Fundamental Shifts in South America

Lately I've been emailing a number of correspondents in the region, trying to get them to pay more attention to Brazil. We'll see what comes of that effort, but for now, I wanted to share a slightly moderated version of the email I've been sending most of them on how and why there is a fundamental shift going on in South America:

...There's a large story that could use more coverage down here that has everything to do with how Brazil is slowly but surely consolidating its role as South America's leader, despite Chavez's staying power or Washington's relationship with Bogota.

Take, for example, the fact that Uribe met with Lula on 17 February to discuss bilateral relations, trade, etc. On the agenda is also a discussion about border protection and Brazil's role as a mediator/facilitator in Colombia's ongoing dealings with the FARC. The helicopters used to rescue the recently released hostages were furnished by Brazil.

Brazil's Petrobras is a major supporter of Colombia's small yet robust biofuel program. And PDVSA looks to Petrobras to help with refinery needs - not to mention Brazil's potential to eclipse Venezuela as a serious, professional oil exporter in the next 20 years.

UNASUR was Brazil's idea, and when Ameripol meets, Brazil is one of the loudest voices, I'm told.

Obama called Lula very early in his administration, and he will travel to the US in March. When Obama comes down here, I think he will promote - privately - the idea of Brazil as a regional policing force. Brazil will resist initially, but if Obama takes that position, it will give Brazil at least tacit approval of its new role in the region.

Along those lines, Brazil will be replaced by Colombia as Washington's number one partner in the region, especially when Amorim (Brazil's leftist Foreign Minister who does NOT like Tom Shannon) is out of office in 2011.

There's more: Brazil is currently developing five separate infrastructure projects (w/o Chinese help) to link its interior with the Pacific, through Ecuador, Peru, and Bolivia. In the mid- to long-term, Brazil will increasingly be interested in protecting these assets from criminal groups inside these Andean countries that seek to use them for black market purposes. These projects link a portion of Brazil's economy with security issues inside her neighbors.

Also, when Brazil's recently discovered natural gas deposits come online (late 2009, early 2010), the country will depend less on Bolivia, and will be in a position to actually export natural gas. This makes Brazil an attractive partner for Chile, currently struggling under its less than ideal natural gas partnership with Argentina.

In short, there are many factors, some mentioned above, that point toward Brazil's future as the leader in the region. We're both aware that some media sources have covered the story of the "Giant that awoke," but the stories I've seen only scratch the surface...

Pricing on Weapons Smuggled into Mexico

I've been asked by the Dept. of Homeland Security to remove this post. Apparently what I thought was public information is still sensitive.

My apologies.

Hutchinson-Whampoa Drops Manta Concession

The world's largest container-terminal operator, Hutchinson-Whampoa, will drop its concession to modernize and operate Ecuador's deep water port at Manta, according to a 6 February Bloomberg report.

This news comes after a 3 January speech by President Correa, who said Hutchinson would have to leave the country if it did not develop Manta according to the government's wished.

It is an "unacceptable" position, according to Hutchinson.

This is an interesting turn of events. On one hand, I believe Correa was speaking to a domestic audience, eager for him to make nationalistic statements.

On the other, Hutchinson doesn't need Manta. It is the closes port to China across the pacific, but apparently ports in Peru, Chile, Panama, and Mexico are just as if not more attractive.

I suspect Correa may be lobbying to win back his Chinese investors. We'll see if he does or not.

The "middle" of the end for the FARC?

Colombia's Semana news magazine posted an interesting piece yesterday. Four Colombians presented themselves to Panama's Servicio Nacional de Fontera, located some 50 kilometers from the Panama/Colombia border.

Most speculate the four Colombians were members of the FARC. Reading the story, I was reminded of the FARC's desertion rate, and how in the past couple years, we have seen this rate rise, slowly but steadily.

Meanwhile, on 10 February, El Tiempo reported that a joint force of Colombian police and military apprehended Jesus Antonio Garcia Largo (aka Chucho Mapurilla) in Putumayo, near the border with Ecuador. At 51 years old, he is a 35 year FARC veteran who spent some time with the 48th Front . Chucho was also one of the FARC's remaining ideological leaders...

These two news items, when taken together with the conciliatory position the FARC has taken recently (apart from the Indian massacre in Nariño), points towards what I would call the "middle" of the end for the FARC as an armed threat inside Colombia.

I say "middle" because I've already considered the beginning of the end, here, as well as questioning if they were even still revolutionaries in 2005, here.

Moving forward, I think it is important to note the desertion and attrition rate - measured both by what the Colombian military says (see last to paragraphs in this piece) and by what we see reported, like Panama yesterday.

It is anyone's guess how much longer the FARC will remain as an organization that closely resembles what it was during the Pastraña administration, but I think we can all agree that the FARC has peaked and is now on its way down.

The PRI's Comeback?

Upcoming legislative elections in Mexico may tell us just how tight a grip organized crime has on the political establishment.

According to a poll released on 9 February by Mexican daily El Universal, the former ruling party, the PRI, currently enjoys nearly 40% of the potential vote, while Calderon's PAN party would take 25% and the beleaguered PRD would take 15%.

The PRI, as I have commented before, is a party known to have close ties to organized crime in Mexico's northern states, and likely in other states across the nation.

With all 500 members of Mexico's lower house and at least four state governors up for re-election on 5 July, we'll see if the PRI takes control of the lower house. If so, I'll be sure to let you know which members have suspected ties with organized crime...

Cancun in Trouble

Mexico's armed forces took control of the Cancun police on 9 February after the death of Brig. General Mauro Enrique Tello Quinones. As far as I know, this is the highest ranking military officer killed by organized crime in Mexico in the past few years.

The retired general had just taken a consulting post in Cancun to help develop a "new strategy" to combat organized crime. I'm not sure what that new strategy might have been, but apparently policemen within Cancun didn't want to find out.

Not long after the general's tortured body was found with two others, the Cancun chief of police was arrested, suspected of the murder. Francisco Velasco will remain in custody as the military seeks to unravel this mystery.

Obviously Cancun is a major tourist destination. If you knew that security in Cancun had been compromised so much that the military had to take over, would you fly there this year for Spring break? It reminds me of when heads first rolled in Acapulco.

Maras and Heavy Weaponry

Two stories in Central America surfaced late last week, suggesting that street gangs, aka "maras" or "pandilleros" in Spanish, have begun purchasing heavy weaponry.

Funds from extortions, kidnapping, and drug sales, have been used by maras in El Salvador to purchase at least two AK-47s, one M-16s, a G-3s, and even a light anti-tank weapon (LAW).

According to Oscar Bonilla, the director of El Salvador's National Council of Public Security, cited the arrest of five street gang members, and the seizure of their weapons (listed above), when discussing this trend.

The five gang members were arrested while transporting the arms police believe were to be used to attack a maximum security prison in Zacatecoluca, located about an hour from San Salvador. This is the prison that is thought to house a critical mass of Mara Salvatrucha (MS-13) senior members.

This news comes on the heels of a separate incident, where gang members used "heavy caliber rifles" and police uniforms to surprise and murder six individuals in the areas of Quezaltepeque and Kejapa, about 20 miles from San Salvador. Reminds me of what the Mexican organized criminals like to do - use police uniforms.

The articles rounded out the news with a few statistics:

In 2008, the economic costs of violence in Central America reached US$6.5 billion, or some 7.7 percent of Central America's combined GDP

During this time, businesses and families spent some US$1.2 billion to protect themselves

Between 90,000 and 100,000 gang members live in Mexico and Central America, many of them deported from the United States.

