mess at home.

Lula recently visited with promise of more Petrobras investment. He also told Morales to have “patience, patience, and more patience” with the opposition. Sometimes all it takes are a few words. Lula will likely work to bring Bolivia back into the Brazilian sphere of influence, further asserting his regional leadership role over Chavez.

Meanwhile, inside Brazil, we will be watching two important issues. First, the aviation crisis is still not resolved. How will Lula manage to keep Brazil’s skies safe? Might there be another accident? We’ve seen on many occasions reports of near misses in Brazilian media that some how doesn’t make it to the international scene. Just as important is Lula’s recent loss in the Brazilian Congress over the CPMF tax – one that taxes the movement of money through Brazilian banks. The bottom line is Lula’s administration will have roughly US$ 20 billion less to spend on social programs to pass along to state and municipal budgets in 2008.

Internationally this loss could hurt Brazil’s investment grade, we’re told by the Financial Times and sources in Brasilia, but what does it mean for the Brazilian economy in the long run?

Overall, 2008 promises to be another interesting year in Latin America. For now, and through the end of 2007, we will simply observe...

Crime, politics, and three bullets in the head

Salvatore Mancuso, a paramilitary chief in Colombia, famously claimed control over a third of the Colombian Congress after the 2002 legislative elections. The truth behind this statement continues to unfold even today as more and more Colombian politicians on the national level fall to the so-called para-politico scandal. Colombian paramilitaries across the country were able to extended their reach to national politicians because prior to 2002 they completely controlled politics on a state and municipal level in many of Colombia’s departments.

Violence leading up to elections is the best evidence of the fact that organized crime has a hand in political matters, and while the recent municipal elections in Colombia were not as violent as those of the past, it remains a fact that former paramilitary leaders still control some municipalities in Colombia.

Observing this pattern across the region, there is a striking similarity between Colombia and Mexico.

Mexico is ruled by three political parties. The PAN, represented by the president, Felipe Calderón, has a strong presence in the Congress. The PRD occupies the second-most seats on the national level and sits as the main opposition party. And then there’s the PRI – a political party that holds relatively little sway on the national level but controls nearly all of the Mexican states from the governor down to literally hundreds of municipalities.

These states include: Sonora, Chihuahua, Coahuila, Nayarit, Nuevo Leon, Tamaulipas, Sinaloa, Durango, Veracruz, , Quintana Roo, and Yucatan among others. The states listed here, however, are arguably those most afflicted by Mexican organized crime.

Focusing on Tamaulipas, considered the head quarters of the Mexican drug trafficking organization known as the Gulf Cartel, we see that violence surrounding elections denotes a heavy presence of organized crime in local and state-level politics.

On 29 November, men in a Suburban, a Jeep Cherokee, and a pickup opened fire on the recently elected president of the border-town municipality of Rio Bravo, Antonio Guajardo Anzaldúa, who was exiting his offices with a federal police escort. After the rain of bullets, one of the attackers calmly opened the door of his pickup, walked over to Guajardo, and shot him three times in the head.

Later that day, a main Tamaulipas-state newspaper received a call from the Gulf Cartel, warning that when reporting the news of Guajardo’s death the reporters should be careful with that they print, according to Mexico’s El Proceso magazine.

Guajardo was a member of the Workers’ Party, part of the coalition formed by the PRD. He was a relatively unimportant politician in the grand scheme of Mexican politics, but he had information on PRI politicians in Tamaulipas that he insisted on using to denounce the presence of organized crime in state and municipal politics.

During his campaign, Guajardo focused on blowing the whistle on any and all PRI politicians or political appointees who had connections to the Gulf Cartel in Tamaulipas. He denounced the state’s governor, Eugenio Hernández Flores, as an accomplice of the Gulf Cartel. He denounced Servando López Moreno, who won the elections in the border municipality of Miguel Alemán. López, according to Guajardo, had already appointed Juan Felipe Hinojosa, father of a well known crime boss Carlos Hinjosa, as the municipality’s treasurer. And the list goes on, too long to share with you here.