Nicaragua's Vulnerability

On 1 February, Mexico's El Universal published a piece on the Sinaloa drug trafficking organization's presence on Nicaragua's Pacific coast.

According to the piece, the Sinaloa DTO has been present in Nicaragua since 2003. I'm not surprised to see this news: we've long known that DTOs are crawling around Central America.

What makes this news more interesting, however, is Nicaragua's demographical distribution. Most of the country's population is concentrated on the Pacific side. Truth be told, only a small amount of the country is actually patrolled and controlled by the government, seated in Managua.

There is a thin strip of population on Nicaragua's Caribbean coast, but if you've ever been to Bluefields, you'd note that most people there identify themselves more with Jamaica than with Managua.

And to the north, where Indian tribes rule, there is little to no connection with Managua, other than the occasional armed altercation between Nicaraguan police and the coastal Indians, armed to the teeth.

The vast expanse between Managua and the country's easter coast is a no man's land, especially to the north, where Nicaragua borders with Honduras.

The news in Mexico claims that DTOs are once again focused on Nicaragua's Pacific coast, but I agree with others, who claim the middle of the country is much more vulnerable.

Obama on the lookout for Corruption

For those of you who read Portuguese, Jornal do Brasil published today a short piece of mine about corruption in the US and Brazil, and Obama's admission that he had made a mistake on Daschel.

You can find it here.

Paraisopolis and the PCC - history and symbology

Sao Paulo was once again in the news earlier this week when at least 120 members of the Military Police - including an elite squad - entered and occupied one of Brazil's largest favelas.

Paraisopolis is home to about 80,000 people, and is the size of approximately 80 soccer fields, or some 798,695 square meters. There are some 17,200 houses. Bottom line: closely-packed quarters.

The violence started when a police action in the favela on Sunday night resulted in the death of a 25 year old man who the police called a drug trafficker and car thief. People inside the favela, however, thought otherwise, calling him a "trabalhador" or, simply put, worker.

Most of the violence was focused at two entrances to the favela, where Volkswagen vans, tires, trash, furniture, and other flammable items were piled and set ablaze.

Rocks, bottles, sticks, and other items were thrown at the police, but there were enough shots fired from sniper positions inside the favela to provoke the police to bump up the number to 300 Military Police, as well as call in a support unit which sent in an armored vehicle and a helicopter.

As far as I can tell the violence has subsided. But all those who are interested in this incident need to understand that there is a symbolic quality to Paraisopolis that few foreign reporters understand: this is PCC territory.

In 2003, members of the Primeiro Comando da Capital (PCC), or the First Capital Command as the prison gang is known in English, were placed in charge of Paraisopolis by the leader of the PCC - a very shrewd man known as Marcola.

Marcola, who is currently in prison, made his stamp on history in May, 2006, when he ordered a general strike on Sao Paulo police that brought the city to its knees.

But when he ordered his men to take over the drug trafficking network in Paraisopolis, he sent in a team of 50 men, who acted as a type of paramilitary group that enforced the law within the "city inside a city." For Marcola, Paraisopolis was a very important community to control, influence, and develop as a support system for the PCC.

When the police come in and act like they run the show, there will always be trouble.

According to my sources, there were two mid-level Military Police guys who were calling themselves the "donos" or "owners" of Paraisopolis. This news most certainly made its way back to Marcola. And I'm sure he made a phone call to put his people inside the favela on the alert. But Marcola is smart enough to know that he can't just start killing cops. There needs to be a reason. And that reason was delivered by the very security organization that does not want to go head to head with the PCC.

Reading the news Monday morning, I was reminded of Black Hawk Down, and how Mark Bowden described in his book the way the locals in Mogadishu would pop out of nowhere and fire randomly and sometimes lethally on the US Rangers who were completely surrounded.

It explains why the Military Police in Sao Paulo went in with so much force. The other explanation is that Paraisopolis is located near Morumbi, a well-heeled neighborhood in Sao Paulo. The Secretary of Public Security couldn't let the burning tires and thrown bottles go without some sort of response.

I have to consider that Marcola used this incident as an opportunity to test the reaction forces and willingness of the relatively new government in place. Paraisopolis was a test of will between two men: Marcola and the Secretary of Public Security for the state of Sao Paulo. Makes me wonder if Marcola has something else up his sleeve...

Stay tuned.

Get off the Fence

The Dallas Morning News reported this morning that we may see an “enhanced role” for the United States in Mexico. True, the drug trade in Mexico is out of control, but I have to agree with those who are cautious about any "enhancement", or joint operations.

This is Mexico’s fight first, and while the US must support its southern neighbor, that support should come by way of what the US can do inside its own borders, first.

That aside, the DMN article reminded me of a presentation I gave in November 2008 at a government intelligence agency base in Texas. The presentation was on the presence of Mexican drug trafficking organizations in the Americas, outside of Mexico.

During my 6-hour stay with government intelligence employees, the one resounding comment I heard was, “we need to get off the fence.”

The US needs to decide, from an intelligence-gathering point of view, whether or not Mexico will be seen as a friend or an enemy. That fundamental distinction will set the tone for all decisions for “enhanced roles” down the road. And as far as I can tell, that decision has not yet been made.

Now, back to the presentation: the slide that got the most attention was a map of the United States, I borrowed from the Los Angels Times (see below).

Apart from the problems with drug demand and gun trafficking from the US into Mexico, we need to focus on eradicating - or at least complicating - the down stream operations of Mexican organized crime inside the US.

The laundry list of what the US government can do inside our own country is long enough not to continue worrying about the supply side. Sure, share intelligence, but let the Mexicans fight their own battle. We have enough to do at home.

A Look Inside Brazil's Foreign Policy Team

A source of mine in Brasilia, and someone close to the maneuvering of politics within the Brazilian Congress and Lula’s administration, recently made an interesting comment.

Lula, he says, becomes quite upset at the lack of coordination between the various cabinet-level politicians who operate a specific segment of Brazil’s foreign policy.

Brazil’s foreign policy is officially delegated to Foreign Minister, Celsom Amorim, and Lula’s Foreign Affairs adviser, Professor Marco Aurelio Garcia, who has been a foreign policy adviser with the Workers Party (PT) for well over a decade.

Professor Marco represents the PT’s hard left, based on ideology from the party’s socialist position formed in the 1960s. His position contrasts somewhat with the relatively more moderate position taken by the Brazilian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, aka Itamaraty, and under Amorim’s charge.

Amorim undoubtedly drives Brazil’s over all foreign policy maneuvers, but insiders report that it’s Professor Marco who works behind the scenes to maintain Brazil’s cordial relationship with the region’s leftist governments in Venezuela, Bolivia, Ecuador, Argentina, and Paraguay.

If Obama seeks to appease Brazil, and use the South American giant as a regional proxy in South America, his team must appease both Amorim and Professor Marco – not an easy task as both men often disagree.

Defense Minister, Nelson Jobim, also has a voice in Brazilian foreign policy. So does Carlos Minc, the Environmental Minister. In the area of foreign trade, Ministers Reinhold Stephanes with Agriculture and Miguel Jorge with Development and Foreign Trade, weigh in.

In addition to this not to small group, another appointee to Lula’s administration, Harvard Professor Roberto Mangabeira Unger, is in place to advise on long term, strategic foreign policy decision making. His voice and ideas fall directly in line with what Brazil would plan for a long-term, strategic relationship with the United States.

Mangabeira, my source reports, recently visited Washington to engage with the Obama administration. He claims links to the first couple because he was at least a professor for Barak Obama when he attended Harvard.

Perhaps Mangabeira’s influence led to the 26 January phone call between Presidents Obama and Lula. But the press never covered Mangabeira’s visit, nor was the Brazilians embassy directly involved in the visit.

Either way, Lula has unofficially committed to a trip to DC in March, and it is quite possible Obama will visit Brazil before the end of the year, maybe even before the end of the North American summer months.

Border Surge and Unintended Consequences in Spain

A colleague of mine who writes for Latin American Thought recently sent over an interesting article from El Espectador, a Colombian print weekly.

The article outlines how Colombian organized crime has installed itself inside Spain.

Citing the recent murder of a Sr. Leonidas Vargas, killed while resting in a hospital bed in Madrid, the author pointed out that in the past the assassin would have been sent from Colombia - most certainly on his way home before the Spanish authorities could respond to the crime. Today, however, the assassin probably didn't even leave Madrid, asserts the author. I completely agree.

For years now, Spanish police have done away with the idea that Colombian assassins travel from Colombia to do their work in Spain. Today, these men live and work in Madrid, perfectly blending in with Madrid's business class.

The are called "debt collectors," and are sent to force their targets to pay a drug trafficking debt - often marked in dollars - with their own life.

"You pay or you die."

There is very little about this scenario that we haven't seen in Latin America. There is even little novelty of this occurrence in Spain, especially for those of us who follow the trends of Latin American drug trafficking.

But what I find interesting is how Spain may become over time a new battle ground for rival trafficking groups who seek to use the Iberian peninsula as a spring board into the rest of Europe.

Until now, we haven't seen blood shed between the Colombian and Mexican drug trafficking organizations (DTOs). There is a business agreement in place, one forged many years ago. But this agreement considers only the movement of product into the United States. When the EU is under consideration, all bets are off.

Spain becomes a more important transit country when we consider Venezuela's role in moving bulk quantities of cocaine from Colombia to Europe, as much of it flows through Spain.

Spain is a stopping point on the drug route from Western Africa into the EU, and places such as Guinea-Bissau and Senagal, which have become reception points for drugs flowing out of Brazil and Argentina.

Finally, if all the talk of a "border surge" turns into reality, then we will see Spain, again, become a hot transit zone.

The Colombians are already in place. And I recently read that street gangs such as the Mara Salvatrucha are heavily networked throughout Spanish cities. What, then, will happen once the Mexicans come into town?

A spike of violence in Spain on the heels of any border surge, I think, would be the text book definition of unintended consequences.

Citizen Command of Juarez - update

Update 20/1: The Mexican army has declared an alert in the state of Chihuahua due to the formation of what it calls a "new criminal group." The army assumes that this group may turn into something similiar to "La Familia" a civil justice group in Michoacan that eventually fell into the services of one drug trafficking organization, used to wipe out members of a rival criminal group. If the Citizen Command of Juarez does begin working with a DTO, it will be very interesting to see how that plays out. Either way, the future does not bode well for Juarez.

Citizen Command of Juarez

Over the weekend, a militia group in Juarez popped out of nowhere. They call themselves the Citizen Command of Juarez (CCJ), and through a number of emails sent to newspapers and other media, this group claims it will kill one criminal every 24 hours until there is peace again in Juarez.

This group is allegedly supported by local business men who are “tired” of the impunity for criminals in Juarez.

Leaders in the local business community have negated any connection to this popular militia.

As many know, Juarez suffered some of the worst violence in Mexico in 2008, and it’s likely to experience a similar stretch of murder and mayhem in 2009.

The birth of this militia may not take the group farther than a couple killings and maybe some more media play before they are stopped. Cleary, the men this group wants to target are untouchable – too powerful to worry about a bunch of civilians with (American) guns.

There is one significant point to make, however. When citizens have enough evidence to support the idea that the cops and the military can’t contain crime and violence, the argument to take justice into one’s own hands becomes stronger. Given what Mexico faces in 2009, groups like CCJ will spread, if they haven’t already…

An Opening for Obama to Engage Brazil

The new administration will seek to engage Brazil in an unprecedented way. This is one of the strongest conclusions made by nearly everyone I spoke with while preparing a recently published piece on Obama’s plans for Latin America.

The specifics of how, when, where, etc are yet to come. As many have already noted, there is a (long) short list of people on deck to take over for Tom Shannon. And Cuba will certainly be the first LatAm country to receive some long overdue attention, setting the tone for the Obama administration’s efforts south of the border.

But when it comes to Brazil, there are few in DC who can put their finger on exactly how the US can answer Brazil’s biggest question: so what? So what if you want to work with us, the Brazilians might say to Obama’s team. What’s in it for us?

From Brazil’s point of view, the US is not a free trader. Brazil has perennially confronted – and defeated over a cotton subsidies issue – the US at the WTO. Sugar and ethanol subsidies further exacerbate trade challenges, and to date there has been little to no support from the US on any matters concerning Brazil’s desire to become a player on the UN Security Council (never mind it’s one of the most defunct multilateral forums in existence today).

But let’s say that whoever replaces Tom Shannon has a keen ability to break through to Lula’s people, winning over the especially skeptical Celso Amorim, Brazil’s Foreign Minister and a strong advisor to the president. Then what?

What can Obama possibly offer that doesn’t have to go through Congress or be subjected to the geopolitical strategies of other UN Security Council members? The most clear answer is to support Brazil’s efforts to combat South America’s drug trade.

In a recently released policy paper on Brazil’s new national defense posture, the Brazilian military announced that it will begin shifting its focus from the southern borders to the Amazon basin, specifically to its borders with Bolivia, Peru, and Colombia. To date, the “Cobra” operation, run by Brazil’s Federal Police to patrol the Colombia-Brazil border, has met limited success, largely due to inadequate resources.

With the military high command united behind securing Brazil’s most porous borders, Brazil is in a position to provide support in material and man power to her neighbors that have the desire but not the ability to stop drugs flowing from their countries to flourishing markets in the US and Europe.

And I was waiting for the news to come out. I knew it was a matter of time before Lula would make public his first offer of assistance to combat drug trafficking in the region. It happened on 15 January in a small border town between Brazil and Bolivia, where an international road that connects the Atlantic to the Pacific will be finalized later this year (and the Chinese are happy about that).

Lula said, “he would grant Morales’ request for helicopters and other logistics support to patrol the porous frontier that is a major cocaine-trafficking route from the Andes…”

And this is where Obama’s people – and the Drug Enforcement Administration – should tread carefully. Lula is reaching out in an unprecedented way to assist Bolivia with an international challenge that Brazil now realizes is in its national best interests to combat.

The State Department under Clinton and the DEA should recognize Brazil’s political abilities in the region, and follow her lead. If Obama wants to appease Brazil, the best way is to whole heartedly support the region’s true leader – one with the ability to influence both Colombia and Bolivia (and Venezuela).

With enough support, Brazil could be encouraged to assist Peru, Colombia, and Venezuela with the region’s drug trafficking challenge. The US need not be the region’s policeman when a capable and ready Brazil is in place. It would be folly to try and force a reversal to the days when the US’ agents crawled all over the place poking around behind the backs of local police.

Finally, two caveats: I do not want to down play the DEA's important role in the region, but it is important the DEA remains a team player, as hard as it is sometimes due to concerns over corruption and operational integrity.

And second, I do not wish to promote the use of the military to do police work. The Brazilian Federal Police should take the lead on combating drug trafficking in the region. But I must recognize that in Latin America security sector reform is more of a dream than a reality. And the reality now is that if Brazil’s military will step forward to assist Bolivia and stop the cocaine and coca paste leaking out of that country and through Brazil into Europe and the US, we – and Obama – should welcome that initiative and do what we can to support it.