Guajardo’s death and the following cover up underline the close relationship between organized crime and PRI politicians in Tamaulipas. But what about other states and other municipalities where organized crime likely controls politics as much as it does in Tamaulipas?

Consider that the PRI controls governorships and municipalities in just about every state where organized crime is a principle problem and you’ll get a sense of the possible depths of corruption Calderón must tackle as he fights to remove organized crime from his country.

Eventually we may see the day when an organized criminal boss declares that he controls a third of the Mexican Congress. It would be a stretch to make such assumptions now, but if that day comes, many will remember when Salvatore Mancuso said the same thing in Colombia in 2002 and then proved it by telling the truth and crushing the careers of various politicians in 2007.

Digging into Blackwater USA

Hugo Chavez has lost the referendum to vote his reform package into law. And some news has surfaced that a group out of Serbia might have had something to do with the “no” vote, but more on that next week. We’re also looking in why the RC-26B aircraft is not part of the Merida Initiative package and why it should play a central role.

But for now, we're digging into Blackwater USA...

When two US government inspectors were asked by a US Border Patrol Agent if they were US citizens, they replied, “yes.” It was all they needed to enter the country at a land crossing between US and Mexico. No government issued form of identification was requested. The Border Patrol Agent never even got up from his seat, located some 10 feet away.

The agent obviously didn’t know that the two investigators were working for the Government Accountability Office on a report requested by the House of Representatives Committee on Homeland Security. The report, entitled, “Despite Progress, Weaknesses in Traveler Inspections Exist at Our Nation’s Ports of Entry,” found that both the Department of Homeland Security and the Border Patrol had some serious issues to overcome, including communication between field offices and headquarters, and training.

Training is an expensive process the US government would rather outsource. It has been well documented that contracts awarded by the Department of Defense (DOD) have focused on training Iraqi policemen and others in the Middle East, but what about training US agents inside the United States?

Such considerations have been on the books for Blackwater USA since at least 2005, when the company’s president at the time, Gary Jackson, testified before the House of Representatives Committee on Homeland Security in May of that year. “Just as the private sector has responded in moving mail and packages around the world more efficiently, so too can Blackwater respond to the customs’ and Border Patrol’s emerging and compelling training needs,” Jackson told Committee members.

Since early 2007, Blackwater has worked hard to lobby the right politicians in San Diego County for a license to operate a new training facility located in Potrero, California. A number of news stories have outlined the battle between Blackwater and local residents, numbering around 850 in the rural border town community, who don’t want the so-called “mercenary training camp” installed in their backyard.

What’s more, the training camp would be located less than ten miles from the US-Mexico border. The selection of the site, according to Blackwater, has nothing to do with the company’s interest in increased involvement in border patrol and the United States’ efforts to combat narco-trafficking on the US-Mexico border.

But this base’s location become more interesting given the results of a recent DOD bidding process for a US$15 billion dollar contract to combat narcoterrorism.

On 14 September, Blackwater USA, along with four other government contractors received slices of a multi-billion dollar contract awarded by the Pentagons’ Counter-Narcoterrorism Technology Program Office. Presumably, Blackwater will help with the development of surveillance technology used to stop “narcoterrorists” crossing into the United States from Mexico.

These facts, when considered together with the news that military contractors will be used to train Mexican law enforcement officials as part of the Merida Initiative, or Plan Mexico, draws a narrow bead on Blackwater as a likely candidate for a bidding process that will award the contract to train Mexicans how to fly the surveillance helicopters used to patrol the Mexican side of the border.

If this is the case, we should consider two more questions. First, how will the Mexican government react to Blackwater's presence so close to their border and on Mexican soil to train Mexican law enforcement officials. Second, in the long run, how involved will companies such as Blackwater become in protecting the US-Mexico border? As we've seen in Iraq, mission creep is tough to avoid.