Thankfully, Lula has committed the Brazilian military before Obama’s team could come in and make that suggestion, which would have been a mistake and bad start considering Brazil’s sensitivities over issues of sovereignty – like what its military does and does not do.

With this announcement in place, the Obama administration has a clear hand to play. Let’s hope they do.

Peru, dollars, and China

Word has come through that Peru is talking about swapping out its local currency for dollars amidst negotiations for a major loan. But the most interesting aspect of this economic news is that the Peruvian government is talking to the United States and China.

The Peruvian Finance Minister, Luis Valdivieso, said Peru is looking for some US$ 9 billion in loans to help finance some $35 billion in development projects.

Considering the change of the Presidential guard next week and other issues around the world, the US might stall - or prolong - the negotiations in the face of increasingly drastic Peruvian need. It will be interesting to see if China bails out Peru, with a long-term strategic look at what Peru has to offer in return, apart from repaying the loan and what Garcia has already given China by way of mining concessions...

Failure in Mexico: The State vs. the states

During the week of 5 January, Mexican military forces engaged and captured Enrique "El Primo" Rivera Garin, a suspected operator of the Beltran Leyva brothers cartel in the town of Tlapa de Comonfort, located in the state of Guerrero.

At the time of his arrest, Rivera had on his person some five kilos of cocaine, two assault rifles, a shotgun, three handguns, thousands of dollars in cash, over seven yards of detonating cord, and a cartridge of industrial explosive.

After his arrest, the town's mayor fired the entire police force. He suspected that the whole group had been working with the narco cell run by Rivera.

Reflecting on what Boz recently posted concerning a range of ideas and positions on Mexico as a failed state, I came to the conclusion that we shouldn't be talking about that yet. It's ok for the DOD to engage in long range planning. That's what they do.

In a Dallas Morning News article, the author takes a moment to consider Ciudad Juarez as a failed city, noting that the mayor and other city officials now commute from El Paso.

The same could probably be said of Tijuana. And I spoke with a contact in Culiacan yesterday who told me that he was all but convinced that it was time to leave the city. He said the violence there is the worst it's ever been. Most violent acts are likely not even reported.

I would submit that rather than consider Mexico as on the road to a failed state, we should dig deeper, look at the state level within Mexico, not simply the State. We should also look at the possibility of failed cities, and towns - especially towns like Reynosa, Matamoros, and Nuevo Laredo on the US-Mexico border where the chances of failure appear most likely.

Violence in Mexico has finally gained traction in US news. But rather than talk about possible eventualities, which is interesting I admit, let's focus on realities.

Ciudad Juarez is an ugly reality. So is the small town of Tlapa de Comonfort.

My question is how many small towns in Mexico are under the complete control of narcos. How many cities? And how many Mexican states? Counting those numbers, we will over time gain a better handle on whether or not Mexico will fail at the national level or become something perhaps even worse: a hollow democracy that, due to the ideals of sovereignty, shields corruption, crime, and violence that extends from the top all the way to small, forgotten towns all over the country.

Inside Los Zetas

On the last day of 2008, Mexico’s El Universal paper published an interesting summary entitled “Los Zetas” por dentro. Its author had obtained a document prepared by the Mexican PGR (Attorney General), based on interviews conducted with former members of Los Zetas. As someone who has followed this group for some time, I was pleased to learn something new.

Many understand that the Los Zetas is a well organized drug trafficking organization, formed by members of a group of Mexican soldiers who deserted their unit, known as the Grupo Aeromóvil de Fuerzas Especiales (GAFES).

The GAFES deserters, totaling around 40 men, stuck together and offered their services to the Gulf Cartel, and Osiel Cárdenas, specifically. But once he was extradited around two years ago today, Heriberto Lazcano, aka El Lazca, took absolute control of Los Zetas. The group slowly but surely took complete command and control over all of the drug trafficking corridors formerly operated by the Gulf Cartel, primarily the plazas from Nuevo Laredo to Matamoros, across the border from Brownsville, Tx in the lower Rio Grande Valley.

When El Lazca took over the Gulf Cartel’s operations, Mexico experienced a cascading moment in the country’s drug trade. For the first time in Mexican history, we had a military unit operating like a drug trafficking organization (DTO). In Mexico, it’s normally the other way around.

And based on what we know from Colombian history, when you have a disciplined military unit operating as a DTO, it’s very hard to dislodge entrenched soldiers. The Zetas differ in one very important aspect: they are willing to take the Mexican military head on – and so far, the Mexican military has, at best, disrupted only a fraction of the group’s operations.

The men who stuck with El Lazco, who were part of the original Zetas, are referred to as the Zetas Viejos within the DTO. They are the men who work as commanders and operate from command/control positions in the group’s various hard points within its drug trafficking network. One very clear example is Miguel Triveño, aka El 40, who runs the Nuevo Laredo plaza – perhaps still the most lucrative drug trafficking corridor in the Americas.

El 40 and El Lazco clearly are Zetas Viejos. They are also known as Cobras Viejos, or L Viejos. Logically, the younger recruits, and next down in the line of command, are called Zetas Nuevos. These men include Mexican military deserters, former policemen, family members of Los Zetas, and – most notably – men trained within the Guatemalan Special Forces, known as Kaibiles. The Zetas Nuevos operate on the frontlines, take orders only from the Zeta Viejo commander they serve under, and act with the utmost brutality and lethal force.

These are the guys you read about when there’s a story that claims two trucks pulled up to a stopped car and unloaded a full clip into the target – overkill. Their calling card includes lots of brass bullet casings littered on the ground, kidnap and torture, decapitation, disfiguration, and in some cases very professional “double-tap” styled assassinations. In this regard, they differ little from the enforces who work for La Familia, the Beltran Leyva brothers, or the Tijuana Cartel.

But where the Zetas differ, I think, is again with the military order that reigns throughout the organization and the crisp, clean nature of many of the group’s operations. There are documented cases of paramilitary training for new Zetas, especially those with little to no military experience. Training camps dot the landscape in Tamaulipas and Nuevo Leon, hidden within large acre ranches.

The Cobras Nuevos, or L Nuevos, form the next level down the chain of command. These are the men who serve the Zetas Viejos directly as bodyguards. When the Zetas Viejos travel, they take a trusted contingent of gunslingers, and those men are the Cobras Nuevos. According to the PGR, sometimes Zetas Nuevos join them as the drivers to back up the Cobra Nuevos. They are all armed with one long barrel rifle, likely automatic, and a sidearm.

The next level down is where we get into the Zetas’ money laundering and business operations. A nation-wide network of men are in place with the sole purpose of covering up all the illicit business operated by members of Los Zetas. It’s not clear in the article, but it makes sense to consider that each Zeta Viejo operates his own group of business owners and accountants. Within the Zetas DTO, the members of this group are appropriately referred to as productividad.

The lowest members within the Zetas DTO chain of command are called halcones. These men serve as the eyes and the ears of Los Zetas wherever they may be. I’ve read stories that recount how in states like Tamaulipas, where Los Zetas have complete control, the halcones stand on overpasses that cross major highways just to take note of the traffic flowing in and out of town. These men likely work in business, politics, at bars, at hospitals, anywhere, and everywhere. These men are likely part of the Mexican “blue collar” infrastructure that keeps the country running. Makes me think of the movie The Fight Club – these guys are everywhere.

In addition to potentially thousands of halcones and members of the productividad who operate both in Mexico and in the United States, we can’t forget that the Zetas Viejos have any number of police commanders, politicians, high-level businessmen, judges, lawyers, military soldiers and mid- to high-level commanders, etc. on the payroll.

All that information funnels through the Zeta intelligence network, and is likely the principle reason why no man who betrays this group is safe in Mexico or the United States, or anywhere really. It’s very much like when Pablo Esobar in Colombia would send his assassinations to kill people who tried to flee from him in Spain, Russia, or even Turkey.

The Zetas’ counter intelligence organization has no peer in the Americas, and it begins with the halcones. Like most intelligence organizations, gathering information is easy, shifting through it to make sense of what’s important and what’s not is where the work gets tricky.

Obviously, this network is not without faults. A high-level Zeta leader has already been captured this year. Miguel Angel Soto Parra, who oversaw Zeta activities in central Mexico, is now in custody. He will likely join some of his other Zeta Viejo buddies caught last year, and join the list of those to be extradited to the US.

The bottom line, however, is that the Zetas is a well trained, well informed, and absurdly rich organization that will take more than the Mexican military to bring down. We tend to focus on just the top members, but when you consider all the levels within the organization that I’ve described above, the whole Zeta DTO expands into a massive criminal organization that likely employs thousands in a country where finding a legitimate job is very difficult, if not next to impossible in today’s economic climate.

It will be very interesting to watch how Mexico’s organized criminal map unfolds in 2009. I’ll make one safe prediction: Los Zetas will still be around in 2010, and quite possibly beyond Calderon and Obama’s respective administrations.

Overwhelming the System

According to a New York Times article, published 11 January, federal immigration cases are overwhelming the justice system from federal to local courts.

Some of the below highlights of this article are based on a study recently concluded by a Syracuse University research group known as the Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse. Quoted material follows:

• Federal prosecutions of immigration crimes nearly doubled in the last fiscal year, reaching more than 70,000 immigration cases in 2008.
  
• Immigration prosecutions have steeply risen over the last five years, while white-collar prosecutions have fallen by 18 percent, weapons prosecutions have dropped by 19 percent, organized crime prosecutions are down by 20 percent and public corruption prosecutions have dropped by 14 percent.
  
• United States attorneys on the Southwest border, who handle the bulk of immigration prosecutions, usually decline to prosecute drug suspects with 500 pounds of marijuana or less — about $500,000 to $800,000 worth. As a result of Washington’s decision to forgo many of those cases, Mr. Goddard said, local agencies are handling many of them and becoming overwhelmed.

On a light day, judges sentence between 40 and 60 criminals at a time. On heavy days, over 200 immigrants are handed sentences that vary from a few weeks to six months.

Reminds me of the Dark Knight when Two-face – before his accident – put 500 of Gotham’s criminals before a judge…

This article underscores one point more than any other. Eventually resources will dry up. We’ll never have enough judes, prosecutors, or ICE agents to capture, try, sentence, and the deport all the illegal aliens flowing in and out of the United States. And it’s quite clear that deportation is not a long term solution. Some of those deported are back inside the US in well under a week.

We can't police our way out of our problems with immigration.

Obama may have not wanted to touch the immigration lightening rod topic during the campaign, but one way or another it’s going to catch up to him.

Obama to meet with Calderon today - January 12, 2009

Much has already been published about Obama’s first “official” meeting with a world leader. Mexican President Felipe Calderon will meet with president-elect Barack Obama this morning at the Mexican Cultural Center in Washington DC. Calderon has an agenda heavy with a number of items that include immigration, security, and trade, yet he will receive very little by way of promise or action.

Mexico’s Proceso news magazine is quick to point out that Calderon supported McCain in the presidential campaign. But Obama will not hold that against him. Nevertheless, it will likely be at the back of both men’s minds, and if Obama wants to, he could use that simple fact to pressure Calderon, if only a little.

What Obama will make clear is that every request Calderon might make will have to go through the US Congress first – immigration reform, NAFTA tweaks, and support for the drug war top that list.

Obama has also played “the wall” cards close to his chest. The construction of the new border fence continues, and during the presidential campaign, neither Obama nor McCain made much of the issue. The truth is there was little daylight between each man’s position – use a wall near the cities and rely on a “virtual fence” in the long stretches between populated areas.

This will not be good enough for Calderon, but he must face the larger picture. Dozens of immigrants may still loiter around the Chevron station off of the 285 loop in Atlanta, looking for work as they do in every major city in the United States, but there are enough Mexican immigrants returning home to capture the national media’s attention. Once again, Congress comes into play, and the new Congress, once seated, will most certainly focus on the economy. The Mexicans, sadly, may have to wait it out through the summer and into the fall before we see any significant movement in Congress, and that’s with or without strong support from the Obama Whitehouse.

Calderon has done well to get his foot in the door first, ahead of a long line of world leaders eager to make a positive first impression on the new US president. To what avail? As optimistic as I’d like to be on this point, I must agree with the Proceso when it points out that little more that rhetoric will come of this meeting.

Mexicans in Australia

Three Mexican nationals, who arrived in Melbourne, Australia five weeks before a 16 million dollar shipment of cocaine arrived at port have been arrested in Australia.

What’s interesting is that the Australian Federal Police have said that the cocaine was smuggled from South America, through the United States, and on to Australia.

Does this suggest there is a glut of cocaine inside the United States? That would be an interesting development. I have noted here and there that some sources – mostly from the US government – say demand for cocaine is down. The fact that Mexicans are moving cocaine into new markets, beyond the US, seems to support these findings.

Yet more ephedrine activity in Argentina, this time in Rosario, suggests there might be a shift occurring from a focus of selling cocaine inside the US to a focus on methamphetamines. Similarly, the focus may have shifted from the US as a primary coke market to other places in the world…

Diosito - "My little God"

Diosito – “My little God” - was the last word of the co-pilot of the plane that crashed in Mexico, just before the black box recording ended. While some people in Mexico tell me that sabotage has not been ruled out, most of the Mexican public seems to be content with the results of the investigation.

While coming into land, the plane carrying two top Mexican officials got caught in the jet wake of a commercial airliner less than two miles ahead. The plane’s jet engines could not handle the intake of another jet’s wake and thus began to malfunction.

This sort of accident smacks of pilot error, which is unfortunate given the deadly results of what was perhaps a moment’s lack of concentration or a slight mistake in calculation.

Nevertheless, the official story is that the crash was an accident, and for now it seems to have satisfied most observers. If the crash was indeed sabotage, those that know the truth are keeping it from the rest of us, likely to maintain some sort of handle on the situation.

The possibility that a criminal outfit in Mexico targeted and downed an official flight, killing two very important officials in the fight against organized crime, is one none of us are willing to stomach. It would mean an escalation of Mexico’s security problems beyond what many will agree is already a very difficult situation.

Mexican organized crime inside the United States

Keep in mind, these points represent reports of a presence, which doesn’t necessarily mean a strong presence. Thanks to the LA Times for pulling this map together together with this story.

A new map for the US?

The FBI recently released information (see Washington Times article) that their agents in Texas believe Los Zetas have extended their operational control to north of the Mexico-Texas border. Zetas operating in Texas each operate in distinct areas, organized and divided to reflect the various border crossings or "plazas" at Juarez, Nuevo Laredo, Reynosa, Matamoros, and others.

In light of this not-very-surprising-information, I thought I would post here a new map of the US, sent over by a friend in Texas.

Pictures are worth a thousand words...

A few words on Bolivia

In the best interests of maintaining a balance between work and play, I decided many months ago to stop trying to cover the whole region. Bolivia is one of the countries I have allowed slip off my radar. I do receive quite a bit of information from sources in the country, but I can no longer take the time to sift through that information and try to present a sensible analysis for my readers.

But I cannot ignore how much Bolivia has distanced itself from Washington in the past few months.

Bolivia has lost trade preferences for a long list of its export products, meaning the US is no longer an export market for Bolivia. This decision hinged mostly on Bolivia’s ongoing cooperation in the War on Drugs. Seizures and the arrest of drug traffickers makes up part of what seems to be a largely subjective decision, mostly based on how much Washington “likes” the current administration in Bolivia.

Morales has been very clear about using the United States as a scapegoat in his domestic battle to keep the whole country under his control. I believe that when he expels the US ambassador and USAID, he does so mostly to keep his core constituency happy. Unfortunately the fallout on the international level is one where Washington will not stand by and let a Bolivian leader sling mud.

Now the Peace Core is packing up and leaving, as is the Drug Enforcement Administration.

I would argue that Bolivia is now firmly inside the Venezuelan orbit. Morales has effectively cut himself off from any would be channels of dialogue or mutual support with Washington and has apparently placed his bets with the success of the Chavez regime – a considerable risk simply considering that all his geopolitical eggs should not be in one basket.

I wouldn’t venture to guess what will happen next in Bolivia, but wanted to point out Bolivia’s current status to call attention to a situation I think will seriously deteriorate over the coming months and could likely explode before the end of 2009, if not before.

Best case scenario: Morales manages to keep the low lands under his control and moves the country forward on shaky legs.

Worst case scenario: Bolivia slides into civil war, with Chavez backing Morales in a fight to keep control of the low lands. If this were to unfold, it will be interesting to see how Brazil and Argentina react – both receive a significant portion of gas imports from Bolivia’s low land regions.

An Obama Promise and Plane Crash Implications

Mexican President Felipe Calderon called President-elect Barak Obama on 6 November to congratulate him and discuss matters of Mexican security.

Obama reassured Calderon he is committed to helping Mexico with his security challenges. And Calderon invited Obama to visit Mexico.

Let the promises begin. Early in Bush's presidency, he made similiar promises to former Mexican president Vicente Fox only to nearly completely ignore the southern neighbor.

Many of us will watch closely the development of this important relationship.

Meanwhile, the recent plane crash in Mexico City that killed Interior Secretary Juan Camilo Mourino and the former director of federal organized crime investigations, Jose Luis Santiago Vasconcelos and possibly other high-ranking government officials has got conspiracy theorists working over time.

There were some reports that the plane exploded in mid-air, but no confirmation has since surfaced.

Did Mexican organized crime sabotage the plane? It seems pretty clear now that there was no direct attack on the plane from a point on the ground, as in a surface to air missile, but the Mexican government has so far not ruled out sabotage or other such activity. Nor has it ruled out that the crash was an accident.

If this crash was not an accident, the implications are serious and very worrying. The Mexican government is stretched to the maximum with troop deployment and financial resources deployed to combat narcotrafficking across a number of Mexican states, especially the border regions with the United States and Guatemala.

I'm not sure how the government would be able to handle yet another escalation in the country's ongoing war against organized crime. I am fairly certain, however, that the cartels are in a position to take this conflict to the next level. I have doubts about the Mexican government.

More on this developing situation soon...

A new direction

This blog will take a new direction. Posts will be shorter and more frequent.

The commentaries I posted on this blog and prepared for Southern Pulse up until a couple weeks ago will continue to be published by International Security Network. They will also be available on my web site through occasional updates.

This blog will continue to focus on security in Latin America, but I will place here ideas, observations, and off the record information I can not publish simply because the information cannot be corroborated or has come from an unconfirmed source.

Finally, the information and analysis in the blog posts after this one reflect my own opinions, not those of the Southern Pulse network or any of my publishers.

Now, with the introduction and that disclaimer out of the way, let us begin...

The Monroe Doctrine: Circling the Drain

Many of the legacies left by George W. Bush will focus on the War on Terror and Iraq. In Latin America, however, his legacy will be one that always remembers how Latin America was lost on his watch. As President Bush closes out his final months in office, many in Washington lament that the Monroe Doctrine, the foundation of Washington’s soft power in Latin America, is circling the drain and nearly dead.

Iran, China and Russia are certainly helping it along, but they would be in no position to do so if the present White House had simply lived up to what President Bush promised in his first presidential campaign: closer ties with Latin America. If anything, however, President Bush has distanced himself farther from Latin America than any president in recent history, creating a vacuum that has been steadily filled by patron nations not motivated by Washington’s best interests.

On 22 September Russian Naval cruiser, Peter the Great, set sail with two other ships for Venezuela where they will take part in naval exercises in the Caribbean. Russian bombers recently left Venezuela after a number of training missions off the Venezuelan coast, and a long time Russian spy, now Deputy Prime Minister, Igor Sechin recently made his rounds through Cuba, Venezuela, and Nicaragua at the head of a large delegation of diplomats and business leaders.

The Russians are courting Bolivia, offering helicopters to help combat organized crime and drug traffickers. Meanwhile, Bolivia has announced it will move its Middle Eastern embassy from Egypt to Iran, a county now hard wired to Venezuela with at least one weekly flight.

A runway built by the US military in Manta, Ecuador, may soon be used to receive regular flights from China, and there are talks to open an international deep water port in Manta, making Ecuador a primary link between South America and growing business interests out of China.

Hutchinson-Wampoa, the company that controls ports on both sides of the Panama Canal has shown considerable interest in building in operating the Manta port, as well as a deep water port in northern Mexico.

The Chinese Development Bank, a financial institution that conducts some US$400 billion in annual loans, grants, and other programs, will invest US$100 million in Chile, where the national mining company, Codelco, will soon open another copper mine just to meet Chinese demand.

Over the past four years, we have watched the president of Iran receive a warm welcome in Nicaragua, Bolivia, Venezuela, and Ecuador, when the US president was all but forced off stage at the Summit of the Americas in Argentina and embarrassed by a negative public reception in Guatemala at the tail end of his obligatory Latin American tour in 2007.

The US State Department declared in January 2008 that this would be the year of engagement. So far, there has been little more than a cursory glance at Latin America, with most of the attention coming recently when Bolivia, then Venezuela, sent the US ambassador packing.

The International Monetary Fund has been lambasted as a bunch of Washington cronies. The State Department's Human Rights report and yearly review of cooperation in the so-called War on Drugs is significantly watered down in an environment where the region’s new patron states don’t place a high value on protecting human rights or preventing drugs from entering the United States.

Any influence the United States may still retain over the region has all but eroded. And since Thomas Shannon, the State Department’s top diplomat in Latin America, visited China in 2004, it has been all but formally acknowledged that China has a “seat at the table” when any Latin America enters serious discussions over trade, military support, or foreign direct investment.

Looking ahead, President Bush will hand his successor two ongoing conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq as well as the so-called wars on terrorism and drugs. By many accounts, the new president will inherit four “wars”. Three of the four wars are over an ocean and half a world away. And the war that potentially has the most impact on Americans' daily lives has received the least amount of attention and funding.

What may affect Americans the most in the coming presidential term and beyond is likely not the threat of nuclear war or a terrorist attack but losing the support and respect of a region that since 1823, when the Monroe Doctrine was first signed, has been for better and for worse, the sole purview of the United States.

In the last eight years, Washington’s backyard has become littered with a number of interests that range from hostile to indifferent towards the United States. For many Latin American nations, the upshot is choice, an option to trade with other countries aside from the US and the EU. They are new patrons who don’t care about human rights standards. They do not force Latin governments to give their soldiers immunity from prosecution at the International Criminal Court

Moving forward, many countries in Latin America, specifically Brazil, Ecuador, Chile, Argentina, and Mexico, may see winning combinations and synergies emerge from budding relationships with at least China and Russia. Iran is a distant, yet significant regional player.

The big loser will be the United States. US diplomatic pressure and geopolitical voice will increasingly fall on deaf ears. A region that was once very close has perhaps forever stepped away. It is unlikely future leaders in the White House will repair broken relations or revive one of the region’s oldest unspoken laws.

One Brazilian diplomat recently told Southern Pulse, “In the past, the door for talks with the United States on any issue had to remain open. We had no choice. Now we can close it if we want. And in the future, it may rarely, if ever, open again if China and Russia have their way.”

A drop in the Bucket

Between 16 and 17 September, the Drug Enforcement Administration closed out Project Reckoning, a multi-layered operation focused on the activities of Mexican organized crime inside the United States and Europe. The 15 month investigation, focusing on the Gulf Cartel, culminated in the arrest of some 500 individuals in the US and Italy.

In addition, the DEA seized a large quantity of drugs and money. Their press release reads: “Project Reckoning has resulted in…the seizure of approximately $60.1 million in U.S. currency, 16,711 kilograms of cocaine, 1,039 pounds of methamphetamine, 19 pounds of heroin, 51,258 pounds of marijuana, 176 vehicles and 167 weapons.”

At a glance, this operation was a resounding success. The DEA’s mission has always been to focus on the big fish, the major players in drug trafficking, and by investigating the upper echelons of the Gulf Cartel’s operations in the United States, focusing on Atlanta, it had led a multi-agency effort to dismantle an important faction inside a major criminal network.

It is an impressive conclusion to a long investigation, and perhaps even a good start. But it is still only a drop in the bucket.

Not long ago, in early August, five Mexican nationals were found with their throats cut in an apartment complex in Birmingham, Alabama. Local police responded in force. But it is likely they were too late to catch the perpetrators, who were miles away, en route to Mexico before the first 911 call was even made.

This incident reminded us of the shoot out that occurred in Phoenix, Arizona on 22 June when organized criminal, dressed like Phoenix Police Department SWAT, entered the house of local drug traffickers and killed everyone inside before leaving the scene and fleeing back to Mexico.

Texan teens were recruited by members of Los Zetas to conduct assassinations in the Laredo area in 2006. The recruiters purposely targeted minors who were US citizens for the grisly work. For the duration of one year there were at least three cells of minor assassins operating across Texas.

These are just three examples of how the tentacles of Mexican organized crime have begun to stretch into and across the United States. Continuing demand for methamphetamines, cocaine, heroin and other drugs ensure a constant flow of drug supply north. And as Mexican organized crime consolidates control of all levels and layers of the drug trade in the United States, down to the wholesale level, the need to protect turf will extend north from the border into American cities as far north as Seattle and New York.

As the Merida Initiative indicates, the front line of the so-called drug war has moved north from Colombia to Mexico. But what Project Reckoning exemplifies is the fact that this front line will not stop at the US-Mexico border. It will continue north into American cities, towns, neighborhoods, and the suburbs of small cities like Birmingham, a place most people would consider safe and a fair distance from the blood bath constantly splayed across Mexican press.

For many years now, the argument against a supply-side approach to reducing the amount of drugs flowing into the United States has fallen on deaf ears, Republican and Democratic alike. And when the DEA most needs funding and support to dismantle large smuggling operations, the organization has seen significant budget constraints and a forced hiring freeze in 2007 and part of 2008, while the Department of Homeland Security, perhaps one of the best examples of bureaucratic failure in the past decade, has seen a constant budget boost.

The result is an increase in the number of Immigrations and Customs Enforcement agents organizing the deportation of immigrant criminals who are back within the week, often bringing others with them. There are many examples that suggest deportation feeds a cycle of violence between the US and Central America, with Mexico in the middle.

The encroaching presence of Mexican organized crime inside the United States is inexorably tied to immigration because both challenges have everything to do with the US-Mexican border. In as much as Mexico is unable to provide security incentives to stay home and contain its own organized crime problem, Americans will continue to watch as violence directly linked to the drug trade migrates from foreign press, to national news, to local reports.

The border cannot be plugged, and deportation is not an answer. The most direct route to improving this situation is by focusing on assisting the Mexican government with a security problem it clearly cannot handle. The Merida Initiative is a start, but when the total aid for three years, some US$1.5 billion, is compared with the annual earnings of Mexican organized crime, estimated between US$15 and 40 billion, one begins to see how much more help is required. It is best sourced from international partners, and if Mexico continues to suffer, the United States will continue to be the first in line to feel the effect.

Bolivia's Morales Fights to Avoid a Common Fate

When Bolivian President Evo Morales won the 10 August referendum with some 68% percent of the vote, many observers thought he had taken a major step in the right direction towards quieting his opposition. Events since the referendum, however, have proven that if anything the opposition is more incensed and strategically better positioned than ever to thwart Morales’ plans to mold his country after his own progressive ideals.

On the 27th of August, the Brazilian military was mobilized to help Morales out of an embarrassing situation. When a Bolivian military helicopter carrying President Morales landed in Guyaramerin in the northeastern Bolivian department of Beni, after his meeting with a Canadian oil company, members of the Youth Union of Beni attacked the helicopter with rocks and bottles.

Morales was quickly escorted to a waiting car and driven to the Mamore River, which forms the border with Brazil in that region. Crossing into Brazil, Morales was eventually met by a Bolivian military transport craft that landed by the light provided by the headlights of Brazilian military trucks lined up on either side of the runway at Brazil’s Guajara Mirim base.

Such youth groups with a strong following in Beni and in the city of Santa Cruz have been the more militant arms of an opposition in Bolivia’s “media luna” lowlands region where an ongoing dispute over the reallocation of resources, specifically the direct hydrocarbon tax (IDH), has opposition leaders at loggerheads with the Bolivian government.

Road blocks, protests, and other acts of civil unrest have continued to disrupt the flow of goods and services around the country and by many indications appear to be getting worse.

Opposition leaders have control of food and energy resources that flow from the lowlands to the highlands, where there is a mass concentration of Morales supporters. But Morales has significant popular support and the control of the military.

When opposition leaders in the southern department of Tarija threatened to cut off gas supplies to Argentina, Morales responded by sending the military to secure the gas stations.

But as some analysts have pointed out, it wouldn’t take more than a well placed explosive to disrupt gas flows from the lowlands to the highlands. In the coming weeks, as Morales pushes harder for a national referendum to consolidate the legality of the country’s new constitution, it is possible such dramatic measures are taken.

Already, it seems, the Morales camp is preparing for this eventuality. On 30 August, the Bolivian Vice President, Alvaro Garcia, outlined the possible development of a terrorist group in Santa Cruz, a city long held by the opposition. A day before Garcia’s announcement, a group of Morales supporters, seeking to peacefully march to the center of Santa Cruz, were met by a group of violent anti-Morales activists. A number of Morales supporters were seriously injured.

Before leaving for his trip to Algeria, Lybia, and Iran, Morales announced that the nationwide referendum to approve or reject the new constitution would be held on 7 December. Governors from the "media luna" departments of Beni, Santa Cruz, Tarija, Cochabamba and Pando have said they would prevent their people from taking part in the vote. And on 2 September, Bolivia’s National Electoral Court blocked the 7 December referendum decree stating that by Bolivian law, any such vote must be first approved by the Congress, which has the authority to set the date. Bolivia’s senate is controlled by Morales’ opposition, placing the president at a serious disadvantage.

One side controls the presidency and military, the other controls most of the country’s resources, the senate, and a surly, unorganized group of militant youths. Something will eventually give, and it is not clear if Morales will succeed in preventing the opposition from blocking his reforms and perhaps forcing him out of office. Morales will have a fight on his hands if he wants to avoid the very same fate he has helped hand his predecessors, all of whom were members of the opposition.

The Price of Violence in Central America

The Salvadorian Public Security Council (CNSP) recently released a report that quantified violence, drug trafficking, and organized crime by placing a number on the amount Central American countries spend on security.

In an effort to curb violence, Central American governments spent some US$6.5 billion in 2006, according to the CNSP study, or nearly 7.7 percent of the sub-region’s GDP.

The highest spending rates are for Guatemala, with a bill of US$2.29 billion, followed by El Salvador with US$2.10 billion. Costa Rica and Nicaragua registered significantly less with US$ 791 million and US$529 million respectively.

When compared to the GDP of each country, these numbers represent a surprisingly high portion of GDP, with some 11 percent for El Salvador, with ten percent in Nicaragua, and 3.6 percent for Costa Rica.

Measured against this backdrop, international aid focused on increasing security seems woefully lacking. As part of Plan Merida, the US’ most recent anti-narco trafficking legislation, Central America may receive up to US$150 million in the next two years.

Yet compared to 2.29 billion spent in Guatemala on security in 2006 alone, the money slotted for Central America in the Merida Plan, if allowed to pass, will likely fall far short of making any real impact in the region.

El Salvador had one of the world's highest death rates at 150 per 100,000 in 1991 at the end of that country's civil war. Some 15 years later, in 2006, Salvador's CNSP registered a death rate of 67.8 per 100,000, still one of the region's highest death rates, measured at three times Mexico's death rate, where the drug trade ensures the death of over 2,500 annually.

How much money needs to be spent before Central American leaders realize they need to try another approach?

According to the CNSP study El Salvador spends some 11 percent of its GDP on security, yet spends only 2.7 percent on education. Something is not right.

The Deportation Conveyor Belt

Mexico’s National Immigration Institute (INM), the governmental organ responsible for investigation illegal immigration and enforcing Mexico’s immigration laws, is underfunded, poorly manned, and full of corrupt officials, according to the head of the INM, Cecilia Romero Castillo.

In a recent interview with Mexico’s Processo news magazine, Romero claims her organization simply cannot keep up with the growing number of illegal and documented migrants that enter Mexico on a yearly basis. Human trafficking, she claims, is a “juicy business” supported by INM officials that have been in place since November, 2006.

“…We are advancing a series of investigations…to identify a networks of traffickers. And when I speak of networks, I’m referring to an arrangement between foreigners and Mexicans, and within the group of Mexicans I have no doubt that some migration agents and officials with INM are involved,” Romero told Processo.

One group, called the Miami Mafia, specializes in trafficking Cubans into the United States through Mexico. According to reports from Mexico’s Attorney General’s office, this organization may earn as much as US$80 million a year. In other cases, human traffickers have charged as much as US$4,000 a person, to move them from Guatemala, through Mexico, and into specific points inside the United States.

The INM has some 4,600 employees between migration agents, investigators, and mid- to high-level officials. And for many years, the number of employees has not risen to keep pace with the growing number of people passing through Mexico’s various ports of entry via land, sea, and air.

“In 2000, the country had 23 airports and now there are close to 100,” Romero admitted, adding, “The most worrying is that INM now has less employees that it did in 2000.”

One in five or six illegal immigrants make it through and remain in the United States, Processo reports.

“In the state of Tamaulipas, which is a very complicated situation, there are only 240 employees, and they are not enough to cover 11 international bridges, five airports, two sea ports, apart from migration stations,” Romero said.

Tamaulipas has long been the stronghold of Mexico’s Gulf Cartel, and a major trafficking point for any illegal product – human, drug, or otherwise – that flows into the US from Mexico.

Meanwhile, INM must document and receive all those Mexicans deported from the United States apart from preventing the passage of illegal immigrants through Mexico.

The organization’s Countryman Program oversees this process, and has two separate initiatives for children and minors who are deported from the United States, unaccompanied by adults.

Between January and May, 2008, some 300 thousand Mexican nationals were deported from the United States, nearly 2,000 a day, placing the 2008 tally at over a million.

When considering the complex situation of immigration inside the United States, and the current focus on deportation, the above facts should place a light on a larger reality: many of the people who are deported back to Mexico simply cannot be processed by the INM.

The trouble within Mexico’s INM is just one of the many reasons why a number of Mexican analysts consider the movement of people between Central America, Mexico and the United States to literally be like a human conveyor belt. Once deportees arrive, its likely they are shuffled through a haphazard layer of backed up paper work, resulting in a high probability of human error. And once repatriated, what’s to stop them from returning?

Until the INM receives better funding, reduces corruption, and increases the number of personnel required to cover the country’s various ports of entry, deportation as a tool for controlling illegal migration in Mexico or the United States is, at best, a mechanism that keeps the conveyor belt moving.

Mexico's Hydra

The Mexican state of Michoacan has long been a battle ground for opposing members of organized crime. Both the Gulf Cartel and Sinaloa Federation have fought over this important territory in the middle of Mexico, where cocaine supply from Colombia or precursor chemical supply from Asia can be received and quickly moved north.

One criminal group, however, has emerged as the true power in Michoacan. Since its inception, believed to be in 2004, it has grown from a small, clandestine entity to one of Mexico’s rising stars in the criminal underworld – a testimony to the nature of the hydra effect in organized crime. When one head is cut off, another quickly replaces it.

Known as La Familia Michoacana, or simply La Familia, this group was an unknown group of armed thugs in Michoacan, quietly going about its perverse form of social justice until late 2006, when Mexican daily, El Universal, interviewed one of the group’s spokesman, an individual who called himself “Most Crazy.”

Most Crazy revealed that La Familia had some 4,000 members working in various parts of Michoacan. Everyone received a salary of between $1,500 and $2,000 a month, and all were born in Michoacan. The group’s focus was to rid the state of “hielo” or ice as methamphetamine was called, take out any kidnappers, and extortionists, and protect the youth.

Its enemies were members of the Milenio Cartel, a second-tier drug smuggling organization tied to the Sinaloa Federation.

Most Crazy ended his interview stating that his group did not like to kill. But by the end of 2006, the state of Michoacan had registered some 520 executions, 17 of which were decapitations. By most accounts, this “reluctant” violence worked as La Familia is now considered the reigning criminal organization in the Michoacan area, with a strong grip on the state of Mexico and the Federal District.

Since the group’s public announcement, La Familia has inched its way up the ladder, moving from a second-tier local outfit to a more powerful group with an increased amount of financial backing and human resources across at least two states and in the capitol city.

La Familia reportedly pays millions in bribe money every month, and offers protection to various business owners in Michoacan, the state of Mexico, and the Federal District. The protection, however, mostly translates to extortion, where some business owners are taxed every week, others once a month.

Now, in August, the Mexican Attorney General’s office has made an announcement, revealing what many observers have known all along. La Familia intends to control the drug smuggling market in Michoacan and open a route all the way north, passing though the traditionally held lands of the Sinaloa Federation, where many claim El Chapo Guzman has been weakened by the Mexican government’s constant focus on dismantling his organization and his ongoing battles with Los Zetas and other rival groups.

What began as a small group of armed men on the prowl to protect their kids from hielo has turned into a first rate criminal outfit that often dresses in the uniforms of elite federal police, the AFI, and is just as well armed and organized as any top-tier drug smuggling organization in Mexico.

This group’s move to the top levels of Mexican organized crime, perhaps more than any other example, shows how dismantling one group normally leads to another taking its place.